properly considered factors in New York

2015Upon our review of the evidence at the fact-finding hearing, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests, and that its determination has “a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1627 [2010]).

2015Upon our review of the evidence at the fact-finding hearing, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests, and that its determination has “a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1627 [2010]).

2015Upon our review of the evidence at the fact-finding hearing, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests, and that its determination has “a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1627 [2010]).

2015Upon our review of the evidence at the fact-finding hearing, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interests, and that its determination has “a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1627 [2010]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2012“The determination of the trial court, which heard and observed the witnesses, is entitled to great deference and should not be disturbed where, as here, it had a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Salerno v Salerno, 273 AD2d 818, 818 [2000]; see Matter of Battaglia v Hopkins, 280 AD2d 953, 954 [2001]).

2012“The determination of the trial court, which heard and observed the witnesses, is entitled to great deference and should not be disturbed where, as here, it had a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Salerno v Salerno, 273 AD2d 818, 818 [2000]; see Matter of Battaglia v Hopkins, 280 AD2d 953, 954 [2001]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2015We conclude that the court’s determination to award maintenance for a period of five years was not an abuse of discretion “inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a)” (Scully v Scully, 104 AD3d 1137, 1138 [2013]; see Schmitt v Schmitt, 107 AD3d 1529, 1529 [2013]; McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1482 ; cf. Perry v Perry, 101 AD3d 1762, 1762-1763 [2012]).

2012We conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests (see Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1626-1627 [2010]; Matter of Seyler v Hasfurter, 61 AD3d 1437, 1437 [2009]; Matter of Jones v Tarnawa, 26 AD3d 870, 871 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 714 [2006]).

2012We conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests (see Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1626-1627 [2010]; Matter of Seyler v Hasfurter, 61 AD3d 1437, 1437 [2009]; Matter of Jones v Tarnawa, 26 AD3d 870, 871 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 714 [2006]).

2012We conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests (see Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1626-1627 [2010]; Matter of Seyler v Hasfurter, 61 AD3d 1437, 1437 [2009]; Matter of Jones v Tarnawa, 26 AD3d 870, 871 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 714 [2006]).

2012We conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the children’s best interests (see Matter of Murphy v Peace, 72 AD3d 1626, 1626-1627 [2010]; Matter of Seyler v Hasfurter, 61 AD3d 1437, 1437 [2009]; Matter of Jones v Tarnawa, 26 AD3d 870, 871 [2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 714 [2006]).

2012“The determination of the trial court, which heard and observed the witnesses, is entitled to great deference and should not be disturbed where, as here, it had a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Salerno v Salerno, 273 AD2d 818, 818 [2000]; see Matter of Battaglia v Hopkins, 280 AD2d 953, 954 [2001]).

2012“The determination of the trial court, which heard and observed the witnesses, is entitled to great deference and should not be disturbed where, as here, it had a sound and substantial basis in the record” (Salerno v Salerno, 273 AD2d 818, 818 [2000]; see Matter of Battaglia v Hopkins, 280 AD2d 953, 954 [2001]).

2011The record establishes that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6), including the reasonable needs of both parties (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712 ; see generally Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 52 ).

2011The record establishes that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6), including the reasonable needs of both parties (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712 [2007]; see generally Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 52 [1995]).

2008The court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d), including the parties’ respective contributions to the family economic enterprise (see Price, 69 NY2d at 14-15 ; O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 587 [1985]).

2007The defendant, who supported the plaintiff during his last year and a half of law school, was entitled to a share of the enhanced earning capability represented by the plaintiffs law degree and license (see McSparron v McSparron, 87 NY2d 275, 286 [1995]; O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576, 588 [1985]; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620, 621 [1997]).

2008Contrary to defendant’s contention, in determining the combined parental income beyond the $80,000 cap, the court properly considered the standard of living that the children would have enjoyed had the marriage not ended (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [3]; [f] [3]; Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649, 653 [1995]).

2007However, since the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (f), in deciding to cap the combined parental income at $225,000, we decline to disturb the child support determination (see Matter of Cassano v Cassano, 85 NY2d 649 [1995]).

2013Contrary to plaintiffs further contention, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in directing that defendant was not obligated to begin paying his pro rata share of the children’s private high school tuition until January 1, 2012 (see generally Fruchter v Fruchter, 288 AD2d 942, 943 [2001]).

2007In determining that the relocation was in the best interests of the child, the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]), as well as the effect of the child’s relocation on extended family relationships and the fact that petitioner has been the primary caretaker of the child (see Fruchter v Fruchter, 288 AD2d 942 [2001]; Matter of Boyer v Boyer, 281 AD2d 953 [2001]).

2011The record establishes that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6), including the reasonable needs of both parties (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712 ; see generally Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 52 ).

2011The record establishes that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6), including the reasonable needs of both parties (see Griggs v Griggs, 44 AD3d 710, 712 [2007]; see generally Hartog v Hartog, 85 NY2d 36, 52 [1995]).

2010Furthermore, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727 [1996]) in determining that the children’s best interests would be served by granting the father’s petition (see generally Matter of Gillard v Gillard, 241 AD2d 966, 968 [1997]).

2002The court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea (supra at 740-741) and found that, although the relocation would benefit the child economically, her relationship with respondent would be adversely affected because a reasonable visitation schedule would not be feasible in view of the distance between the two locations, the financial circumstances of the parties and respondent’s work schedule (cf., Matter of Gillard v Gillard, 241 AD2d 966, 968-969 ).

2025The court properly considered these factors—and the overall stability they provided in the child's life in determining that it was in the child's best interests to modify the custody arrangement ( see Matter of Alexis A.T. v Gary C.T. , 204 AD3d 555, 555-556 [1st Dept 2022]).

2025The court properly considered these factors—and the overall stability they provided in the child's life in determining that it was in the child's best interests to modify the custody arrangement ( see Matter of Alexis A.T. v Gary C.T. , 204 AD3d 555, 555-556 [1st Dept 2022]).

2015Inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a), the award of maintenance was not improvident (see Marley v Marley, 106 AD3d 961 , 962 *665 [2013]; McCarthy v McCarthy, 57 AD3d at 1481-1482 ; Meccariello v Meccariello, 46 AD3d 640, 641-642 [2007]).

2013We conclude that the court’s determination here to terminate maintenance on December 31, 2011 was not an abuse of discretion inasmuch as the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6) (a) (see Smith v Winter, 64 AD3d 1218, 1220 [2009], lv denied 13 NY3d 709 [2009]).

2013In deciding to limit the child support award to the first $130,000 in combined parental income, the court properly considered the factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (f), including the fact that the divorce would not result in a change in the children’s standard of living (see Burns, 70 AD3d at 1502).

2013Plaintiffs contention that the court erred in calculating the parties’ pro rata shares was raised for the first time in her reply brief and thus that contention is not properly before us on appeal (see Turner v Canale, 15 AD3d 960, 960 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 702 [2005]).

2012Following a fact-finding hearing, Family Court denied both petitions and further ordered that, “should the [mother] relocate to Alabama the Court finds that it would be in the child’s best interest that the [father] should be the primary custodian of the child.” With respect to the relocation petition, we conclude that the court properly considered the factors set forth in Matter of Tropea v Tropea ( 87 NY2d 727, 740-741 [1996]) in determining that the mother failed to meet her burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed relocation is in the child’s best interes

2008In addition, the court properly determined that the tax returns of the parties bore “little resemblance to the real available income” and that defendant had “available to him substantially more [income] than [what was] reported” (see Matter of Buley v Buley, 142 AD2d 814, 815 [1988]; see also Carr v Carr, 171 AD2d 776, 777 [1991]).