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9 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2007–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J. B.green2 sentences2019Instead, she proceeds under a theory of negligence per se, which, as a general matter, “arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC, 300 Ga. at 845 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Nash v. Reed, 349 Ga. App. 381 , 385 (3) ( 825 SE2d 853 ) (2019) (“Under Georgia law, a statute may establish a duty, and violating that statute may result in a breach of the duty, constituting negligence per s 2017B., 300 Ga. 840, 845 (2) ( 797 SE2d 87 ) (2017) (“[Njegligenceper se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (punctuation omitted)); Brown v. Belinfante, 252 Ga. App. 856, 861 (1) ( 557 SE2d 399 ) (2001) (“In determining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person | 3 | 3 |
Murphy v. Bajjanigreen2 sentences2022See Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 200 (2) (647 SE2d 54) (2007) (“[N]egligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (citation omitted)); see also Amick v. BM & KM, Inc., 275 FSupp.2d 1378, 1381 (II) (A) (N.D. 2022See Murphy v. Bajjani, 282 Ga. 197, 200 (2) (647 SE2d 54) (2007) (“[N]egligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (citation omitted)); see also Amick v. BM & KM, Inc., 275 FSupp.2d 1378, 1381 (II) (A) (N.D. | 3 | 3 |
Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co.green2 sentences2012Griswold also set forth a claim for negligence per se premised on his assertion that Collins “issued corporal punishment not within the guidelines of OCGA §§ 20-2-730, 20-2-731, and 20-2-732.” “Negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co., 288 Ga. App. 767, 770 (2) (b) ( 655 SE2d 228 ) (2007); see OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law re 2012Griswold also set forth a claim for negligence per se premised on his assertion that Collins “issued corporal punishment not within the guidelines of OCGA §§ 20-2-730, 20-2-731, and 20-2-732.” “Negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chancey v. Peachtree Pest Control Co., 288 Ga. App. 767, 770 (2) (b) ( 655 SE2d 228 ) (2007); see OCGA § 51-1-6 (“When the law re | 2 | 2 |
McLain v. Mariner Health Care, Inc.green2 sentences2019Instead, she proceeds under a theory of negligence per se, which, as a general matter, “arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC, 300 Ga. at 845 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Nash v. Reed, 349 Ga. App. 381 , 385 (3) ( 825 SE2d 853 ) (2019) (“Under Georgia law, a statute may establish a duty, and violating that statute may result in a breach of the duty, constituting negligence per s 2019Instead, she proceeds under a theory of negligence per se, which, as a general matter, “arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC, 300 Ga. at 845 (2) (punctuation omitted); see Nash v. Reed, 349 Ga. App. 381 , 385 (3) ( 825 SE2d 853 ) (2019) (“Under Georgia law, a statute may establish a duty, and violating that statute may result in a breach of the duty, constituting negligence per s | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Belinfantegreen2 sentences2017B., 300 Ga. 840, 845 (2) ( 797 SE2d 87 ) (2017) (“[Njegligenceper se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (punctuation omitted)); Brown v. Belinfante, 252 Ga. App. 856, 861 (1) ( 557 SE2d 399 ) (2001) (“In determining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person 2017B., 300 Ga. 840, 845 (2) ( 797 SE2d 87 ) (2017) (“[Njegligenceper se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against.” (punctuation omitted)); Brown v. Belinfante, 252 Ga. App. 856, 861 (1) ( 557 SE2d 399 ) (2001) (“In determining whether the violation of a statute or ordinance is negligence per se as to a particular person, it is necessary to examine the purposes of the legislation and decide (1) whether the injured person | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
RES-GA McDonough, LLC v. Taylor English Duma LLP
green
1 sentence2020Based on the language of the ordinances and Hernandez’s complaint, we disagree. “[N]egligence per se arises when a statute [or ordinance] is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the [ordinance] was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the [ordinance] was intended to 13 RES-GA McDonough, LLC, 302 Ga. at 446 . 11 guard against.”14 The ordinances at issue here contain mirroring language, as provided, for example, in the Brookhaven nuisance ordinance: The governing authority of the [city/county] finds that nuisances are such activitie | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In re Levin
green
1 sentence2017Thus, OCGA § 51-1-6 does not necessarily authorize any type of tort claim merely because an alleged statutory violation satisfies its requirements. 293 Ga. 162 . 229 Ga. App. 522 . 334 Ga. App. 826 ( 780 SE2d 689 ) (2015). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Parris v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
1 sentence2017Thus, OCGA § 51-1-6 does not necessarily authorize any type of tort claim merely because an alleged statutory violation satisfies its requirements. 293 Ga. 162 . 229 Ga. App. 522 . 334 Ga. App. 826 ( 780 SE2d 689 ) (2015). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
The Best Jewelry Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Fulton County, Georgia
green
2 sentences2017Thus, OCGA § 51-1-6 does not necessarily authorize any type of tort claim merely because an alleged statutory violation satisfies its requirements. 293 Ga. 162 . 229 Ga. App. 522 . 334 Ga. App. 826 ( 780 SE2d 689 ) (2015). 2017Thus, OCGA § 51-1-6 does not necessarily authorize any type of tort claim merely because an alleged statutory violation satisfies its requirements. 293 Ga. 162 . 229 Ga. App. 522 . 334 Ga. App. 826 ( 780 SE2d 689 ) (2015). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Hubbard v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2007Noting that negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against (Hubbard v. Dept. of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002)), the Court of Appeals determined that Timothy, as a high school student, was a member of the class of persons the reporting requirements were intended to protect, and aggravation of Timothy’s injuries caused by the delay in medical treatment brought about by the failure to 2007Noting that negligence per se arises when a statute is violated, the person injured by the violation is within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect, and the harm complained of was the harm the statute was intended to guard against (Hubbard v. Dept. of Transp., 256 Ga. App. 342 (3) ( 568 SE2d 559 ) (2002)), the Court of Appeals determined that Timothy, as a high school student, was a member of the class of persons the reporting requirements were intended to protect, and aggravation of Timothy’s injuries caused by the delay in medical treatment brought about by the failure to | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.