factual sufficiency challenge in Texas

2026In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge to a finding for which the appellee had the burden of proof, we “set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (citations omitted); Royce Homes, L.P. v. Humphrey, 244 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied).

2026A factual sufficiency challenge, on the other hand, requires us to examine the entire record to determine if the findings are “so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that they are clearly wrong and unjust.” Id. (quoting Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam)).

2025This is because factual sufficiency was done viewing the evidence in a “neutral” light, which was in conflict with, and yielded to, deference to the role of the fact-finder: “the required deference to jury determinations of weight and credibility” required the “‘eliminat[ion of] . . . viewing the evidence in a ‘neutral light’ component of a factual-sufficiency standard,’ rendering it ‘indistinguishable’ from the legal-sufficiency standard.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 ).

2025This is because factual sufficiency was done viewing the evidence in a “neutral” light, which was in conflict with, and yielded to, deference to the role of the fact-finder: “the required deference to jury determinations of weight and credibility” required the “‘eliminat[ion of] . . . viewing the evidence in a ‘neutral light’ component of a factual-sufficiency standard,’ rendering it ‘indistinguishable’ from the legal-sufficiency standard.” Id. (quoting Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 ).

2025App. P. 38.1(i) (requiring an appellant’s brief to accompany argument “with appropriate citations to authorities”), but the only sufficiency-related case law that Howard cites is that for the standard of review—which, we might add, Howard largely misstates.3 See Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 35; Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 3 Howard recites the factual sufficiency standard of review, relying on Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim.

2025App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all 5 Appellate counsel recites the factual sufficiency standard of review, relying on Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 , 135–36 (Tex. Crim.

2025Under the factual sufficiency standard, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (“A standard that focuses on whether a reasonable jury could form a firm conviction or belief retains the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.”).

2024Under the factual sufficiency standard, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (“A standard that focuses on whether a reasonable jury could form a firm conviction or belief retains the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.”).

2015See also Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8 (also recognizing that if " a reviewing court was to accord absolute deference to the fact finder's determinations, then a factual sufficiency determination would, no doubt, become the functional equivalent of a legal sufficiency review" ). [19] This may be illustrated by considering the following formulation of the factual-sufficiency standard that Watson approved: " Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415 .

2015See also Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8 (also recognizing that if “a reviewing court was to accord absolute deference to the fact finder's determinations, then a factual sufficiency determination would, no doubt, become the functional equivalent of a legal sufficiency review”). 19 This may be illustrated by considering the following formulation of the factual-sufficiency standard that Watson approved: “Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415.

2012See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635 (noting that the appellate court reviews a factual sufficiency challenge based on the evidence 12 B.

2012See Pool , 715 S.W.2d at 635 (noting that the appellate court reviews a factual sufficiency challenge based on the evidence in the record); see also K-Mart No. 4195 v. Judge , 515 S.W.2d 148, 155 (Tex. Civ.

2020From the context of the order, it is clear the trial court was referring to section 42.072, the stalking provision. 8 Under a factual sufficiency standard, we examine all of the record evidence and set aside the trial court’s order only if it is “so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996).

2019Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 , 827–28 (Tex. 2005) (describing the legal sufficiency standard of review); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (describing the factual sufficiency standard of review).

2020See Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899 , 901–02 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 1994, no writ) (explaining that a complaint that the jury’s finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is a factual sufficiency challenge); see also Spinks v. Brown, 04-08-00877-CV, 2010 WL 381041 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 3, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (construing the appellant’s argument that the jury finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence (citing Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 , 406–07 (T

2019See Kratz v. Exxon Corp., 890 S.W.2d 899 , 901–02 (Tex. App.—El Paso, 1994, no writ) (explaining that a complaint that the jury’s finding is against the overwhelming weight of the evidence is a factual sufficiency challenge); see also Spinks v. Brown, 04-08-00877-CV, 2010 WL 381041 , at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 3, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (construing the appellant’s argument that the jury finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence (citing Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 , 406–07 (T

2019Co., 619 S.W.2d 400 , 401–02 (Tex. 1981) (per curiam) (providing that when both factual and legal sufficiency challenges are raised in a court of appeals, the court should first resolve the legal sufficiency challenge, and the factual sufficiency challenge often may not be addressed until after this Court has decided legal sufficiency and remanded to the court of appeals to decide factual sufficiency); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam) (explaining that appellate courts must weigh all the evidence in conducting factual sufficiency review, regardless of whether th

2017“In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence in a civil case in which the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, an appellate court weighs [all] the evidence to determine whether a verdict that is supported by legally sufficient evidence nevertheless reflects a risk of injustice that would compel ordering a new trial.” Day, 342 S.W.3d at 213 (applying the factual sufficiency standard established by In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 662 (1951)).

2024Analysis In her sole issue, English urges us to conduct a factual-sufficiency review of her sentence, citing two past-their-shelf-life cases that used the factual-sufficiency standard of review formerly applicable to convictions: Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 405 (Tex. Crim.

2015See also Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 8 (also recognizing that if " a reviewing court was to accord absolute deference to the fact finder's determinations, then a factual sufficiency determination would, no doubt, become the functional equivalent of a legal sufficiency review" ). [19] This may be illustrated by considering the following formulation of the factual-sufficiency standard that Watson approved: " Considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, was a jury rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415 .

2015Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); see Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989).

2015See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986); see Plas–Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex.1989).

2007In Watson , the court disavowed the factual sufficiency standard of review articulated in Zuniga v. State , 144 S.W.3d 477 (Tex. Crim.

2006The factual-sufficiency standard “acknowledges that evidence of guilt can ‘preponderate’ in favor of conviction but still be insufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 485 (Tex.Crim.App.2004).

2018When considering a factual sufficiency challenge of a finding on which the appellant did not bear the burden of proof, we first examine all of the evidence, Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986), and, having considered and weighed all of the evidence, set aside the verdict only if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.

2012Dist. v. Olivares , 917 S.W.2d 494, 499 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no pet.) (“In reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, . . . this Court considers and weighs all the evidence presented at trial .”) (emphasis added) (citing Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. , 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986)).

2009In *50 examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we view all evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict “‘only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.’ ” Cain v. State, 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (quoting Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1996)).

2008In examining a factual-sufficiency challenge, we view all evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict A > only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. = @ Cain v. State , 958 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. Crim.

2009In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we “must give due deference to the fact finder’s determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence.... ” Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2009In examining a factual sufficiency challenge, we "must give due deference to the fact finder's determinations concerning the weight and credibility of the evidence...." *508 Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

2024In considering a factual sufficiency challenge under a clear and convincing standard, “we ‘must give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing.’” Galvan v. Vera, No. 04-18-00309-CV, 2018 WL 4096383 , at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 29, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ).

2022In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (citing In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 ). 4 We must determine 4 C.M. presents his factual insufficiency argument relying on a traditional factual sufficiency standard which the Supreme Court determined was inadequate to afford the protections inherent in the clear and convincing standard of proof.

1994In a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support jury findings, we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence under the standard set out in Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965), and the factual sufficiency under the standard set out in In re King’s Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660, 661-62 (1951).

1990See Garza v. Alviar, supra. In a factual sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence including that which is contrary to the verdict.

2018Even so, Roberson invites this Court to conduct such a review, claiming that “[t]reating civil and criminal litigants differently for purposes of access to factual sufficiency review violates the Factual Conclusivity, Equal Protection, Due Process[,] and Open Court provisions of the Texas Constitution.” In Brooks, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the legal-sufficiency standard is “‘indistinguishable’ from a factual-sufficiency standard” because “the jury is ‘the sole judge of a witness’s credibility, and the weight to be given their testimony.’” Id. at 901–02 (quoting Lancon

2009See generally, Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705 ; see also Tyrone v. State, No. 04-97-00073-CR, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 1283 , at *3-6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio Feb. 27, 1998, pet. ref’d) (not designated for publication) (overruling a factual sufficiency challenge where the appellant complained about the inadequacy of the police investigation).

2024Standard of Review Morrison challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of her conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon of a household member, but “[t]his [c]ourt reviews sufficiency-of- the-evidence challenges applying the same standard of review, regardless of whether an appellant presents the challenge as a legal or a factual sufficiency challenge.” Shah v. State, 414 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (citing Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49 , 53–54 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim.

2018THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee On Appeal from the 405th District Court Galveston County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 14CR2726 CONCURRING OPINION I concur in the judgment of the Court and write separately to explain why, although this Court has a duty to address the factual-sufficiency challenge of appellant, Edwin Eugene Vernon, Jr., in accord with the Factual-Conclusivity Clause of the Texas Constitution,1 I agree that we must, at this time, overrule his challenge in light of this Court’s precedent in Ervin v. State, 331 S.W.3d 49 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).2 In his sixth

2009Santellan v. State , 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim.

2009Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164 (Tex. Crim.

2005Under the factual sufficiency standard, we ask “whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.” King v. State, 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) Appellant contends that his refusal to place his right hand behind his back was not a voluntary act, but was, instead, an omission to act for which he could not be held criminally liable absent a showing t

2004Under the factual sufficiency standard, we ask “whether a neutral review of all the evidence, both for and against the finding, demonstrates that the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury’s determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof.” King v. State , 29 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim.

2019STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged.1 In our due-process evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 This standard of review also applies to the rejection of a defendant’s self-defense claim.3 Although Appellant argues in terms of legal sufficiency, the law is well established that there is no meaningful distinction between t

2019STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged.1 In our due-process evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 This standard of review also applies to the rejection of a defendant’s self-defense claim.3 Although Appellant argues in terms of legal sufficiency, the law is well established that there is no meaningful distinction between t

2025In reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge to a jury finding on an issue on which the appellant had the burden of proof, the appellant must show that “the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 242 .

2023Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001). 6 When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we “must consider and weigh all of the evidence,” not just the evidence that supports the trial court’s finding.

2010In examining a factual-sufficiency challenge, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict *666 only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict “seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust” or (2) the verdict is “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” See Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (quoting Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-15 (Tex.Crim.App.2006)).

2010In examining a factual-sufficiency challenge, we review all the evidence in a neutral light and set aside the verdict only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict “seems clearly wrong or manifestly unjust” or (2) the verdict is “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.” See Marshall v. State , 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim.

2006See Zuniga v. State , 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see also Zuliani v. State , 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (specifically outlining the factual sufficiency standard concerning jury’s rejection of self-defense).

2006See Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 484 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); see also Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (specifically outlining the factual sufficiency standard concerning jury’s rejection of self-defense). 2.

2025When reviewing a factual sufficiency challenge, we are mindful that it is the factfinder’s province to determine “the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given 9 to their testimony.” Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).

2007A. Standard of Review The Texas Supreme Court recently set out the factual sufficiency standard of review as follows: In reviewing termination findings for factual sufficiency, a court of appeals must give due deference to a jury's factfindings, In re C.H ., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002), and should not supplant the jury's judgment with its own, Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson , 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003).

2025Under the factual sufficiency standard, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (“A standard that focuses on whether a reasonable jury could form a firm conviction or belief retains the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.”).

2024Under the factual sufficiency standard, we defer to the trier of fact’s determinations on the credibility of the witnesses “so long as those determinations are not themselves unreasonable.” In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); see In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 26 (“A standard that focuses on whether a reasonable jury could form a firm conviction or belief retains the deference an appellate court must have for the factfinder’s role.”).

2023App. 2013) (stating civil standards of factual-sufficiency review apply to issues for which burden of proof is that of “preponderance of the evidence,” because “preponderance of the evidence” is “same burden as in civil proceedings”); see also Rankin, 617 S.W.3d at 185–86 (“In reviewing an issue on which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, we apply the factual-sufficiency standard in Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 , 154–55 (Tex. Crim.

2021Standard of review In reviewing an issue on which the defendant has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, we apply the factual sufficiency standard in Meraz 11 v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 , 154–55 (Tex. Crim.

2025Id. at 953 . “[A]n appellate court may sustain a defendant’s factual-sufficiency claim only if, after setting out the relevant evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience- 7 shocking, or clearly biased.” Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim.

2025Under that standard, a reviewing “court may sustain a defendant’s factual-sufficiency claim only if, after setting out the relevant evidence and explaining precisely how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the verdict, the court clearly states why the verdict is so much against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, conscience-shocking, or clearly biased.” Id.