31 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1933–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McCown v. GRAY KENTUCKY TELEVISION, INC.green2 sentences2025See, e.g., McCown v. Gray Kentucky Television, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Ky. App. 2008) (upholding directed verdict on KRS 336.700 wrongful termination claim where the plaintiff “failed to correctly identify any right clearly granted by statute or constitution which would be waived” by signing the employment release); see also KRS 446.070 (providing in relevant part that “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation[.]”). 2025See, e.g., McCown v. Gray Kentucky Television, Inc., 295 S.W.3d 116, 119 (Ky. App. 2008) (upholding directed verdict on KRS 336.700 wrongful termination claim where the plaintiff “failed to correctly identify any right clearly granted by statute or constitution which would be waived” by signing the employment release); see also KRS 446.070 (providing in relevant part that “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation[.]”). | 2 | 2 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Reedergreen2 sentences2000Co. v. Reeder, supra. Since the UCSPA does not specifically create a cause of action for damages for violation of its provisions, 3 the holding in Reeder was premised solely upon the provisions of KRS 446.070, Reeder, supra, at 117-18 , which provides as follows: A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation. 2000Co. v. Reeder, supra. Since the UCSPA does not specifically create a cause of action for damages for violation of its provisions, 3 the holding in Reeder was premised solely upon the provisions of KRS 446.070, Reeder, supra, at 117-18 , which provides as follows: A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation. | 1 | 3 |
Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences2015ANALYSIS: FRONT PAY, KRS 2168.165(3), AND KRS 446.070 In the parlance of wrongful termination of employment litigation, "front pay" is "money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement." Pollard v. E.I. du Pont 2 de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 (2001). 2014ANALYSIS: FRONT PAY, KRS 216B.165(3), AND KRS 446.070 In the parlance of wrongful termination of employment litigation, “front pay” is “money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.” Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 846 , 121 S.Ct. 1946 , 150 L.Ed.2d 62 (2001). | 1 | 2 |
Grzyb v. Evansgreen2 sentences2005It is also recognized in section 466, Ky. St.: `A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.'"). [8] 100 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Ky.2003). [9] Id. at 763 (citing Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949)). [10] Id. [11] See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky.1985) ("Under KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. 2005See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky.1985) ("Under KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. | 1 | 2 |
Hickey v. Gen. Elec. Co.green1 sentence2026We agree. “[A]n action for damages under KRS 446.070 for violation of a statutory right is subject to the five-year statute of limitations in KRS 413.120(2).” Hickey v. General Electric Company, 539 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Ky. 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Hargis v. Baizegreen1 sentence2024Hargis v. Baize, 168 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Ky. 2005). -19- The negligence per se claim fails as a matter of law as Xhale’s failure to ensure Sims’ licensure would not have prevented an unwanted touching. | 1 | 1 |
City of Louisville v. O'Neillgreen1 sentence2023(Emphases ours.) As we explained in City of Louisville v. O’Neill, the purposes of KRS 411.110 are: to give the city an opportunity to investigate the scene of an accident and correct any defective condition, if such exists, to enable the city to investigate and evaluate the case so that if liability exists it might have an opportunity to settle it without long and expensive litigation, and to give the city an opportunity to protect its funds against unjust and illegal claims. 440 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Ky. 1969). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Carrangreen1 sentence2019As noted above, that statute provides, “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” KRS 446.070 codifies the doctrine of negligence per se and allows an injured party to recover “for a violation of a statutory standard of care if the statute in question provides no inclusive civil remedy and if the party is within the class of persons the statute is intended to protect.” Young v. Carran, 289 S.W.3d 586, 589 (Ky. App. 2008). | 1 | 1 |
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompsongreen1 sentence2012See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Ky.2000) (describing the relevancy of expert testimony to a particular fact in issue as one of “fit”). | 1 | 1 |
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Rekergreen2 sentences2005It is also recognized in section 466, Ky. St.: `A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.'"). [8] 100 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Ky.2003). [9] Id. at 763 (citing Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949)). [10] Id. [11] See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky.1985) ("Under KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. 2005It is also recognized in section 466, Ky. St.: 'A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.” ')• . 100 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Ky.2003). . | 1 | 1 |
