time of the jurisdiction hearing in California

2026(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629–630 (R.T.).) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1

2025(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629–630 (R.T.).) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1

2024(In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 .) Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146 ), the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.

2024“A parent’s past conduct is a good predictor of future behavior.” (In re T.V. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 126, 133 , italics omitted.) “To establish a defined risk of harm at the time of the hearing, there ‘must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146 .) “A dependency court is not required to ‘wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.’ [Citation.] Where jurisdictional allegations are based solely on risk to the

2023(See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 , 1219–1220 (Christopher R.) [children “six years old or younger at the time of the jurisdiction hearing” are “children of ‘tender years’” for whom “the finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or 11 guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm”].) Mother raises three arguments against our conclusions.

2023Thus, reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order regarding father’s failure to protect Yasmine could result in effective relief for father, particularly because DCFS fails to show any other basis for the juvenile court’s order removing Yasmine from father’s custody. 16 suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” the “failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1)(A); see In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 [describing elements].

2025(In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383 , overruled on other grounds by In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 560, fn. 18; In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993 ; § 300, subd. (b).) Second, he argues that there was no risk of harm by the time of the jurisdiction hearing, as evidenced by the trial court’s failure to remove the children from father’s custody or to impose any “no driving with the children” condition.

2023(See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [for children “six years old or younger at the time of the jurisdiction hearing,” a “finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm”]; In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 767 [same]; see also In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 [mother’s “continuous illicit drug use” put her infant daughter “at substantial risk of harm”].) Amber argues she rebutted the presumption because there was evidence Kieran “was wel

2023“In order to sustain a petition under section 300, a significant risk to the child must exist ‘ “at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.” ’ ” (In re J.N., supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 775.) Although past conduct may be probative of current conditions, “ ‘there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” ’ ” (In re Cole L., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 602; see In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 ; In re S.F. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 696 , 712–713.) 11 DCFS points to the October 2021 incident and argues that “[a]ny time a grown man and a seven[-

2021As such, they were “children of such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and care pose[d] an inherent risk to their 12 physical health and safety. [Citations].” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 ; see also In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [children “six years old or younger at the time of the jurisdiction hearing” are “children of ‘tender years.’”].) Father further argues that the jurisdictional finding as to father was based on prior substance abuse, not current substance abuse.

2024(In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 (A.F.).) “[S]ection 300(b)(1) authorizes dependency jurisdiction without a finding that a parent is at fault or blameworthy for her failure or inability to supervise or protect her child.” (R.T., supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 624 .) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and rea

2022(See In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283, 293 [denial is a relevant factor in determining whether a person is likely to modify his or her behavior in the future without court supervision].) The foregoing supports the finding that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, mother’s issue with substance abuse posed a current risk to the children’s safety if placed in her care.

2026(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629–630 (R.T.).) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1

2025A court must also find that the parent . . . is unable to provide regular care for a child and that as a result, the child has suffered serious physical harm or illness or is at 13 significant risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.” (Id. at p. 556.) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591 , 601-602 (Cole L

2026(See In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803, 805 ; In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129 , 135–136.) But “[a]lthough section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591 , 601–602.) When evaluating the potential of future risk, the juvenile court may consider a parent’s insight (or lack thereof) into the problems that led to the

2021Nevertheless, “dependency jurisdiction is not warranted under [Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,] subdivision (b) if, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there no longer is a substantial risk that the child will suffer harm.” (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803 ; Welf. & Inst.

2026Although Aiden had not yet suffered other serious physical harm from Mother’s failure or inability to supervise him, “ ‘[t]he court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) To her credit, Mother began to participate in services around the time of the jurisdiction hearing.

2024In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 .) “Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citations.] The court may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection. [C

2025The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise 12 jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance’ ”]; In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 330, fn. 5 [concluding that finding of substantial risk under section 300, subdivision (j) based on parents’ physical abuse of sibling “also supports jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (a)”].) Mother also argues that the jurisdictional findings were unsupported because six months had passed since Ma.D.’s injuries and there was no ong

2023The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 774 ; accord, In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 327-328 .) Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146 ), the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary

2024(N.R., supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 540, fn. 9.) That is what CFS alleged as to father. 13 substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 .) The child must be subject to a defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.

