flight instruction in California

2023As our Supreme Court has reaffirmed in several cases, “a flight instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.’ ” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 (Bradford); see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522 (Abilez); People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328 (Bonilla); Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 285 .) Flight need not entail the “ ‘ “physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven” ’ ” (Bradford, at p. 1055) but only “

2023(Ibid., citing People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1152 [explaining that the flight instruction, as given, “adequately conveyed the concept that if flight was found, the jury was permitted to consider alternative explanations for that flight other than [the] defendant’s consciousness of guilt”]; see also Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1055 [same].) The instruction in this case (CALCRIM No. 372), like the substantially similar instructions in Navarette and its predecessors on this issue, properly allowed the jury to consider whether there was proof of flight, and if so, whether that fl

2025(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313 , 328–329 [flight instruction proper where jury even if there were innocent explanation for conduct so long as guilt was a reasonable inference].)7 And assuming that a flight instruction had been erroneously given, any error would have been harmless under the standard of harmless error articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818—that is, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Jimenez would have been reached by the jury.

2025(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313 , 328–329 [flight instruction proper where jury even if there were innocent explanation for conduct so long as guilt was a reasonable inference].)7 And assuming that a flight instruction had been erroneously given, any error would have been harmless under the standard of harmless error articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818—that is, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Jimenez would have been reached by the jury.

2025(People v. Clem (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 337 , 344–345 [applying Watson standard to erroneous instruction on flight].) The flight instruction “did not posit the existence of flight; both the existence and significance of flight were left to the jury.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 870 , abrogated on a different ground as stated in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346 , 364–365; see also CALCRIM No. 372.) The jury was instructed that flight “may show” that a defendant is aware of his guilt, but that it was up to the jury to decide the meaning and importance of any alleged flight and

2025(People v. Clem (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 337 , 344–345 [applying Watson standard to erroneous instruction on flight].) The flight instruction “did not posit the existence of flight; both the existence and significance of flight were left to the jury.” (People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 870 , abrogated on a different ground as stated in People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346 , 364–365; see also CALCRIM No. 372.) The jury was instructed that flight “may show” that a defendant is aware of his guilt, but that it was up to the jury to decide the meaning and importance of any alleged flight and

2021However, evidence that the defendant fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.” Generally giving the flight instruction erroneously is considered harmless because “the instruction [does] not assume that flight was established, leaving that factual determination and its significance to the jury.” (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 61 .) Here, the court also told the jury that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply” and “[d]o not assume just because I give you a particular instruction that I’m suggesting anything about the facts.” Appellants have not suggested why we should

2016Analysis Even if we were to agree that instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 372 under the circumstances of this case was error, as the California Supreme Court has repeatedly held, the giving of the instruction would be harmless as the "instruction did not assume that flight was established, leaving that factual determination and its significance to the jury." (People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 61 ; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182-1183 .) The flight instruction does not create an unconstitutional permissive inference or lessen the prosecutor's burden of proof, and is p

2025(See People v. Quiroz (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 65, 76 .) According to Reed, the only evidence supporting the flight instruction was the “mere fact” that he “did not remain at the scene.” He claims the police chase “months after the incident” did not support the giving of the flight instruction because it “may have reflected consciousness of guilt of possessing drugs” that day, “but not consciousness of guilt regarding the incident occurring a year earlier.” Contrary to Reed’s suggestion, “the instruction neither requires knowledge on a defendant’s part that criminal charges have been filed, nor

2025The instruction “did not assume that flight was established, but instead permitted the jury to make that factual determination and to decide what weight to accord it.” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182-1183 ; accord, People v. Richardson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1020 [“the instruction applied only 14 if the jurors found flight had been shown; if they did not so find here, they would have disregarded the flight instruction as they were also instructed”].) Further, the instruction clarified that evidence that he fled or tried to flee cannot prove guilt by itself.

2025(People v. Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 502; see People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 695 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 .) To begin with, the language of the jury instructions themselves minimized any prejudicial impact from the flight instruction.