Butcher v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2005It is also recognized in section 466, Ky. St.: `A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.'"). [8] 100 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Ky.2003). [9] Id. at 763 (citing Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949)). [10] Id. [11] See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky.1985) ("Under KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. 2005It is also recognized in section 466, Ky. St.: `A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.'"). [8] 100 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Ky.2003). [9] Id. at 763 (citing Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949)). [10] Id. [11] See Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ky.1985) ("Under KRS 446.070, a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. | 1 | 1 |
ATHERTON CONDO APARTMENT-OWNERS ASS'N BD OF DIRECTORS v. Blume Dev. Co.green2 sentences1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 | 1 | 1 |
Hackney v. Fordson Coal Companygreen2 sentences1992Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky. 362 , 19 S.W.2d 989, 990 (1929). 1992Hackney v. Fordson Coal Co., 230 Ky. 362 , 19 S.W.2d 989, 990 (1929). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. City of Louisvillegreen1 sentence1970See Berry v. City of Louisville, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 818 , and Dukes v. City of Louisville, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 110 . | 1 | 1 |
Dukes v. City of Louisvillegreen1 sentence1970See Berry v. City of Louisville, Ky., 249 S.W.2d 818 , and Dukes v. City of Louisville, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 110 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
St. Luke Hospital, Inc. v. Straub
green
2 sentences2015KRS 446.070 provides: "A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation." We said in Straub that "in accord with traditional legal principles related to the common law concept of negligence per se, [KRS 446.070] applies when . . . the plaintiff comes within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute [alleged to have been violated]." Id. 2015KRS 446.070 provides: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” We said in Straub that “in accord with traditional legal principles related to the common law concept of negligence per se, [KRS 446;070] applies when ... the plaintiff comes within the class of persons intended to be protected’ by the statute [alleged to have been violated].” Id. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Allen v. Lovell's Adm'x
green
2 sentences2004Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 303 Ky. 238 , 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946). 2004Allen v. Lovell’s Adm’x, 303 Ky. 238 , 197 S.W.2d 424 (1946). | 2 | 1987–2004 |
Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles, Aerie No. 3738, Inc. v. Claywell
red
2 sentences2004The Court of Appeals relied upon this Court’s decision in Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 S.W.2d 328 (1987). 1994See Atherton Condominium, Apartment-Owners Association Board of Directors v. Blume Development Company, 115 Wash.2d 506 , 799 P.2d 250 (1990).” KRS 446.070 elevates proof of violation of statutory standards to the status of negligence per se, by stating: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” The interrelationship between the statutory standard and KRS 446.070 is illustrated by Grayson Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Claywell, Ky., 736 | 2 | 1994–2004 |
Pirtle's Administratrix v. Hargis Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1939Section 466, Kentucky Statutes, provides that: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.” As stated in Pirtle’s Adm’x v. Hargis Bank & Trust Company, 241 Ky. 455 , 44 S. W. (2d) 541, 544 , “We have often held that by virtue of this section when damages or injury result from the violation of another section of the statute, the persons sustaining the resulting injury or damage may recover same from the offender. ’ ’ See the Pirtle 1939Section 466, Kentucky Statutes, provides that: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damage as he may sustain by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture for such violation be thereby imposed.” As stated in Pirtle’s Adm’x v. Hargis Bank & Trust Company, 241 Ky. 455 , 44 S. W. (2d) 541, 544 , “We have often held that by virtue of this section when damages or injury result from the violation of another section of the statute, the persons sustaining the resulting injury or damage may recover same from the offender. ’ ’ See the Pirtle | 2 | 1933–1939 |
Insight Kentucky Partners II, L.P. v. Preferred Automotive Services, Inc.
green
1 sentence2026The trial court denied the amendment, 5 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 6 This statute provides: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” Id. -24- concluding that the proposed claim did not relate back under CR 15.03 and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
T & M JEWELRY, INC. v. Hicks Ex Rel. Hicks
green
2 sentences2025However, it allowed common law negligence claims to proceed, 14 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 15 KRS 446.070 provides: “A person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation, although a penalty or forfeiture is imposed for such violation.” Id. -23- noting that the plaintiff could rely, at least in part, on the Federal Gun Control Act, to inform the jury as to the proper standard of care. 2025Id. at 532 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co.
