defendants first claim in Connecticut

2017"It is well settled that a trial court in foreclosure proceedings has discretion, on equitable considerations and principles, to withhold foreclosure or to reduce the amount of the stated indebtedness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut , 167 Conn.App. 347 , 378, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).

2017"It is well settled that a trial court in foreclosure proceedings has discretion, on equitable considerations and principles, to withhold foreclosure or to reduce the amount of the stated indebtedness." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut , 167 Conn.App. 347 , 378, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).

2016Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394 , 409, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004), which held that the standard for determining whether an insured's intent may be negated for the purposes of an intentional act exclusion is whether the insured was able to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.

2016Co. v. Barron, 269 Conn. 394 , 409, 848 A.2d 1165 (2004), which held that the standard for determining whether an insured's intent may be negated for the purposes of an intentional act exclusion is whether the insured was able to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.

2012The defendants argue that the prevailing law establishes that the duties of a tree warden are discretionary as a matter of law, and they cite § 23-59 9 *371 and this court’s decision in DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005), in support of their position.

2012The defendants argue that the prevailing law establishes that the duties of a tree warden are discretionary as a matter of law, and they cite § 23-59 9 *371 and this court’s decision in DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005), in support of their position.

2012On appeal, the defendants first claim that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that the commission lacked jurisdiction “to review the amount of a spouse’s recovery from a third party claim for loss of consortium when determining the appropriate moratorium due [the defendants].” The defendants contend that, pursuant to this court’s holding in Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 406 , 750 A.2d 1098 (2000), the commissioner has not only the authority but also the obligation to review the subject settlement allocation between the plaintiff and his wife “to determi

2012On appeal, the defendants first claim that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that the commission lacked jurisdiction “to review the amount of a spouse’s recovery from a third party claim for loss of consortium when determining the appropriate moratorium due [the defendants].” The defendants contend that, pursuant to this court’s holding in Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 406 , 750 A.2d 1098 (2000), the commissioner has not only the authority but also the obligation to review the subject settlement allocation between the plaintiff and his wife “to determi

2012The defendants argue that the prevailing law establishes that the duties of a tree warden are discretionary as a matter of law, and they cite § 23-59 9 *371 and this court’s decision in DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005), in support of their position.

2012The defendants argue that the prevailing law establishes that the duties of a tree warden are discretionary as a matter of law, and they cite § 23-59 9 *371 and this court’s decision in DeConti v. McGlone, 88 Conn. App. 270 , 869 A.2d 271 , cert. denied, 273 Conn. 940 , 875 A.2d 42 (2005), in support of their position.

2008Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148 , 799 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911 , 806 A.2d 49 (2002).

2008Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148 , 799 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911 , 806 A.2d 49 (2002).

2008Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148 , 799 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911 , 806 A.2d 49 (2002).

2008Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn. App. 133, 148 , 799 A.2d 298 , cert. denied, 261 Conn. 911 , 806 A.2d 49 (2002).

2007Specifically, the defendants argue, pursuant to Woodhouse v. McKee, 90 Conn. App. 662 , 879 A.2d 486 (2005), that because the original owners of lots 193 and 201 were related, a presumption of permissive use arose regarding the presently disputed lot, and because this presumption was not clearly repudiated, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the use of the disputed area was hostile.

2007Specifically, the defendants argue, pursuant to Woodhouse v. McKee, 90 Conn. App. 662 , 879 A.2d 486 (2005), that because the original owners of lots 193 and 201 were related, a presumption of permissive use arose regarding the presently disputed lot, and because this presumption was not clearly repudiated, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the use of the disputed area was hostile.

2004Specifically, the defen dants contend that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) pursuant to § 7-4 (b) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the plaintiff had met her burden of demonstrating that the facts forming the basis of Swan’s testimony were “of a type customarily relied on by experts in the particular field in forming opinions on the subject”; and (2) Swan’s testimony satisfied the threshold requirements for the admissibility of scientific evidence as set forth in § 7-2 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 11 and as articulated in State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 57 .

2003At the outset, we note our well established standard of review regarding the evidentiary rulings of the court. “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence. . . . [Its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William B., 76 Conn. App. 730, 739 , 822 A.2d 265 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 918 , 828 A.2d 618 (2003).

2003At the outset, we note our well established standard of review regarding the evidentiary rulings of the court. “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence. . . . [Its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William B., 76 Conn. App. 730, 739 , 822 A.2d 265 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 918 , 828 A.2d 618 (2003).

2003At the outset, we note our well established standard of review regarding the evidentiary rulings of the court. “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence. . . . [Its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William B., 76 Conn. App. 730, 739 , 822 A.2d 265 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 918 , 828 A.2d 618 (2003).