2023As our Supreme Court has reaffirmed in several cases, “a flight instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.’ ” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 (Bradford); see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522 (Abilez); People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328 (Bonilla); Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 285 .) Flight need not entail the “ ‘ “physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven” ’ ” (Bradford, at p. 1055) but only “

2020(People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199 .) The reasoning was that flight “is a factor tending to connect an accused with the commission 13 of an offense.” (People v. Moore (1963) 211 Cal.App.2d 585, 600 .) However, a flight instruction which assumes “‘neither the guilt nor the flight of the defendant’” is not erroneous.

2020In Rhodes, this court observed, “a flight instruction is appropriate where there is substantial evidence of flight by the defendant apart from his identification as the perpetrator, from which the jury could reasonably infer a consciousness of guilt. [Citations.] Thus, for example, where there is independent evidence of flight as to which defendant’s identity as the fleer is not in dispute, [a flight instruction] is proper.” (Id. at p. 1476.) The court made this observation in the context of examining People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189 (Anjell), disapproved of by People v. Mason (1991)

2025(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73 .) But section 1127c requires a trial court to give a flight instruction “where evidence of flight . . . is relied upon as tending to show guilt” as follows: “The flight of a person immediately after the commission of the crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence.” “CALCRIM No. 372 is merely a distillation of the instructional duty imposed . . . by . . . section 1127c.” (People v. Pettigrew

2025(People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 73 .) But section 1127c requires a trial court to give a flight instruction “where evidence of flight . . . is relied upon as tending to show guilt” as follows: “The flight of a person immediately after the commission of the crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or innocence.” “CALCRIM No. 372 is merely a distillation of the instructional duty imposed . . . by . . . section 1127c.” (People v. Pettigrew

2025The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury on Flight “The giving of [a flight] instruction is statutorily required when flight evidence is relied upon by the prosecution.” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 23 Cal.4th 1000 , 1020, citing § 1127c.)5 “ ‘In general, a flight instruction “is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.” [Citations.] “ ‘[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly do

2025Lang argues that the instruction affected his substantial rights, and his failure to object therefore does not forfeit the claim on appeal. (§ 1259; People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 285 ; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691, fn. 12 .) When the prosecution introduces evidence that a defendant fled, “ ‘and if such evidence is relied on as tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522 .) Specifically, “ ‘[a] flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime s

2025The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury on Flight “The giving of [a flight] instruction is statutorily required when flight evidence is relied upon by the prosecution.” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 23 Cal.4th 1000 , 1020, citing § 1127c.)5 “ ‘In general, a flight instruction “is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.” [Citations.] “ ‘[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly do

2025Although this evidence may also be compatible with the inference that Berger’s presence at the hotel room was only to sell drugs, “[t]he evidentiary basis for the flight instruction requires sufficient, not uncontradicted, evidence.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1020 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 509 ; see also People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477 [“Alternative explanations for flight conduct go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide”].) Finally, we conc

2024J. “[T]he instruction [does not] require[] . . . a defined temporal period within which the flight must be commenced . . . .” (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182 (Carter); see ibid. [flight instruction proper where “the evidence introduced by the prosecution establish[ed] that defendant left California in the days immediately following the charged offenses”].) In People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909 (Mason), we noted that our cases concerning the sufficiency of evidence to support the giving of a flight instruction do not “create inflexible rules about the required proximity between

2023(People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 943 (Mason); People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522 .) “ ‘A flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime scene . . . logically permits an inference that his movement was motivated by guilty knowledge.’ ” (Abilez, at p. 522; see also People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328 .) Evidence that a defendant left the scene is not alone sufficient; instead, the circumstances of departure must suggest ‘a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.’ [Citations.] To obtain the instructi

2025Lang argues that the instruction affected his substantial rights, and his failure to object therefore does not forfeit the claim on appeal. (§ 1259; People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 285 ; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691, fn. 12 .) When the prosecution introduces evidence that a defendant fled, “ ‘and if such evidence is relied on as tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522 .) Specifically, “ ‘[a] flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime s

2024The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (§ 1127c.) “CALCRIM No. 372 is merely a distillation of the instructional duty imposed . . . by . . . section 1172c.” (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477 , 499.) Our Supreme Court has interpreted section 1127c as mandating a rule that when the prosecution introduces evidence the defendant fled, “ ‘and if such evidence is relied on as tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522 .) Specifically, “ ‘[a] flight instruction is prope

2025(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313 , 328–329 [flight instruction proper where jury even if there were innocent explanation for conduct so long as guilt was a reasonable inference].)7 And assuming that a flight instruction had been erroneously given, any error would have been harmless under the standard of harmless error articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818—that is, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Jimenez would have been reached by the jury.

