161 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 40 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mailgreen2 sentences2025Nor, for that matter, does he assert that, in imposing a sentence within that standard range, the court relied on “‘material facts of constitutional magnitude that are not true.’” Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 713 (quoting Herzog, 112 Wn.2d at 431 (citing Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 ; Townsend, 334 U.S. 736 )). 2023“It is almost self-evident that, while cloaking his arguments in ‘procedure,’ [Senior’s] ultimate object . . . in seeking resentencing is to receive a lower sentence within the standard range.” Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 714 . | 4 | 18 |
State v. Ammonsgreen2 sentences2025However, a defendant is “not precluded from challenging on appeal the procedure by which a sentence within the standard range was imposed.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 (1986). 2024However, a defendant is “not precluded from challenging on appeal the procedure by which a sentence within the standard range was imposed.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 (1986). | 3 | 25 |
State v. Garcia-Martinezgreen2 sentences2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. 2017App. 322, 330 , 944 P.2d 1104 (1997)). -13- No. 74436-4-1/ 14 The first-time offender waiver allows a sentencing court to waive the imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range and impose a lesser sentence that may include up to 90 days of confinement and community custody.29 The trial court has broad discretion in sentencing a defendant under the first-time offender option or in refusing to grant a first-time offender waiver.30 Here, the record does not support Bauml's claim that the trial court categorically refused to impose a first-time offender waiver. | 2 | 12 |
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Harcon Barge Co.green2 sentences2019A trial court’s decision regarding the length of a sentence within the standard range is not appealable because “as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S. Ct. 398 , 93 L. 2004Compare Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 712 (“in order for a ‘procedural’ appeal to be allowed under Ammons, it must be shown that the sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the SRA, and that the court failed to do so”) with State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 (“[a]n appellant... is not precluded from challenging on appeal the procedure by which a sentence within the standard range was imposed”), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986). | 2 | 7 |
State v. Lawgreen2 sentences2018Law, 154 Wn.2d at 93 . 4 No. 76209-5-1/5 As a general rule, the court must impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, and a sentence for multiple current convictions is concurrent. 2015Generally, a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range." State v. Law, 18 No. 45048 -8 -II 154 Wn.2d 85, 94 , 110 P. 3d 717 ( 2005); see RCW 9. 94A.505( 2)( a)( i). | 2 | 6 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2026See State v. Johnson, 61 Wn. 2022E.g., State v. Johnson, 61 Wn. | 2 | 5 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2018Brooks, 107 Wn. 2018Brooks, 107 Wn. | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Walshgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Barberiogreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herzoggreen2 sentences2025Nor, for that matter, does he assert that, in imposing a sentence within that standard range, the court relied on “‘material facts of constitutional magnitude that are not true.’” Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 713 (quoting Herzog, 112 Wn.2d at 431 (citing Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 ; Townsend, 334 U.S. 736 )). 2019RCW 9.94A.585(1); see also State v. Herzog, 112 Wn.2d 419, 423 , 771 P.2d 739 (1989)("When the sentence given is within the presumptive sentence range then as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion and there is no right to appeal"). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Houston-Sconiersgreen2 sentences2024And in the context of juvenile sentencing, the court need not even impose a sentence within the standard range under the SRA; it has “discretion to impose any sentence below the otherwise applicable” sentence and it “must consider mitigating qualities of youth at sentencing.” Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21 (emphasis added). 2020The court emphasized that the sentencing court must consider the following factors: 1. “[M]itigating circumstances related to the defendant’s youth – including age and its ‘hallmark features,’ such as the juvenile’s ‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.’ ” Id. (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 477 ). 1 Generally, a sentence within the standard sentence range for an offense may not be appealed. | 1 | 3 |
Reardon v. Colagreen2 sentences2019A trial court’s decision regarding the length of a sentence within the standard range is not appealable because “as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S. Ct. 398 , 93 L. 2004Compare Mail, 121 Wash.2d at 712 , 854 P.2d 1042 ("in order for a `procedural' appeal to be allowed under Ammons, it must be shown that the sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the SRA, and that the court failed to do so") with State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 ("[a]n appellant ... is not precluded from challenging on appeal the procedure by which a sentence within the standard range was imposed"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S.Ct. 398 , 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986). | 1 | 3 |
