properly considered factors in Connecticut

2026The defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly awarded the plaintiff alimony on the basis of the defendants’ postseparation increase in income was foreclosed by this court’s decision in Panganiban v. Panganiban ( 54 Conn. App. 634 ), and, even if the defendant were correct that it was improper for the trial court to rely on a postseparation, but predissolution, increase in income when entering an initial alimony award, the record did not support his claim that the court’s alimony award was based solely on his postsepara- tion increase in income because the court properly considered the

2026The trial court did not err in awarding pendente lite alimony to the plaintiff at the time of dissolution, as the applicable statute (§ 46b-83 (a)) expressly permitted the court to award pendente lite alimony from the date of the plaintiff’s initial application for alimony, and this court’s decision in Hal- lock v. Hallock ( 228 Conn. App. 81 ) established that the trial court had authority to decide the pendente lite alimony motion at the time of the dissolution judgment.

2025The trial court in the first action did not abuse its discretion in denying L’s request for a trustee fee, as the court’s factual findings were supported by the record and were not clearly erroneous, and the court properly considered the factors set forth in Hayward v. Plant ( 98 Conn. 374 ) in making its determination.

2022D With respect to the portion of the plaintiff’s manda- mus claim seeking an order requiring the payment of its approved 2009 application, we first address the defendants’ argument that such claim ultimately seeks monetary relief and, therefore, should be treated as a claim for money damages pursuant to this court’s decision in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 93 Conn. App. 37, 41 , 888 A.2d 115 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006).

2022D With respect to the portion of the plaintiff’s manda- mus claim seeking an order requiring the payment of its approved 2009 application, we first address the defendants’ argument that such claim ultimately seeks monetary relief and, therefore, should be treated as a claim for money damages pursuant to this court’s decision in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 93 Conn. App. 37, 41 , 888 A.2d 115 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006).

2022D With respect to the portion of the plaintiff’s manda- mus claim seeking an order requiring the payment of its approved 2009 application, we first address the defendants’ argument that such claim ultimately seeks monetary relief and, therefore, should be treated as a claim for money damages pursuant to this court’s decision in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 93 Conn. App. 37, 41 , 888 A.2d 115 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006).

2022D With respect to the portion of the plaintiff’s manda- mus claim seeking an order requiring the payment of its approved 2009 application, we first address the defendants’ argument that such claim ultimately seeks monetary relief and, therefore, should be treated as a claim for money damages pursuant to this court’s decision in Bloom v. Dept. of Labor, 93 Conn. App. 37, 41 , 888 A.2d 115 , cert. denied, 277 Conn. 912 , 894 A.2d 992 (2006).

2020It is well settled that ‘‘the defendant’s ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating financial awards.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122, 129 , 964 A.2d 1252 (2009).

2020It is well settled that ‘‘the defendant’s ability to pay is a material consideration in formulating financial awards.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pellow v. Pellow, 113 Conn. App. 122, 129 , 964 A.2d 1252 (2009).