2025(People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313 , 328–329 [flight instruction proper where jury even if there were innocent explanation for conduct so long as guilt was a reasonable inference].)7 And assuming that a flight instruction had been erroneously given, any error would have been harmless under the standard of harmless error articulated in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818—that is, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Jimenez would have been reached by the jury.

2023Instead, as discussed ante, the evidence at trial provided sufficient support for the prosecution to argue that Ruiz fled the scene because he “knew he had done something wrong” and to warrant the flight instruction. (§ 1127c.) There was no due process violation because “ ‘the suggested conclusion [wa]s [] one that reason and common sense justif[ied] in light of the proven facts before the jury.’ ” (Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 180 .) Even assuming Ruiz’s arguments are founded on valid considerations regarding the impacts of racially disparate policing on inferences arising from a defendan

2022(People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 389 ; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 689 .) We accord “great defense to counsel’s tactical choices.” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181 , 198.) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 .) “ ‘A flight instruction is

2025Although the evidence may also be compatible with the inference that appellant left to avoid police harassment, “[t]he evidentiary basis for the flight instruction requires sufficient, not uncontradicted, evidence.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1020 .) A phone call indicating appellant would voluntarily surrender if charged does not nullify all the evidence of flight.

2025Although this evidence may also be compatible with the inference that Berger’s presence at the hotel room was only to sell drugs, “[t]he evidentiary basis for the flight instruction requires sufficient, not uncontradicted, evidence.” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1020 , superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 509 ; see also People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477 [“Alternative explanations for flight conduct go to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, not the court, to decide”].) Finally, we conc

2020“Flight requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven.” (People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 391 .) Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested. “ ‘In general, a flight instruction “is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.” ’ [Citations.] Evidence that a defendant left the scene is not alone sufficient; instead, the circumstances of departure must suggest ‘a purpose to avoid being obse

2014The prosecution is not required to “prove the defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest, only that a jury could find the defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt from the evidence.” (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328 .) “Flight requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven.” (People v. Cannady (1972) 8 Cal.3d 379, 391 [approving use of flight instruction in circumstances also consistent with defendants intending to report incident to prison guards].) The court correctly provided a flight instruction, and

2025(Carroll v. Commission on Teacher Credentialing (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 365 , 382–383.) “ ‘[T]he instruction merely permitted the jury to consider evidence of flight in deciding defendant’s guilt or innocence; it did not suggest that the jury should consider such evidence as dispositive.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 522 .) 13 Campos has not demonstrated that without the flight instruction, it was reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict.

2025Lang argues that the instruction affected his substantial rights, and his failure to object therefore does not forfeit the claim on appeal. (§ 1259; People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 285 ; People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691, fn. 12 .) When the prosecution introduces evidence that a defendant fled, “ ‘and if such evidence is relied on as tending to show guilt, then a flight instruction is proper.’ ” (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 521-522 .) Specifically, “ ‘[a] flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the circumstances of [a] defendant’s departure from the crime s

2025Analysis A flight instruction “is statutorily required when flight evidence is relied upon by the prosecution.” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1020 (Howard); Pen.

2025A flight instruction “is statutorily required when flight evidence is relied upon by the prosecution.” (People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1020 ; see also § 1127c.) “ ‘ “In general, a flight instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.” ’ ” ’ ” (

2024(People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691 ; see also People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1223-1224 , abrogated in part on another point as stated in 11 McGee v. Kirkland (C.D.Cal. 2009) 726 F.Supp.2d 1073, 1080 .) Rather, we review this type of error for prejudice under the state-law standard, asking whether it was “reasonably probable [the defendant] would have fared any better had the trial court not given the flight instruction.” (People v. Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 502; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) Even if the court erred in providing the flight instru

2023(People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 , 1223–1224.) Rather, we review this type of error for prejudice under the state-law standard, asking whether it was “reasonably probable [the defendant] would have fared any better had the trial court not given the flight instruction.” (Pettigrew, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 502; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) We agree with the Attorney General that any potential prejudice from the purported error was minimized because of other aspects of the jury instructions.

