sentence within standard in Pennsylvania

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding defendant’s standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard-range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding defendant’s standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2025See, e.g., Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (holding a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines is viewed as appropriate, and the sentence is not unreasonable where the trial court had the benefit of a PSI and imposed a standard-range sentence); see also Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1254-55 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding standard-range sentences were neither unreasonable nor excessive where the “record reflects that the [sentencing] court carefully considered all of the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing”).

2024Because Appellant received a sentence within the standard range recommended by the Sentencing Guidelines, we could not vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing unless this case involved circumstances where the application of the guidelines “would be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa. Super. 2009) (a sentence imposed within the standard guideline range is presumptively reasonable).

2022Commonwealth v. Ventura, 975 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Pa.Super. 2009) (cleaned up).

2026See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 1996) (explaining claim that court did not consider mitigating factors challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Wright, 600 A.2d 1289, 1290 (Pa. Super. 1991) (claim that sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines when the circumstances warranted a sentence within the mitigated range treated as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence).

2025See Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 546 (Pa. Super. 1995).

2021See Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/21, at 10; see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that where a sentence is within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, Pennsylvania law presumes the sentence is appropriate under the Sentencing Code); Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (explaining that where a sentencing court considered the PSI, it is presumed that they are “aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”); Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating th

2018See Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. 2015). - 23 - J-A19024-18 Here, the court sentenced Appellant to a sentence within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.12 In sentencing Appellant, the court acknowledged reviewing the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing guidelines, and Appellant’s history, and extensively discussed the nature and circumstances of Appellant’s offenses.

2026See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cruz-Centeno, 668 A.2d 536 (Pa. Super. 1995), appeal denied, 676 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 1996) (explaining claim that court did not consider mitigating factors challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing); Commonwealth v. Wright, 600 A.2d 1289, 1290 (Pa. Super. 1991) (claim that sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines when the circumstances warranted a sentence within the mitigated range treated as a challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence).

2026See Watson, supra. Additionally, the court imposed a sentence within the standard range.

2025See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Comitz, 530 A.2d 473 , 476 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1987) (determining that counsel was not ineffective for failing to bring a meritless claim that trial court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence within the standard range upon defendant experiencing mental illness when committing the crime because the trial court has discretion to weigh defendant’s mental health needs with the protection of the public).

2024See Tirado, supra. Additionally, the court imposed a sentence within the standard range.

2022See Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Here, each of Leatherby’s sentences was within or below the standard range of the sentencing guidelines … Thus, the trial court was not required to provide a statement of reasoning and this claim does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Szarko, 616 A.2d 26, 27 (Pa. Super. 1992) (court was not required to provide a contemporaneous written statement for a deviation from the guidelines where it imposed a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines).

2022See Commonwealth v. Leatherbury, 116 A.3d 73, 83 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Here, each of Leatherby’s sentences was within or below the standard range of the sentencing guidelines … Thus, the trial court was not required to provide a statement of reasoning and this claim does not raise a substantial question.”); Commonwealth v. Szarko, 616 A.2d 26, 27 (Pa. Super. 1992) (court was not required to provide a contemporaneous written statement for a deviation from the guidelines where it imposed a sentence within the standard range of the guidelines).

2021See Trial Court Opinion, 1/13/21, at 10; see also Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (stating that where a sentence is within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, Pennsylvania law presumes the sentence is appropriate under the Sentencing Code); Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988) (explaining that where a sentencing court considered the PSI, it is presumed that they are “aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.”); Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526, 533 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating th

2021After reviewing the record, including both the guilty plea and sentencing transcripts, we agree. - 14 - J-S10037-21 First, since this issue implicates the discretionary aspects of sentencing, Kerr would need to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by demonstrating that his claim involves a “substantial question.”6 See generally Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935-36 (Pa. Super. 2013).

2019A defendant is not guaranteed a sentence within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines; he is, however, entitled to a sufficient explanation for any deviation from the guideline ranges. “[B]asic elements of procedural due process are adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the case.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 961 A.2d 119, 132 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

2018See Commonwealth v. Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 827 (Pa. Super. 2015). - 23 - J-A19024-18 Here, the court sentenced Appellant to a sentence within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.12 In sentencing Appellant, the court acknowledged reviewing the pre-sentence investigation report, the sentencing guidelines, and Appellant’s history, and extensively discussed the nature and circumstances of Appellant’s offenses.

2017See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758, 767 (Pa. Super. 2006).

2017Under those circumstances, it is difficult to see how a "rational defendant would want to appeal." Markowitz, 32 A.3d at 716 ( citations omitted).

2015See id.

2015It is well-established that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the judge, and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Sheller, 961 A.2d 187, 190 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 980 A.2d 607 (Pa. 2009).

2015See Commonwealth v. Seagraves, 103 A.3d 839, 842 (Pa. Super. 2014) (“When, as here, the trial court has the benefit of a pre- sentence report, we presume that the court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with any mitigating factors.”).

1990See n. 1, supra. Should appellant show symptoms of AIDS, the trial court has the discretion, pursuant to 61 P.S. § 81, to modify his sentence.