Wells-Gorshen rule in California

1974Counsel at Trial 9 The Solano County Superior Court found that petitioner “had a crucial defense [diminished capacity] available which was not presented on his behalf.” The diminished capacity concept, commonly known as the Wells-Gorshen rule (see People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 731 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 452 P.2d 607 ]), was first fully recognized in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ], which was filed in 1949.

1974Counsel at Trial 9 The Solano County Superior Court found that petitioner “had a crucial defense [diminished capacity] available which was not presented on his behalf.” The diminished capacity concept, commonly known as the Wells-Gorshen rule (see People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 731 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 452 P.2d 607 ]), was first fully recognized in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ], which was filed in 1949.

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

2014Although Wells predated the enactment of section 28, its analysis established the distinction between actual formation of a mental state and capacity to form a mental state that is now found in section 28(a).14 “Whenever a particular mental state, such as a specific intent, is by statute made an essential element of a crime, that specific state must be proved like any other fact. [Citations.] Since, however, the mental capacity to commit the crime 14 Wells has been described as “[t]he first step in the development of the diminished capacity doctrine” (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d. at p.

2014Wells has been described as “[t]he first step in the development of the diminished capacity doctrine” (People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d. at p. 1109), and the diminished capacity defense was sometimes called the “ ‘Wells-Gorshen rule’ ” (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Defenses, § 26, p. 454; see People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]).

1974(People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ].) The jury was instructed on diminished capacity (Wells-Gorshen rule 3 ) and that it could not find the defendant guilty of murder of either degree if it found that his mental capacity was so diminished as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of malice aforethought. 4 Neither side requested and the trial court did not instruct sua sponte on “Conley manslaughter.” (People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 325, fn. 4 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Mosher, 1 Cal.3d 379 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 ,

1974(People v. Ireland, 70 Cal.2d 522 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 , 40 A.L.R.3d 1323 ].) The jury was instructed on diminished capacity (Wells-Gorshen rule 3 ) and that it could not find the defendant guilty of murder of either degree if it found that his mental capacity was so diminished as to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of malice aforethought. 4 Neither side requested and the trial court did not instruct sua sponte on “Conley manslaughter.” (People v. Conley, 64 Cal.2d 310, 325, fn. 4 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ]; People v. Mosher, 1 Cal.3d 379 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 379 ,

1980Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility [or ‘diminished capacity,’ per People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 P.2d 43 ]] even though a defendant be legally sane according to the M’Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree.

1980Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility [or ‘diminished capacity,’ per People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 P.2d 43 ]] even though a defendant be legally sane according to the M’Naughton test, if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree.

1972Sufficiency of Evidence to Support First Degree Murder Conviction (1a) Defendant contends that in view of proof of his diminished capacity the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder and that he should have been convicted of manslaughter or at most second degree murder. (2) "`It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability no

1972Sufficiency of Evidence to Support First Degree Murder Conviction (1a) Defendant contends that in view of proof of his diminished capacity the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder and that he should have been convicted of manslaughter or at most second degree murder. (2) "`It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability no

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1967This policy is now firmly established in the law of California (People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal.2d 716 [ 336 P.2d 492 ]; People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550, 569-571 [ 268 P.2d 705 ] . . . ; People v. Sanchez, 35 Cal.2d 522, 526-529 [ 219 P.2d 9 ] . . . ; People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ] ; People v. Harris, 29 Cal. 678, 683-684 ). ...” What was said with reference to premeditation in People v. Wolff, supra, 61 Cal.2d 795, 822 , is pertinent here: “Certainly in the case now at bench the defendant had ample time for any normal person to maturely and appreciatively reflect upon Ms contemplated

1968(People v. Anderson, supra, 63 Cal.2d 351, 358-360 .) [6] "It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation." (People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 54-55 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 416 P.2d 132 ]; see also People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 855-858

1968(People v. Anderson, supra, 63 Cal.2d 351, 358-360 .) [6] "It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation." (People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 54-55 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 416 P.2d 132 ]; see also People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 855-858

1968This policy is now firmly established in the law of California. [Citations.]” (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 490-491 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; accord, People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 316-319 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] ; People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364-366 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 F.2d 43 ].) We recognize that in the case at bar counsel may have been aware of the Wells-Gorshen doctrine in general terms, for it was apparently on this ground that he premised his defense to the charge of assault with intent to commit rape.

1968This policy is now firmly established in the law of California. [Citations.]” (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 490-491 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 77 , 386 P.2d 677 ]; accord, People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 316-319 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 815 , 411 P.2d 911 ] ; People v. Anderson (1965) 63 Cal.2d 351, 364-366 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 763 , 406 F.2d 43 ].) We recognize that in the case at bar counsel may have been aware of the Wells-Gorshen doctrine in general terms, for it was apparently on this ground that he premised his defense to the charge of assault with intent to commit rape.

