reasonable person to make inquiry in Texas

2022See Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co-Owners, 866 S.W.2d at 747 (“Knowledge of facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry leading to the discovery of the concealed cause of action is in the law equivalent to knowledge of the cause of action for limitation purposes.”) (citing Stephens v. 6 James, 673 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

2017“Knowledge of facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry leading to the discovery of the concealed cause of action is in the law equivalent to knowledge of the cause of action for limitation purposes.” Bayou Bend Towers, 866 S.W.2d at 747 .

2022See Bayou Bend Towers Council of Co-Owners, 866 S.W.2d at 747 (“Knowledge of facts, conditions, or circumstances which would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry leading to the discovery of the concealed cause of action is in the law equivalent to knowledge of the cause of action for limitation purposes.”) (citing Stephens v. 6 James, 673 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

1997See Bayou Bend Towers, 866 S.W.2d at 747 ; Stephens v. James, 673 S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref d n.r.e.).

2011Repair Co., LLC v. Gonzales, 345 S.W.3d 431, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.h.).

2011Repair Co., LLC v. Gonzales, 345 S.W.3d 431, 438 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.h.).

2015See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex. 2011) (the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not toll the limitations period where plaintiff had “actual knowledge of alleged injury-causing conduct”); cf. Etan Indus., Inc., 359 S.W.3d at 623 (the estoppel effect of defendant’s presumed fraudulent concealment ended when plaintiffs were appraised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.).

2015See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex.2011) (the' doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not toll the limitations period where plaintiff had “actual knowledge of alleged injury-causing conduct”); cf. Etan Indus., Inc., 359 S.W.3d at 623 (the estoppel effect of defendant’s presumed fraudulent concealment ended when plaintiffs were appraised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.).

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W .3d at 929 (“Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell’s alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations.”); Marshall, 342 S.W .3d at 69 (“[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP’s fraud through the use of reasonab

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 929 (“Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell's alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations.”); Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 69 (“[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP's fraud through the use of reasonable

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 929 ("Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell’s alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations."); Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 69 (”[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP's fraud through the use of reasonable

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 929 (“Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell's alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations.”); Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 69 (“[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP's fraud through the use of reasonable

2015See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex. 2011) (the doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not toll the limitations period where plaintiff had “actual knowledge of alleged injury-causing conduct”); cf. Etan Indus., Inc., 359 S.W.3d at 623 (the estoppel effect of defendant’s presumed fraudulent concealment ended when plaintiffs were appraised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.).

2015See Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 209 (Tex.2011) (the' doctrine of fraudulent concealment did not toll the limitations period where plaintiff had “actual knowledge of alleged injury-causing conduct”); cf. Etan Indus., Inc., 359 S.W.3d at 623 (the estoppel effect of defendant’s presumed fraudulent concealment ended when plaintiffs were appraised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.).

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 929 ("Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell’s alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations."); Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 69 (”[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP's fraud through the use of reasonable

2015By that date, the Lehmanns were apprised of facts, conditions, and circumstances sufficient to cause a reasonable person to make inquiry that would lead to the discovery of the concealed cause of action.”); Ross, 356 S.W.3d at 929 (“Because the Rosses could have discovered Shell's alleged fraud through the use of reasonable diligence, we hold that, as a matter of law, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment cannot apply to toll the statute of limitations.”); Marshall, 342 S.W.3d at 69 (“[A]s a matter of law, the Marshalls would have been able to discover BP's fraud through the use of reasonable

2015See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex. 1983).

1992See Borderlon v. Peck, 661 S.W.2d 907, 909 (Tex.1983) (limitations in a medical malpractice case).

2010Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d at 439 ; see Ponder, 889 S.W.2d at 645 (recognizing estoppel effect of fraudulent concealment ends when party learns of facts, conditions, or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to discovery of cause of action).

2010Bartlett , 958 S.W.2d at 439 ; see Ponder , 889 S.W.2d at 645 (recognizing estoppel effect of fraudulent concealment ends when party learns of facts, conditions, or circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to make inquiry, which, if pursued, would lead to discovery of cause of action).

2013Id. at 927 .

2013See Haidar, 239 S.W.3d at 926, 927 .

2013Pirtle v. Kahn, 177 S.W.3d 567, 571 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).

2011Kizer v. Meyer, Lytton, Alen & Whitaker, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 384, 389 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.) (discussing discovery rule in context of lawsuit over foundation problems); Haidar v. Nortex Found.

2005Rubalcaba v. Kaestner , 981 S.W.2d 369, 376 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied).