cutpa claim in Connecticut

2005This court previously has indicated that a plaintiff may bring a CUTPA claim that is predicated upon the public policy embodied in another statute, inespective of whether the conduct in question expressly is prohibited by the letter of that statute, so long as the claim is “consistent with the regulatory principles established by the underlying statute.” Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 665 , 509 A.2d 11 (1986); see Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 492-93 .

2005This court previously has indicated that a plaintiff may bring a CUTPA claim that is predicated upon the public policy embodied in another statute, inespective of whether the conduct in question expressly is prohibited by the letter of that statute, so long as the claim is “consistent with the regulatory principles established by the underlying statute.” Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651, 665 , 509 A.2d 11 (1986); see Conaway v. Prestia, supra, 492-93 .

2013Therefore, we need not address whether Virginia’s relationship with the hospital provides standing to sue under CUTPA, or whether her purely emotional injuries constitute an “ascertainable loss.” We begin our analysis of Virginia’s CUTPA action by noting that, “[although physicians and other health care providers are subject to CUTPA, only the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the profession are covered”; Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34 , 699 A.2d 964 (1997); that is, “[m]edical malpractice claims recast as CUTPA claims cannot form the basis for a CUTPA violation.” I

2013Therefore, we need not address whether Virginia’s relationship with the hospital provides standing to sue under CUTPA, or whether her purely emotional injuries constitute an “ascertainable loss.” We begin our analysis of Virginia’s CUTPA action by noting that, “[although physicians and other health care providers are subject to CUTPA, only the entrepreneurial or commercial aspects of the profession are covered”; Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17, 34 , 699 A.2d 964 (1997); that is, “[m]edical malpractice claims recast as CUTPA claims cannot form the basis for a CUTPA violation.” I

2002Generally, a simple breach of contract does not amount to a CUTPA violation, Paulus v. Lasala , 56 Conn. App. 139 , 153 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), in the absence of factual allegations of "substantial aggravating circumstances" or "fraudulent or deceptive practices or bad faith." Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc. , 41 Conn. Sup. 575 , 580 , 595 A.2d 951 (1991); see Healthright v. Executive Risk Specialty Insurance. , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 0272486S (Jan. 12, 2001, Lager, J.) and cases cited therein.

2002Generally, a simple breach of contract does not amount to a CUTPA violation, Paulus v. Lasala , 56 Conn. App. 139 , 153 , 742 A.2d 379 (1999), in the absence of factual allegations of "substantial aggravating circumstances" or "fraudulent or deceptive practices or bad faith." Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc. , 41 Conn. Sup. 575 , 580 , 595 A.2d 951 (1991); see Healthright v. Executive Risk Specialty Insurance. , Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. 0272486S (Jan. 12, 2001, Lager, J.) and cases cited therein.

2023See, e.g., Sports- men’s Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 757 , 474 A.2d 780 (1984) (‘‘it is difficult to conceive of a situation [in which] tortious interference would be found but a CUTPA violation would not’’).

2023See, e.g., Sports- men’s Boating Corp. v. Hensley, 192 Conn. 747, 757 , 474 A.2d 780 (1984) (‘‘it is difficult to conceive of a situation [in which] tortious interference would be found but a CUTPA violation would not’’).

2019As for her CUTPA count, the plaintiff argues that she sufficiently pleaded her cause of action because she ‘‘alleged false and deceptive claims being made by the defendant to intentionally deprive her of benefits to which she was entitled . . . .’’ Although the plaintiff concedes that an employer-employee relationship does not give rise to a CUTPA claim; see Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660, 670 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992) (employer-employee relationship does not fall within definition of trade or commerce for purposes of action under CUTPA); she argues in her appellate brief that Q

2019As for her CUTPA count, the plaintiff argues that she sufficiently pleaded her cause of action because she ‘‘alleged false and deceptive claims being made by the defendant to intentionally deprive her of benefits to which she was entitled . . . .’’ Although the plaintiff concedes that an employer-employee relationship does not give rise to a CUTPA claim; see Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corp., 28 Conn. App. 660, 670 , 613 A.2d 838 (1992) (employer-employee relationship does not fall within definition of trade or commerce for purposes of action under CUTPA); she argues in her appellate brief that Q

2025See, e.g., Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 46 , 717 A.2d 77 (1998) (Fichera ’’does not stand for the proposition that independent fraudulent or deceptive acts taking place within [the] three year period [prior to the filing of CUTPA action] that have been undertaken for the purpose of concealing actionable conduct occurring prior to the three year period cannot independently form the basis of a CUTPA violation’’); Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126 , 142 n.10, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘Fichera did not hold that § 52-595 is inapplicable f

2025See, e.g., Willow Springs Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Seventh BRT Development Corp., 245 Conn. 1, 46 , 717 A.2d 77 (1998) (Fichera ’’does not stand for the proposition that independent fraudulent or deceptive acts taking place within [the] three year period [prior to the filing of CUTPA action] that have been undertaken for the purpose of concealing actionable conduct occurring prior to the three year period cannot independently form the basis of a CUTPA violation’’); Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126 , 142 n.10, 284 A.3d 645 (2022) (‘‘Fichera did not hold that § 52-595 is inapplicable f

2004The plaintiff relies on Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 493 , 656 A.2d 1009 (1995), for the proposition that a CUTPA claim can be based on an employer’s unfair conduct, where that conduct occurs outside the parameter of the employer-employee relationship.

2004The plaintiff relies on Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen, 232 Conn. 480, 493 , 656 A.2d 1009 (1995), for the proposition that a CUTPA claim can be based on an employer’s unfair conduct, where that conduct occurs outside the parameter of the employer-employee relationship.

2002See, id., 363 (knowledge of falsity, either constructive or actual), need not be proven to establish CUTPA violation)." Normand Josef Enterprises v. Connecticut National Bank , supra 230 Conn. 486 , 522-523 , quoting Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes , supra, 223 Conn. 105 -106.

2000In determining a CUTPA violation the Connecticut courts have referred to the "cigarette rule" criteria set forth by the Federal Trade Commission, Id., 522 .

2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

2021As to the CUTPA claim, our Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of law, ‘‘CUTPA [did] not apply to the facts of th[e] case.’’ Id., 79 .

2021As to the CUTPA claim, our Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of law, ‘‘CUTPA [did] not apply to the facts of th[e] case.’’ Id., 79 .

2000The defendant FCSB moves to strike count eight of the plaintiffs revised complaint on the grounds that count eight "fails to set forth allegations with sufficient particularity to sustain a CUTPA claim," and that "allegations of negligence alone are insufficient to establish that the defendant FCSB violated CUTPA." "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d

2000The defendant FCSB moves to strike count eight of the plaintiffs revised complaint on the grounds that count eight "fails to set forth allegations with sufficient particularity to sustain a CUTPA claim," and that "allegations of negligence alone are insufficient to establish that the defendant FCSB violated CUTPA." "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Peter-Michael, Inc. v. Sea Shell Associates , 244 Conn. 269 , 270 , 709 A.2d

2000The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a CUTPA violation "certainly" can be found based on a violation of Connecticut General Statutes 47a-43 (a), Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. , 209 Conn. 243 (1988).

2000The Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a CUTPA violation "certainly" can be found based on a violation of Connecticut General Statutes 47a-43 (a), Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. , 209 Conn. 243 (1988).

2011In directing a verdict in favor of the defendants on the CUTPA claim, the court reasoned that “it does not rise to the level of a trade or business practice that’s covered by [CUTPA] In support of their position that the court improperly directed a verdict on their CUTPA count, the plaintiffs cite to Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484 , 464 A.2d 847 (1983), for the proposition that a landlord-tenant relationship can be the basis for such a claim.

2011In directing a verdict in favor of the defendants on the CUTPA claim, the court reasoned that “it does not rise to the level of a trade or business practice that’s covered by [CUTPA] In support of their position that the court improperly directed a verdict on their CUTPA count, the plaintiffs cite to Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484 , 464 A.2d 847 (1983), for the proposition that a landlord-tenant relationship can be the basis for such a claim.

2011See Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc., 33 Conn. App. 575, 583 , 636 A.2d 1383 (1987) (“[i]t is not a prerequisite of a CUTPA violation to prove that a car dealer intended to deceive when an odometer reading is not accurate”); see also Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 361 , 525 A.2d 57 (1987) (“[i]t is now well established that CUTPA proscribes a broader range of conduct than did the common law action for innocent misrepresentation”).

2011See Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc., 33 Conn. App. 575, 583 , 636 A.2d 1383 (1987) (“[i]t is not a prerequisite of a CUTPA violation to prove that a car dealer intended to deceive when an odometer reading is not accurate”); see also Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 361 , 525 A.2d 57 (1987) (“[i]t is now well established that CUTPA proscribes a broader range of conduct than did the common law action for innocent misrepresentation”).

1999Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80 , 106 (1992) The defendant contends that a single incident cannot give rise to a CUTPA claim, citing, inter alia, Quimby v. Kimberly Clark, 28 Conn. App. 660 , 672 (1992).

1999Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montes, 223 Conn. 80 , 106 (1992) The defendant contends that a single incident cannot give rise to a CUTPA claim, citing, inter alia, Quimby v. Kimberly Clark, 28 Conn. App. 660 , 672 (1992).

2002Likewise, the defendant ignores that the insurer's duty in a CUTPA claim stems "not from the private insurance agreement but from a duty imposed by statute." See Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756 , 790 (1995). 2 The defendant relies upon Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651 (1986) for the proposition no CUTPA claim lies for conduct which does not also violate CUIPA where the alleged misconduct is related to the insurance industry.

2002Likewise, the defendant ignores that the insurer's duty in a CUTPA claim stems "not from the private insurance agreement but from a duty imposed by statute." See Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania, 231 Conn. 756 , 790 (1995). 2 The defendant relies upon Mead v. Burns, 199 Conn. 651 (1986) for the proposition no CUTPA claim lies for conduct which does not also violate CUIPA where the alleged misconduct is related to the insurance industry.

2001Our court has made clear that in determining whether a CUTPA violation exists the so-called "cigarette rule" applies which was formulated by the FTC, McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 192 Conn. 558 , 567 (1984).

2001Our court has made clear that in determining whether a CUTPA violation exists the so-called "cigarette rule" applies which was formulated by the FTC, McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 192 Conn. 558 , 567 (1984).

2025The court found that these misrepresentations, as well as the defendants’ ‘‘two year delay in providing’’ the plaintiff with the bank statement which revealed Hartmann’s misappropriation of the funds, ‘‘[were] intended to, and did, obfuscate and delay the plaintiff from discovering [the] fraud and CUTPA violations and commencing legal action.’’ With respect to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim specifi- cally, the court acknowledged that in Fichera v. Mine 13 The court found that the date of occurrence of the acts or omissions complained of in both counts four and five; see footnotes 8 and 9 of this

2025The court found that these misrepresentations, as well as the defendants’ ‘‘two year delay in providing’’ the plaintiff with the bank statement which revealed Hartmann’s misappropriation of the funds, ‘‘[were] intended to, and did, obfuscate and delay the plaintiff from discovering [the] fraud and CUTPA violations and commencing legal action.’’ With respect to the plaintiff’s CUTPA claim specifi- cally, the court acknowledged that in Fichera v. Mine 13 The court found that the date of occurrence of the acts or omissions complained of in both counts four and five; see footnotes 8 and 9 of this

2002The defendant responds that under the law set forth in Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 (1996), the allegations of count two are sufficient to establish a CUTPA claim.

2002The defendant responds that under the law set forth in Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 (1996), the allegations of count two are sufficient to establish a CUTPA claim.

2002A CUTPA claim cannot generally be raised" when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 232 Conn. 559 , 657 A.2d 212 (1995); see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co. , 202 Conn. 234 , 242 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217[FN 26], 579 A.2d 69 (1990).

2002A CUTPA claim cannot generally be raised" when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 232 Conn. 559 , 657 A.2d 212 (1995); see Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co. , 202 Conn. 234 , 242 , 520 A.2d 1008 (1987); A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217[FN 26], 579 A.2d 69 (1990).