reasonable expectations doctrine in New Jersey

2008On the other hand, the same Court held in State v. Signo Trading Intern., Inc., 130 N.J. 51 , 612 A. 2d 932 (1992), that "courts should resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations only when `the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.'" Id. at 62 , 612 A. 2d 932 (quoting Weedo [v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.], supra, 81 N.J. [233] at 246-47, 405 A. 2d 788 [(1979)]).

2008On the other hand, the same Court held in State v. Signo Trading Intern., Inc., 130 N.J. 51 , 612 A. 2d 932 (1992), that "courts should resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations only when `the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.'" Id. at 62 , 612 A. 2d 932 (quoting Weedo [v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc.], supra, 81 N.J. [233] at 246-47, 405 A. 2d 788 [(1979)]).

2008In Nunn v. Franklin Mutual Insurance Co., 274 N.J.Super. 543, 549-50 , 644 A. 2d 1111 (App.Div.1994), we considered application of the reasonable expectations doctrine in the context of commercial policies: There is some authority for the proposition that "if an insured's `reasonable expectations' contravene the plain meaning of a policy, even its plain meaning can be overcome." Voorhees v. Preferred Mut.

2008In Nunn v. Franklin Mutual Insurance Co., 274 N.J.Super. 543, 549-50 , 644 A. 2d 1111 (App.Div.1994), we considered application of the reasonable expectations doctrine in the context of commercial policies: There is some authority for the proposition that "if an insured's `reasonable expectations' contravene the plain meaning of a policy, even its plain meaning can be overcome." Voorhees v. Preferred Mut.

2005Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 297-99 , 225 A.2d 328 [, 332-33] (1966). [Id. at 556-57, 659 A.2d at 1377 .] We have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to all forms of insurance contracts.

2005Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 297-99 , 225 A.2d 328 [, 332-33] (1966). [Id. at 556-57, 659 A.2d at 1377 .] We have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to all forms of insurance contracts.

2005Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 297-99 , 225 A.2d 328 [, 332-33] (1966). [Id. at 556-57, 659 A.2d at 1377 .] We have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to all forms of insurance contracts.

1997Cos., 48 N.J. 291, 297-99 , 225 A.2d 328 (1966). [Doto v. Russo, 140 N.J. 544, 556-557 , 659 A.2d 1371 (1995).] The reasonable expectations doctrine urged by the plaintiffs applies to insurance policies with private individuals.

2019Oxford Realty, 229 N.J. at 208 .

2017That doctrine is triggered despite unambiguous language where "the insurance contract is inconsistent with public expectations and commercially accepted standards." Id. at 35 (quoting Sparks, supra, 100 N.J. at 338 ).

2017That doctrine is triggered despite unambiguous language where "the insurance contract is inconsistent with public expectations and commercially accepted standards." Id. at 35 (quoting Sparks, supra, 100 N.J. at 338 ).

2017Co., 112 N.J. 30 (1988), our Supreme Court explained the underlying rationale for the reasonable expectations doctrine.

2017That doctrine is triggered despite unambiguous language where "the insurance contract is inconsistent with public expectations and commercially accepted standards." Id. at 35 (quoting Sparks, supra, 100 N.J. at 338 ).

2005President, supra, 180 N.J. at 563 , 853 A.2d at 254 .

2005President, supra, 180 N.J. at 563 , 853 A.2d at 254 .

2005We reasoned that the conflict over whether sudden means abrupt or *121 unexpected was not really the issue; rather the crucial inquiry was whether the courts of this state should give effect to the literal meaning of an exclusionary clause that materially and dramatically reduces the coverage previously available for property damage caused by pollution, under circumstances in which the approval of the exclusionary clause by state regulatory authorities was induced by the insurance industry’s representation that the clause merely ‘clarified’ the scope of the prior coverage. [Id. at 72, 629 A.2d

2005We reasoned that the conflict over whether sudden means abrupt or *121 unexpected was not really the issue; rather the crucial inquiry was whether the courts of this state should give effect to the literal meaning of an exclusionary clause that materially and dramatically reduces the coverage previously available for property damage caused by pollution, under circumstances in which the approval of the exclusionary clause by state regulatory authorities was induced by the insurance industry’s representation that the clause merely ‘clarified’ the scope of the prior coverage. [Id. at 72, 629 A.2d

2001This Court invoked the doctrine in Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 34 N.J. 475 , 170 A.2d 22 (1961).