2016(People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710 .) Appellant relies on People v. Martinez (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1204 (Martinez) and People v. Parrish (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 942 (Parrish) as establishing a flight instruction should not have been given under the circumstances of his trial.

2016(See, e.g., People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1226 ; People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 695 .) The California Supreme Court repeatedly has rejected claims the standard flight instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference or lessens the prosecution’s burden of proof.10 (E.g., People v. Cage, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 286 ; People v. Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 691 ; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 710 ; People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792 .) Although these cases considered the version of the instruction contained in CALJIC No. 2.52, we have reached th

1991The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52 (4th ed. 1979).) 7 In arguing that the trial court erred in giving this instruction, defendant relies on a line of cases stating that the flight instruction should not be given when “identity is a contested issue.” (People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 499, 511 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 889 ]; People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 242 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 569 ]; People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 821 [

1991The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.” (CALJIC No. 2.52 (4th ed. 1979).) 7 In arguing that the trial court erred in giving this instruction, defendant relies on a line of cases stating that the flight instruction should not be given when “identity is a contested issue.” (People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 199 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 669 ]; see also People v. Jackson (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 499, 511 [ 231 Cal.Rptr. 889 ]; People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 242 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 569 ]; People v. Moringlane (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 811, 821 [

2024(Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 30 ; Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 456 .) The jury in this case was given the same essential instructions (see, e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 200 & 220), and we likewise we see no reasonable possibility that it would have interpreted and applied the flight instruction in the way Bucaro suggests on appeal.

2023(See People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 120 [“the giving of an instruction on flight in language which varies slightly from that of section 1127c is not error”]; Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 31 [we do not view one part of an 5. instruction in isolation from another part]; see also People v. Han (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 797, 808 [holding that the standard flight instruction in CALCRIM No. 372’s predecessor, CALJIC No. 2.52, accomplished its purpose “to protect the defendant from the jury’s simply assuming guilt from flight”].) We turn next to defendant’s unconstitutionality argument,

2016As our high court has explained, where “certain types of deceptive or evasive behavior on a defendant’s part could indicate consciousness of guilt . . . [t]he cautionary nature of [consciousness- of-guilt] instructions benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1224 , italics added; see also People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 438-439 [defendant benefitted from the cautionary nature of the flight instruction].) Without the flight instruction, the jury

2015(See People v. Boyette 21 (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381 , 438–439 [“ ‘The cautionary nature of [a flight instruction and other challenged instructions] benefits the defense, admonishing the jury to circumspection regarding evidence that might otherwise be considered decisively inculpatory’ ”].) Finally, we note that, apart from the flight instruction itself, the court specifically instructed the jurors to disregard any instructions that did not apply in light of their factual findings.

2017(See Hernández Ríos, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 .) As Hernández Ríos *456 explained, the California Supreme Court has in essence rejected that argument, albeit in the context of the parallel CALJIC instruction: “On whether a flight instruction permitting a jury to infer ‘awareness of guilt’ is constitutional, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of an analogous challenge to CALJIC No. 2.52 is instructive.

2016(People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691 ; People v. Rios (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159 .) Accordingly, the erroneous giving of a flight instruction is a state law error, and is reviewed pursuant to the standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 , i.e., whether the record leads us to conclude it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have occurred in the absence of error.

2025(CALCRIM No. 372.) Jimenez argues that we must apply the more stringent harmless-beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard for federal constitutional error described in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 to our review of instructional error here, reasoning that the 7 The cases cited by Jimenez on appeal are of no assistance to him.

2016He acknowledges that he did not object to the flight instruction in the trial court but claims the error is nevertheless cognizable on appeal because the instruction affected his substantial rights. (§ 1259; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 534 [even in the 24. absence of an objection, section 1259 permits an appellate court to review instructional error that affects substantial rights].) He contends the error was prejudicial under either the federal standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [the reviewing court must state that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable d

2022(People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 628 .) “In general, a flight instruction ‘is proper where the evidence shows that the defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting that his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt.’ [Citations.] ‘ “[F]light requires neither the physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. [Citation.] Flight manifestly does require, however, a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested.” ’ ” (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055 .) Here, contrary to Campos’s assertion, there was sufficient evidence from which the

2016(People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 628 .) Here, the trial court correctly determined there was sufficient evidence to support giving the flight instruction.