2024(In re L.W. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 840, 848 .) Although section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing (In re D.L. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 1142, 1146 ), the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.

2023(See In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [for children “six years old or younger at the time of the jurisdiction hearing,” a “finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm”]; In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 767 [same]; see also In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1385 [mother’s “continuous illicit drug use” put her infant daughter “at substantial risk of harm”].) Amber argues she rebutted the presumption because there was evidence Kieran “was wel

2016In In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 (Christopher R.), the court found that the children, the oldest of whom was six years old at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, were of “tender years” and thus, “‘the finding of substance abuse is prima facie evidence of the inability of a parent or guardian to provide regular care resulting in a substantial risk of harm.’” (Id. at p. 1219.) Father also finds support for his argument in Christopher R., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 , as rejecting the conclusion in In re Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 754 , that only someone who was “diagno

2024As relevant here, subdivision (b) of section 300 requires CFS to prove that the child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of” the parent’s failure or inability to adequately protect the child. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) “[S]ection 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing,” although the parent’s “‘“[p]ast conduct may be probative of current conditions” if there is reason to believe that the conduct will continue.’” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5t

2015(In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 718 .) There is simply no evidence that Sofia faced “a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness” at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1), italics added.) Cross-Appeal of DCFS DCFS contends that the court should have sustained allegations of sibling abuse.

2017DISCUSSION Relying heavily on comparisons to J.N., supra, 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 , Mother and Father argue the court’s jurisdictional finding is infirm because the drunk driving incident was a one-time episode and there was no substantial evidence of an ongoing substantial risk of harm to their children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. 4 We see the record quite differently.

2016Next, Mother relies on In re J.N. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1010 (J.N.) to argue proof of an ongoing risk of harm to C.R. at the time of the jurisdiction hearing was both necessary and lacking.

2020In order to sustain a petition under section 300, a significant risk to the child must exist “ ‘at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829 , quoting In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 ; see In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [“the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm”].) Although the juvenile court may base a finding of such risk on a parent’s harmful conduct in the past, there must be some non- speculative basis fo

2015Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829 (David M.), italics omitted.) Mother contends the Department failed to make the requisite showing that, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, Makayla was at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future.

2024(See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266 , 283-284 [“where there are multiple findings against one parent[,] the validity of one finding may render moot the parent’s attempt to challenge the others”]; In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1452 [“As a general rule, a single jurisdictional finding supported by substantial evidence is sufficient to support jurisdiction and render moot a challenge to the other findings.”].) As the Supreme Court recently held in In re D.P., at page 283, “where a jurisdictional finding ‘serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal’

2021(In re Jesus M. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 104, 111 .) Domestic violence “may support the exercise of jurisdiction only if there is evidence that the violence harmed the children or placed them at risk of harm, and ‘the violence is ongoing or likely to continue.’ ” (In re M.W. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 .) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 , abrogated in part on other grounds in In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5t

2022It is well established, however, that “[e]xposure to domestic violence may serve as the basis of a jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b).” (In re R.C. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 930, 941 .) “The court need not wait until the child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child,” and the court “may consider past events in deciding whether a child presently needs the court’s protection.” (In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 165 .) At the time of the jurisdiction hearing, the evidence showed a lengthy history of domestic viol

2015Before courts and agencies can exert jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), there must be evidence indicating that the child is exposed to a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 823 .) “Although section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387 , 1396 . . . ; In re Rocco M.[, supra,] 1 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 824), the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction

2022A jurisdictional finding under section 300, subdivision (b) requires “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the [minor], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 .) The third element “effectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future (e.g., evidence showing a substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur).” (Ibid.) To establish a defin

