31 Kentucky opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
True v. Rainesgreen2 sentences2025The LLC is the only named insured on the policy – and the LLC is not an “individual.” Therefore, the UIM policy only covered losses sustained by Metzger while occupying a scheduled automobile. ... [T]he doctrine of reasonable expectations, “applies only to policies with ambiguous terms.” True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2003). 2020However, the doctrine of reasonable expectations, “applies only to policies with ambiguous terms.” True v. Raines, 99 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2003). | 10 | 10 |
Simon v. Continental Insurance Co.green2 sentences2015Co., 724 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Ky.1986) (“An essential tool in deciding whether an insurance policy is ambiguous ... is the so-called ‘doctrine of reasonable expectations.’ ”). 2012“An essential tool in deciding whether an insurance policy is ambiguous, and consequently should be interpreted in favor of the insured, is the so-called ‘doctrine of reasonable expectations.’ ” Simon, 724 S.W.2d at 212 . | 6 | 10 |
Estate of Swartz v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Co.green2 sentences1999Id. at 75 . 1997In addition, where the reasonable expectations doctrine does apply, as we recently stated in Estate of Swartz v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Co., Ky.App., 949 S.W.2d 72, 76 (1997), “[u]nder controlling Kentucky law, the proper area of inquiry is what [the insureds] could reasonably expect in light of what they actually paid for, not what they personally expected or whether those expectations could be ascertained.” In our opinion, Anderson could not have reasonably anticipated protection for claims such as this given what he paid for and the plain language of his policy. | 2 | 3 |
Woodson v. Manhattan Life Insurance Co. of New Yorkgreen2 sentences1997See Woodson v. Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 835, 839 (1987). 1988In Woodson, supra, our Supreme Court noted that under the “doctrine of reasonable expectations,” an insured is entitled to all the coverage he may reasonably expect to be provided under the policy. | 2 | 3 |
Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfieldgreen2 sentences1999The Glasses argue that they paid a premium for UIM coverage, thus the exclusion is void because of the "doctrine of reasonable expectations." That principle or doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 555, 559 (1979), does not pertain to whether a premium was paid for coverage which is excluded, but rather to the clarity of the exclusionary language. 1999The Glasses argue that they paid a premium for UIM coverage, thus the exclusion is void because of the “doctrine of reasonable expectations.” That principle or doctrine, first enunciated by this Court in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Stanfield, Ky., 581 S.W.2d 555, 559 (1979), does not pertain to whether a premium was paid for coverage which is excluded, but rather to the clarity of the exclusionary language. | 1 | 3 |
Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Americagreen1 sentence2021Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company,14 the trial court ruled the 10 Wehr Constructors, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of America, 384 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Ky.2012). 11 Stone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. | 1 | 1 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Prestongreen2 sentences2003Co. v. Preston, Ky., 26 S.W.3d 145, 148-49 (2000), and pertains not to whether a premium was paid for coverage that was excluded but to the clarity of the exclusionary language. 2003Co. v. Preston, Ky., 26 S.W.3d 145, 148-49 (2000), and pertains not to whether a premium was paid for coverage that was excluded but to the clarity of the exclusionary language. | 1 | 1 |
Home Folks Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences1991Simon, supra ; see also Home Folks Mobile Home, Inc. v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, Ky.App., 744 S.W.2d 749 (1987); Moore v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company, Ky. App., 759 S.W.2d 598 (1988). 1991Simon, supra; see also Home Folks Mobile Home, Inc. v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, Ky.App., 744 S.W.2d 749 (1987); Moore v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company, Ky.App., 759 S.W.2d 598 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bidwell v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2023Only an unequivocally conspicuous, plain and clear manifestation of the company’s intent to exclude coverage will defeat that expectation.” Bidwell, 367 S.W.3d at 589 (quoting Simon v. Continental Ins. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Malone v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2021Notwithstanding that this doctrine “resolves an insurance-policy ambiguity in favor of the insured’s reasonable expectation,” True v. Raines, 99 -3- S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. 2003) (emphasis added), Lenwood’s first task is to convince this Court there is an ambiguity. “[T]he mere fact that [a party] attempt[s] to muddy the water and create some question of interpretation does not necessarily create an ambiguity[.] Only actual ambiguities, not fanciful ones, will trigger application of the doctrine.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
James v. James
green
1 sentence2018Concluding that the "what you buy is what you get rationale" of the reasonable expectations doctrine is not viable as applied to insureds of the second class who did not purchase the UIM coverage, the Court held that insureds of the second class "may recover only under the single coverage for the vehicle in which they were riding at the time of the accident." Id. at 114 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Brown v. Indiana Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2013Brown, 184 S.W.3d at 540 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Brown v. Atlanta Casualty Co.
neutral
1 sentence1997The MVRA minimum insurance requirement relied upon by our Supreme Court in Bishop , and Beacon Ins. was also at issue in Brown v. Atlanta Casualty Company, Ky.App., 875 S.W.2d 103 (1994), a ease in which this Court enforced an insurance policy provision denying basic reparation benefits to an eighteen-year old driving his own uninsured vehicle. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Moore v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1991Simon, supra ; see also Home Folks Mobile Home, Inc. v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, Ky.App., 744 S.W.2d 749 (1987); Moore v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company, Ky. App., 759 S.W.2d 598 (1988). 1991Simon, supra; see also Home Folks Mobile Home, Inc. v. Meridian Mutual Insurance Company, Ky.App., 744 S.W.2d 749 (1987); Moore v. Commonwealth Life Insurance Company, Ky.App., 759 S.W.2d 598 (1988). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.