Tanner v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019A trial court’s decision regarding the length of a sentence within the standard range is not appealable because “as a matter of law there can be no abuse of discretion.” State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S. Ct. 398 , 93 L. 2004Compare Mail, 121 Wash.2d at 712 , 854 P.2d 1042 ("in order for a `procedural' appeal to be allowed under Ammons, it must be shown that the sentencing court had a duty to follow some specific procedure required by the SRA, and that the court failed to do so") with State v. Ammons, 105 Wash.2d 175, 183 , 713 P.2d 719 , 718 P.2d 796 ("[a]n appellant ... is not precluded from challenging on appeal the procedure by which a sentence within the standard range was imposed"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 , 107 S.Ct. 398 , 93 L.Ed.2d 351 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mohamedgreen2 sentences2019Id. at 636 , 350 P.3d 671 . ¶ 18 The Court of Appeals in Mohamed explained that the trial court, under the DOSA statute, may "waive imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range." Id. at 638 , 350 P.3d 671 . 2019Id. at 636 , 350 P.3d 671 . ¶ 18 The Court of Appeals in Mohamed explained that the trial court, under the DOSA statute, may "waive imposition of a sentence within the standard sentence range." Id. at 638 , 350 P.3d 671 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Graysongreen2 sentences2018State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 710 , 854 P.2d 1042 (1993); RCW 9.94A.585(1). "[W]hile trial judges have considerable discretion under the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA)], they are still required to act within its strictures and principles of due process of law." State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)(citing Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 712 ). 2017App. 329, 335 , 499 P.2d 263 (1972); accord Turner v. City of Tacoma, 72 Wn.2d 1029, 1034 , 435 P.2d 927 (1967). 26 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 27 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 338 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 28 Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342 (quoting State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Graysongreen2 sentences2018State v. Mail, 121 Wn.2d 707, 710 , 854 P.2d 1042 (1993); RCW 9.94A.585(1). "[W]hile trial judges have considerable discretion under the [Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA)], they are still required to act within its strictures and principles of due process of law." State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005)(citing Mail, 121 Wn.2d at 712 ). 2017App. 329, 335 , 499 P.2d 263 (1972); accord Turner v. City of Tacoma, 72 Wn.2d 1029, 1034 , 435 P.2d 927 (1967). 26 RCW 9.94A.585(1). 27 State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 338 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 28 Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342 (quoting State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Friederich-Tibbetsred | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Mendozagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Turner v. City of Tacomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Osman
green
2 sentences2021App. 583, 587 , 213 P.3d 627 (2009). 5 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 482 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 2 No. 81313-7-I/3 “Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range.”6 But a defendant may appeal if the court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act.7 Bullington argues that the trial court erred in denying him a SSOSA because the court failed to consider “all the factors” required by RCW 9.94A.670(4).8 Specifically, he contends that the court erred in denying him a SSOSA because the court only considered the community benefit factor 2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 11 | 2017–2026 |
State v. Osman
green
2 sentences2021App. 583, 587 , 213 P.3d 627 (2009). 5 State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 482 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 2 No. 81313-7-I/3 “Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range.”6 But a defendant may appeal if the court failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the Sentencing Reform Act.7 Bullington argues that the trial court erred in denying him a SSOSA because the court failed to consider “all the factors” required by RCW 9.94A.670(4).8 Specifically, he contends that the court erred in denying him a SSOSA because the court only considered the community benefit factor 2017The sentencing court erred, she asserts, because the court denied her waiver request and imposed a standard range sentence after listening to her voluntary allocution and determining that she did not acknowledge responsibility for her criminal conduct. 5 No. 74713-4-1/6 "Generally, a defendant cannot appeal a sentence within the standard range." State v. Osman, 157 Wn.2d 474, 481 , 139 P.3d 334 (2006)(citing RCW 9.94A.585(1); State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 11 | 2017–2026 |
State v. Graham
green
2 sentences2018A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES Generally, the sentencing court must impose a sentence within the standard sentencing range under the Sentencing Reform Act.1 State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878, 882 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014). 2018A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES Generally, the sentencing court must impose a sentence within the standard sentencing range under the Sentencing Reform Act.1 State v. Graham, 181 Wn.2d 878, 882 , 337 P.3d 319 (2014). | 11 | 2015–2023 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2024State v. Brown, 145 Wn. 2024Brown, 145 Wn. | 8 | 2018–2024 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2023Under RAP 2.2(b)(6)(B), the State may appeal in a criminal case where the sentence “involves a miscalculation of the standard range.” Case law similarly 1 To avoid confusion with David Anderson (the defendant and respondent herein), the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Anderson is referred to as Tonelli Anderson (the defendant’s full name). -3- No. 83896-2-I/4 holds that the State is entitled to appeal a sentence within the standard range when it is challenging “the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision.” 2013RCW 9.94A.585(1) ("A sentence within the standard sentence range . . . shall not be appealed"); State v. Williams, 149Wn.2d 143, 146, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003); State v. Smith, 118 Wn. | 6 | 2005–2023 |
State v. Fowler
green