2020In order to sustain a petition under section 300, a significant risk to the child must exist “ ‘at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 822, 829 , quoting In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1396 ; see In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 824 [“the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the minor to the defined risk of harm”].) Although the juvenile court may base a finding of such risk on a parent’s harmful conduct in the past, there must be some non- speculative basis fo

2026(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629–630 (R.T.).) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1

2026(See In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 803, 805 ; In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129 , 135–136.) But “[a]lthough section 300 requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child.” (In re Cole L. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 591 , 601–602.) When evaluating the potential of future risk, the juvenile court may consider a parent’s insight (or lack thereof) into the problems that led to the

2020(In re Kadence P., at p. 1384; In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1216 ; see In re S.O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453 , 461.) Here, as Maricela argues, and the Department implicitly agrees, by the time of the jurisdiction hearing Maricela was well aware of the circumstances that led to Edwin’s conviction and the conditions of his probation.

2016(In re S. O. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 453, 461 .) That is, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the jurisdiction hearing subject the child to the defined risk of harm.

2016(In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139 , 152.) While section 300 generally requires that a child be subject to a “defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 , 1215–1216.) 2 DCFS argues that because father does not challenge the entire section 300 petition, we need not address father’s jurisdictional arguments.

2016(In re J.O. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 139 , 152.) While section 300 generally requires that a child be subject to a “defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing [citations], the court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take steps necessary to protect the child. [Citation.]” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210 , 1215– 1216.) We may affirm the juvenile court’s orders made at the jurisdictional stage if substantial evidence supports any one of the counts.

2023We address the latter issue first, because “ ‘ “[i]f the jurisdictional findings are supported by substantial evidence, the adequacy of the petition is irrelevant.” ’ ” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 .) The court adjudged K.C. a dependent under section 300, subdivision (b) which, as relevant here, authorizes the exercise of dependency jurisdiction if a child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of . . . [t]he inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s

2014The child shall continue to be a dependent child pursuant to this subdivision only so long as is necessary to protect the child from risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness.’ Thus, ‘[t]he three elements for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b) are: “‘(1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) “serious physical harm or illness” to the [child], or a “substantial risk” of such harm or illness.’” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1124 (John M.).) Further, “[a]lthough section 300 generally requ

2026(In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622 , 629–630 (R.T.).) To show the child faces a risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there “must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe the alleged conduct will recur.” (In re James R. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 129, 136 .) “While substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be ‘a product of logic and reason’ and ‘must rest on the evidence’ [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].” (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1

2025(In re Kadence P. (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1376, 1383 , overruled on other grounds by In re N.R. (2023) 15 Cal.5th 520 , 560, fn. 18; In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 993 ; § 300, subd. (b).) Second, he argues that there was no risk of harm by the time of the jurisdiction hearing, as evidenced by the trial court’s failure to remove the children from father’s custody or to impose any “no driving with the children” condition.

2025(See, e.g., In re A.G. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 675, 684-686 [dependency court jurisdiction not required where nonoffending parent could protect children].) In sum, the evidence does not compel a finding as a matter of law that at the time of the jurisdiction hearing S. was a person described by section 300, subdivision (b) or (d).

2015(Id. at pp. 1316-1317.) Here, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, mother refused therapy as “unnecessary.” In re A.G., supra, 220 Cal.App.4th 675 is also inapplicable because there, even though the mother suffered undisputed and extreme mental health issues, the children were not at a substantial risk of serious harm because they had a father who showed 27 “remarkable dedication” to protecting them from her dangerous conduct.

2025Domestic violence can constitute such neglect because of “the substantial risk [to the child] of encountering the violence and suffering serious physical harm or illness from it.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 194 .) Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) requires that “a significant risk to the child must exist ‘ “at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.” ’ [Citations.]” (In re J.N. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 767 , 775.) Previous acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm; there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur.

2014DISCUSSION Father raises a single claim on appeal: “because, at the time of the jurisdiction hearing, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding [S.B.] was currently at risk of harm and it was no longer necessary to protect [S.B.] from harm, dependency jurisdiction was not required.” In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193 (citation omitted).) ““In making this determination, we draw all reaso