1968(People v. Anderson, supra, 63 Cal.2d 351, 358-360 .) [6] "It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation." (People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 54-55 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 416 P.2d 132 ]; see also People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 855-858

1968(People v. Anderson, supra, 63 Cal.2d 351, 358-360 .) [6] "It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation." (People v. Ford, 65 Cal.2d 41, 54-55 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 228 , 416 P.2d 132 ]; see also People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal.2d 850, 855-858

1979“CALJIC No. 3.35 (Wells-Gorshen rule) on diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication is a proper instruction (see People v. Spaniel, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d 878, 886-887 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 202 ]) and is to be used instead of CALJIC No. 4.21.

1979“CALJIC No. 3.35 (Wells-Gorshen rule) on diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication is a proper instruction (see People v. Spaniel, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d 878, 886-887 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 202 ]) and is to be used instead of CALJIC No. 4.21.

1974(See People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Williams, 200 Cal.App.2d 838, 841-842 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; 14 Stan.L.Rev. 59, 73-74.) Since peititioner’s trial ended in 1947 his counsel at trial manifestly cannot be regarded as constitutionally inadequate for any failure to anticipate the rule subsequently established in Wells .

1974(See People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Williams, 200 Cal.App.2d 838, 841-842 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; 14 Stan.L.Rev. 59, 73-74.) Since peititioner’s trial ended in 1947 his counsel at trial manifestly cannot be regarded as constitutionally inadequate for any failure to anticipate the rule subsequently established in Wells .

1973We delineate the applicable principles of law: “ ‘ “It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 726-727 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ], cert. den., 410 U.S. 947 [ 35

1973We delineate the applicable principles of law: “ ‘ “It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability not amounting to legal insanity that prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation.” ’ [Citations.]” (People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 726-727 [ 102 Cal.Rptr. 385 , 497 P.2d 1121 ], cert. den., 410 U.S. 947 [ 35

1974Counsel at Trial 9 The Solano County Superior Court found that petitioner “had a crucial defense [diminished capacity] available which was not presented on his behalf.” The diminished capacity concept, commonly known as the Wells-Gorshen rule (see People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 731 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 452 P.2d 607 ]), was first fully recognized in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ], which was filed in 1949.

1974Counsel at Trial 9 The Solano County Superior Court found that petitioner “had a crucial defense [diminished capacity] available which was not presented on his behalf.” The diminished capacity concept, commonly known as the Wells-Gorshen rule (see People v. Morse, 70 Cal.2d 711, 731 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 391 , 452 P.2d 607 ]), was first fully recognized in People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [ 202 P.2d 53 ], which was filed in 1949.

1974(See People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Williams, 200 Cal.App.2d 838, 841-842 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; 14 Stan.L.Rev. 59, 73-74.) Since peititioner’s trial ended in 1947 his counsel at trial manifestly cannot be regarded as constitutionally inadequate for any failure to anticipate the rule subsequently established in Wells .

1974(See People v. Hoxie, 252 Cal.App.2d 901, 911 [ 61 Cal.Rptr. 37 ]; People v. Williams, 200 Cal.App.2d 838, 841-842 [ 19 Cal.Rptr. 743 ]; 14 Stan.L.Rev. 59, 73-74.) Since peititioner’s trial ended in 1947 his counsel at trial manifestly cannot be regarded as constitutionally inadequate for any failure to anticipate the rule subsequently established in Wells .

1972Sufficiency of Evidence to Support First Degree Murder Conviction (1a) Defendant contends that in view of proof of his diminished capacity the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder and that he should have been convicted of manslaughter or at most second degree murder. (2) "`It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability no

1972Sufficiency of Evidence to Support First Degree Murder Conviction (1a) Defendant contends that in view of proof of his diminished capacity the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder and that he should have been convicted of manslaughter or at most second degree murder. (2) "`It has long been settled under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity that in cases other than those where a felony murder is charged, a defendant cannot be convicted of murder of the first degree if, at the time of the alleged offense, he was operating under a mental disability no

1970(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) The Question of Invited Error As defendant’s point on the omission of unconsciousness instructions is thus valid on its merits, the question is whether he is precluded from as- *379 setting it on appeal because his original request for such instructions was “withdrawn.” He contends in effect that he withdrew his request for CALJIC 71-C and 71-D only because the trial court forced him to choose between them and a Wells-Gorshen instruction on dimished capacity.

1970(See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ].) The Question of Invited Error As defendant’s point on the omission of unconsciousness instructions is thus valid on its merits, the question is whether he is precluded from as- *379 setting it on appeal because his original request for such instructions was “withdrawn.” He contends in effect that he withdrew his request for CALJIC 71-C and 71-D only because the trial court forced him to choose between them and a Wells-Gorshen instruction on dimished capacity.