2003At the outset, we note our well established standard of review regarding the evidentiary rulings of the court. “[T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility ... of evidence. . . . [Its] ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William B., 76 Conn. App. 730, 739 , 822 A.2d 265 , cert. denied, 264 Conn. 918 , 828 A.2d 618 (2003).

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2002Practice Book § 10-31 (a) states in relevant part that "[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. . . ." "[A] claim that [the] court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [may be raised] at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dowling v. Slotnick , 244 Conn. 781 , 787 , 712 A.2d 396 , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1017 , 119 S.Ct. 542 , 142 L.Ed.2d 451 (1998). "[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proce

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

2001The defendants argue that the court’s finding that there was an escrow agreement directly contra venes Galvanek v. Skibitcky, 55 Conn. App. 254 , 738 A.2d 1150 (1999), and Kallas v. Harnen, 48 Conn. App. 253 , 709 A.2d 586 , cert. denied, 244 Conn. 935 , 717 A.2d 232 (1998). 6 We are not persuaded.

1999I am going to deny the motion.” Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Gus-sak filed the in lieu of appearance on May 28, 1997. 8 A The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants’ objection to hearsay testimony offered by plaintiffs counsel, Zeichner, concerning his authority to pursue a deficiency judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 We disagree. “[Hjearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Emphasis added; internal quo

1999I am going to deny the motion.” Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Gus-sak filed the in lieu of appearance on May 28, 1997. 8 A The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants’ objection to hearsay testimony offered by plaintiffs counsel, Zeichner, concerning his authority to pursue a deficiency judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 We disagree. “[Hjearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Emphasis added; internal quo

1999They also attempt to distinguish between the terms “stipulation” and “voluntary agreement.” We are not persuaded. “ ‘In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’ United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755 , 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). ‘[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature’s intent.’ American Universal Ins.

1999They also attempt to distinguish between the terms “stipulation” and “voluntary agreement.” We are not persuaded. “ ‘In construing any statute, we seek to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.’ United Illuminating Co. v. Groppo, 220 Conn. 749, 755 , 601 A.2d 1005 (1992). ‘[W]hen the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we need look no further than the words themselves because we assume that the language expresses the legislature’s intent.’ American Universal Ins.

1999Standing The defendants first claim that Stone Street lacks standing to pursue this action. "`It is a basic principle of our law . . . that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.' . . . `A party pursuing declaratory relief must . . . demonstrate, as in ordinary actions, a "justiciable right" in the controversy sought to be resolved, that is, "contract, property or personal rights . . . as such will be affected by the [court's] decision. . . .'" `When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standin

1999Standing The defendants first claim that Stone Street lacks standing to pursue this action. "`It is a basic principle of our law . . . that the plaintiffs must have standing in order for a court to have jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment.' . . . `A party pursuing declaratory relief must . . . demonstrate, as in ordinary actions, a "justiciable right" in the controversy sought to be resolved, that is, "contract, property or personal rights . . . as such will be affected by the [court's] decision. . . .'" `When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standin

1999I am going to deny the motion.” Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Gus-sak filed the in lieu of appearance on May 28, 1997. 8 A The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants’ objection to hearsay testimony offered by plaintiffs counsel, Zeichner, concerning his authority to pursue a deficiency judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 We disagree. “[Hjearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Emphasis added; internal quo

1999I am going to deny the motion.” Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Gus-sak filed the in lieu of appearance on May 28, 1997. 8 A The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants’ objection to hearsay testimony offered by plaintiffs counsel, Zeichner, concerning his authority to pursue a deficiency judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 We disagree. “[Hjearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Emphasis added; internal quo

1999I am going to deny the motion.” Immediately thereafter, the trial court found that Gus-sak filed the in lieu of appearance on May 28, 1997. 8 A The defendants first claim that the trial court improperly overruled the defendants’ objection to hearsay testimony offered by plaintiffs counsel, Zeichner, concerning his authority to pursue a deficiency judgment on behalf of the plaintiff. 9 We disagree. “[Hjearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” (Emphasis added; internal quo

1997The defendants, relying on Katz v. Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 170 , 158 A. 219 (1932), requested that the jury be charged that if the defendants were not insolvent at the time of the transfers of their respective property, notwithstanding future misfortune, no fraudulent conveyances occurred. 6 The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ rely on language in Katz that is taken out of context and therefore inappropriate.

1997The defendants, relying on Katz v. Richman, 114 Conn. 165, 170 , 158 A. 219 (1932), requested that the jury be charged that if the defendants were not insolvent at the time of the transfers of their respective property, notwithstanding future misfortune, no fraudulent conveyances occurred. 6 The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ rely on language in Katz that is taken out of context and therefore inappropriate.