2 sentences2005A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are “substantial and compelling.” State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001). 2005State v. Norlin, 134 Wash.2d 570, 582 , 951 P.2d 1131 (1998). [10] A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are "substantial and compelling." State v. Fowler, 145 Wash.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001). | 6 | 2003–2014 |
State v. Fowler
green
2 sentences2005A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are “substantial and compelling.” State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001). 2005State v. Norlin, 134 Wash.2d 570, 582 , 951 P.2d 1131 (1998). [10] A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are "substantial and compelling." State v. Fowler, 145 Wash.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001). | 6 | 2003–2014 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2023Under RAP 2.2(b)(6)(B), the State may appeal in a criminal case where the sentence “involves a miscalculation of the standard range.” Case law similarly 1 To avoid confusion with David Anderson (the defendant and respondent herein), the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Anderson is referred to as Tonelli Anderson (the defendant’s full name). -3- No. 83896-2-I/4 holds that the State is entitled to appeal a sentence within the standard range when it is challenging “the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision.” 2016However, a party may "challenge the underlying legal conclusions and determinations by which a court comes to apply a particular sentencing provision." State v. Williams, 149 Wn.2d 143, 147 , 65 P.3d 1214 (2003). "[W]here a defendant has requested an exceptional sentence below the standard range: review is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise its discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range." State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. | 5 | 2005–2023 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2021Id. at 299-300 . 2005Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299 . ¶15 Here, Monroe waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt by knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty to the crimes with which he had been charged. | 5 | 2004–2021 |
State v. Law
green
2 sentences2016State v. Law, 154 Wn.2d 85, 94 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). 2015Generally, a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range." State v. Law, 18 No. 45048 -8 -II 154 Wn.2d 85, 94 , 110 P. 3d 717 ( 2005); see RCW 9. 94A.505( 2)( a)( i). | 5 | 2015–2016 |
State v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences2002Former RCW 9.94A.120(1), (2) (1998); State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 643-44 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). 2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 643-44 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001) (citing former RCW 9.94A.120(1), (2) (1999)). | 4 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Ferguson
green
2 sentences2002Former RCW 9.94A.120(1), (2) (1998); State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 643-44 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). 2002State v. Ferguson, 142 Wn.2d 631, 643-44 , 15 P.3d 1271 (2001) (citing former RCW 9.94A.120(1), (2) (1999)). | 4 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Grewe
green
2 sentences2001RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). 2001RCW 9.94A.120(2); State v. Grewe, 117 Wn.2d 211, 214 , 813 P.2d 1238 (1991). | 4 | 1996–2001 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2023A. Legal Principles “Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range unless it finds substantial and compelling reasons to justify a departure.” State v. Smith, 82 Wn. 2021“Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 [(SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW], a trial court must impose a sentence within the standard range unless it finds substantial and compelling reasons to justify a departure.” State v. Smith, 82 Wn. | 3 | 2014–2023 |
State v. McGill
green
2 sentences2024When the trial court imposes a standard range sentence over a party’s request for an exceptional sentence, review is only permissible in “‘circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence below the standard range.’” State v. McFarland, 189 Wn.2d 47 , 56, 399 P.3d 1106 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. McGill, 112 Wn. 2020Accordingly, we may review a trial court’s 12 No. 80372-7-I/13 imposition of a sentence within the standard range if “[the trial court] erroneously believed it lacked the authority to [impose an exceptional sentence].” State v. McGill, 112 Wn. | 2 | 2020–2024 |
State v. Jennings
green
2 sentences2018State v. Jennings, 106 Wn. 2017State v. Jennings, 106 Wn. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
| State v. Jackson green | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Duncan green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Pascal green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Kinneman green | 2 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Beaver green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Moro green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Beaver green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Handley green | 2 | 1993–2004 |
| State v. Moro green | 2 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Broadaway green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Broadaway green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Abdi-Issa green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Alexander green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Engel green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Townsend v. Burke green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Mail green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Engel green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| United States v. Tucker green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Yancey neutral | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Ramos green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Delbosque green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Gutierrez v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Ziglar green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Adamy neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.