2001This Court invoked the doctrine in Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Insurance Co., 34 N.J. 475 , 170 A.2d 22 (1961).

1997See Isko v. Planning Board of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 , 238 A.2d 457 (1968); Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 276 N.J.Super. 142 , 647 A.2d 841 (App.Div.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 143 N.J. 162 , 669 A.2d 1378 (1996); Walker v. Briarwood Condo.

1997See Isko v. Planning Board of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 , 238 A.2d 457 (1968); Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 276 N.J.Super. 142 , 647 A.2d 841 (App.Div.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 143 N.J. 162 , 669 A.2d 1378 (1996); Walker v. Briarwood Condo.

1997See Isko v. Planning Board of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 , 238 A.2d 457 (1968); Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 276 N.J.Super. 142 , 647 A.2d 841 (App.Div.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 143 N.J. 162 , 669 A.2d 1378 (1996); Walker v. Briarwood Condo.

1997See Isko v. Planning Board of Livingston, 51 N.J. 162, 175 , 238 A.2d 457 (1968); Yun v. Ford Motor Co., 276 N.J.Super. 142 , 647 A.2d 841 (App.Div.1994), rev’d on other grounds, 143 N.J. 162 , 669 A.2d 1378 (1996); Walker v. Briarwood Condo.

1992Although Summit suggests that those traditional contract-interpretation principles include “whether application or non-application of the owned property exclusion would best carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties,” 229 N.J.Super. at 64 , 550 A.2d 1235 , courts should resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations only when “the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.” Weedo v. Stone-E- Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 246-47 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979).

1992Although Summit suggests that those traditional contract-interpretation principles include “whether application or non-application of the owned property exclusion would best carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties,” 229 N.J.Super. at 64 , 550 A.2d 1235 , courts should resort to the doctrine of reasonable expectations only when “the phrasing of the policy is so confusing that the average policyholder cannot make out the boundaries of coverage.” Weedo v. Stone-E- Brick, Inc., 81 N.J. 233, 246-47 , 405 A.2d 788 (1979).

1992Co., 101 N.J. 597, 612 , 503 A. 2d 862 (1986).

1992Co., 101 N.J. 597, 612 , 503 A. 2d 862 (1986).

1991Super. 70 , 350 A. 2d 256 (App.Div. 1975) (doctrine of reasonable expectations not applied where there was no ambiguity in the limitation of coverage for household employees); Foley v. Foley, 173 N.J.

1991Super. 70 , 350 A. 2d 256 (App.Div. 1975) (doctrine of reasonable expectations not applied where there was no ambiguity in the limitation of coverage for household employees); Foley v. Foley, 173 N.J.

1991Super. 256 , 414 A. 2d 34 (App.Div. 1980) (no ambiguity in excluding from coverage for personal injury claims between related persons in the same household); Mt.

1986Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [ Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Thus we have consistently construed policy terms strictly against the insurer and where several interpretations were permissible, we have chosen the one most favorable to the assured. [ 44 N.J. at 305 .] With the doctrine of reasonable expectations and this principle of construction in mind, we now examine the concept of surrender.

1986Thus we have consistently construed policy terms strictly against the insurer and where several interpretations were permissible, we have chosen the one most favorable to the assured. [ 44 N.J. at 305 .] With the doctrine of reasonable expectations and this principle of construction in mind, we now examine the concept of surrender.

1986Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [ Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [ Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.

1986Co., 160 F. 2d 599 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 , 67 S.Ct. 1736 , 91 L.Ed. 1858 (1947): A man must indeed read what he signs, and he is charged, if he does not; but insurers who seek to impose upon words of common speech an esoteric significance intelligible only to their craft, must bear the burden of any resulting confusion. [ Id. at 602.] In Gaunt , Judge Hand established the doctrine of reasonable expectations.