green
1 sentence2005First, “where the alleged reason for the discharge of the employee was the failure or refusal to violate a law in the course of employment.” Second, “when the reason for a discharge was the employee’s exercise of a right conferred by well-established legislative enactment.” 316 N.W.2d at 711-12 . 5 Underpinning any cause of action for wrongful discharge is KRS 446.070, pursuant to which a person injured by the violation of any statute may recover from the offender such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Rietze v. Williams Ex Rel. Williams
green
2 sentences2005In Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky.1970), our predecessor court held that because KRS 13.081 provided that all administrative regulations "have the force and effect of law," they had the same effect as statutes or ordinances enacted directly by the General Assembly; thus, the violation of an administrative regulation is the equivalent of a violation of a statute, and a person injured by a violation may recover from the violator such damages as he or she sustained by reason of the violation. 2005In Rietze v. Williams, 458 S.W.2d 613 (Ky.1970), our predecessor court held that because KRS 13.081 provided that all administrative regulations “have the force and effect of law,” they had the same effect as statutes or ordinances enacted directly by the General Assembly; thus, the violation of an administrative regulation is the equivalent of a violation of a statute, and a person injured by a violation may recover from the violator such damages as he or she sustained by reason of the violation. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Stevens v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1999In Stevens v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., Ky., 759 S.W.2d 819 (1988), we held that the Consumer Protection Act provides an insured under a homeowner's policy with a remedy against the conduct of his insurance company, if such conduct constitutes an unlawful act as defined in KRS 367.170. 1999In Stevens v. Motorists Mutual Insurance Co., Ky., 759 S.W.2d 819 (1988), we held that the Consumer Protection Act provides an insured under a homeowner’s policy with a remedy against the conduct of his insurance company, if such conduct constitutes an unlawful act as defined in KRS 367.170. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union of Kentucky, Local 541, SEIU, AFL-CIO Ex Rel. Mann v. Kentucky Jockey Club
green
1 sentence1995The Kentucky Supreme Court in Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union of Kentucky v. Kentucky Jockey Club, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 801 (1977), recognized that a civil action for damages exists in cases where employees are *526 discharged in violation of KRS 336.130; however, the Court held that the statute does not permit injunctive relief. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Renken v. Compton City School District
green
2 sentences1990"Renken v. Compton City School District [ 207 Cal.App.2d 106 ], 24 Cal.Rptr. 347 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App., 1962); Ohio Civil Service Employees Assoc. 1990"Renken v. Compton City School District [ 207 Cal.App.2d 106 ], 24 Cal.Rptr. 347 (Cal.Dist.Ct.App., 1962); Ohio Civil Service Employees Assoc. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Graham v. John R. Watts & Son
green
2 sentences1968Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96 , 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931), that a person for whose benefit the statute was enacted may recover damages for injuries he sustained by reason of the violation thereof. 1968Watts & Son, 238 Ky. 96 , 36 S.W.2d 859 (1931), that a person for whose benefit the statute was enacted may recover damages for injuries he sustained by reason of the violation thereof. | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Treitz v. City of Louisville
green
2 sentences1943However, in the recent case of Treitz v. City of Louisville, 292 Ky. 654 , 167 S. W. (2d) 860 , in which the plaintiff, in a personal injury suit instituted nine and a half months after the accident without a compliance with the Statute, sought to avoid the bar by alleging that a letter containing an account of the accident had been mailed to the mayor within ninety days there.after, we held, after reviewing the authorities from other .states, that the Statute was mandatory, and that nothing .short of a literal compliance therewith would suffice. 1943However, in the recent case of Treitz v. City of Louisville, 292 Ky. 654 , 167 S. W. (2d) 860 , in which the plaintiff, in a personal injury suit instituted nine and a half months after the accident without a compliance with the Statute, sought to avoid the bar by alleging that a letter containing an account of the accident had been mailed to the mayor within ninety days there.after, we held, after reviewing the authorities from other .states, that the Statute was mandatory, and that nothing .short of a literal compliance therewith would suffice. | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Baker v. White
green
2 sentences1941Baker v. White, 251 Ky. 691 , 65 S. W. (2d) 1022 . 1941Baker v. White, 251 Ky. 691 , 65 S. W. (2d) 1022 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.