real-party-in-interest rule in Michigan

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2019In Kearns v Mich Iron & Coke Co, 340 Mich 577, 582 ; 66 NW2d 230 (1954), our Supreme Court explained that “where an assignment is such that satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the assignee will discharge the defendant from his obligation to the assignor, for the purpose of the suit the assignee is the real party in interest and may maintain an action in his own name.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added.) Later, in Stillman v Goldfarb, 172 Mich App 231, 237 ; 431 NW2d 247 (1988), this Court explained that the real-party-in-interest doctrine is a “standing doctrine.” Thus

2019In Kearns v Mich Iron & Coke Co, 340 Mich 577, 582 ; 66 NW2d 230 (1954), our Supreme Court explained that “where an assignment is such that satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the assignee will discharge the defendant from his obligation to the assignor, for the purpose of the suit the assignee is the real party in interest and may maintain an action in his own name.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added.) Later, in Stillman v Goldfarb, 172 Mich App 231, 237 ; 431 NW2d 247 (1988), this Court explained that the real-party-in-interest doctrine is a “standing doctrine.” Thus

2023Indeed, the real-party-in-interest requirement exists to “protect[ ] a defendant from multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action.” Kalamazoo v Richland Twp, 221 Mich App 531, 534 ; 562 NW2d 237 (1997).

2023Indeed, the real-party-in-interest requirement exists to “protect[ ] a defendant from multiple lawsuits for the same cause of action.” Kalamazoo v Richland Twp, 221 Mich App 531, 534 ; 562 NW2d 237 (1997).

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025A litigant may have standing in this context if the litigant has a special injury or right, or substantial interest, that will be detrimentally affected in a manner different from the citizenry at large or if the statutory scheme implies that the Legislature intended to confer standing on the litigant. [C-Spine, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18, quoting Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, 487 Mich at 372 .] The real-party-in-interest rule, in contrast to the concept of standing, “is derived from statutes and court rules.” C-Spine, ___ Mich at ___; slip op at 18.

2022Jurisdiction is not an issue in this case. -14- In Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, MEA/NEA v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), our Supreme Court, overruling several of its earlier opinions, enunciated the principles of standing in Michigan going forward: We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan’s long-standing historical approach to standing.

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2025At best, the passing observations of the DeLong Court are obiter dicta, the relevance of which is greatly diminished by more recent caselaw from this Court and the Court of Appeals that offers sound reasons why litigation should be commenced only by the real party in interest. 14 The majority opinion also cites Waters ex rel Commercial Cas Ins Co v Schultz, 15 People ex rel Herbert v McKinley, 16 and Cannon Twp, 17 stating that these cases “observe 12 Id. at 67 . 13 Id. at 68-69 . 14 Miller, 477 Mich at 106 ; see also Farrar v Suburban Mobility Auth for Regional Transp, 345 Mich App 472 , 482;

2023Statutory standing is a jurisdictional principle, while “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another.” Id. “[I]f a party lacks statutory standing, then the court generally lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or reach the merits.” Id., citing Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601, 608-612 ; 751 NW2d 463 (2008); see also Grady v Wambach, 339 Mich App 325 , 330; 984 NW2d 463 (2021).

2022Statutory standing is a jurisdictional principle, while “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another.” Id. “[I]f a party lacks statutory standing, then the court generally lacks jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding or reach the merits.” Id., citing Miller v Allstate Ins Co, 481 Mich 601, 608-612 ; 751 NW2d 463 (2008); see also Grady v Wambach, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2021) (Docket No. 354091); slip op at 3.

2019In Kearns v Mich Iron & Coke Co, 340 Mich 577, 582 ; 66 NW2d 230 (1954), our Supreme Court explained that “where an assignment is such that satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the assignee will discharge the defendant from his obligation to the assignor, for the purpose of the suit the assignee is the real party in interest and may maintain an action in his own name.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added.) Later, in Stillman v Goldfarb, 172 Mich App 231, 237 ; 431 NW2d 247 (1988), this Court explained that the real-party-in-interest doctrine is a “standing doctrine.” Thus

2019In Kearns v Mich Iron & Coke Co, 340 Mich 577, 582 ; 66 NW2d 230 (1954), our Supreme Court explained that “where an assignment is such that satisfaction of the judgment obtained by the assignee will discharge the defendant from his obligation to the assignor, for the purpose of the suit the assignee is the real party in interest and may maintain an action in his own name.” (Quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added.) Later, in Stillman v Goldfarb, 172 Mich App 231, 237 ; 431 NW2d 247 (1988), this Court explained that the real-party-in-interest doctrine is a “standing doctrine.” Thus

2017“Absent unique circumstances, an attorney is only liable in negligence to his client.” Mieras v DeBona, 452 Mich 278, 297 ; 550 NW2d 202 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J).

2017“Absent unique circumstances, an attorney is only liable in negligence to his client.” Mieras v DeBona, 452 Mich 278, 297 ; 550 NW2d 202 (1996) (opinion by BOYLE, J).

2024Because the trial court considered documents outside the pleadings in deciding whether plaintiff had the legal authority to bring this wrongful-death action, we will “treat the trial court’s decision as having been made under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” Cannon Twp, 311 Mich App at 411 , citing Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

2024Because the trial court considered documents outside the pleadings in deciding whether plaintiff had the legal authority to bring this wrongful-death action, we will “treat the trial court’s decision as having been made under MCR 2.116(C)(10).” Cannon Twp, 311 Mich App at 411 , citing Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-120 ; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).

2022At the time the suits were commenced, which is the timeframe that we must consider for purposes of standing and the real-party-in-interest rule, League of Women Voters, 506 Mich at 595 n 54; Girard, 437 Mich at 244 , C-Spine had fully conveyed their rights and interests in PIP benefits in exchange for compensation, and there were no counter-assignments.

2022Jurisdiction is not an issue in this case. -14- In Lansing Sch Ed Ass’n, MEA/NEA v Lansing Bd of Ed, 487 Mich 349, 372 ; 792 NW2d 686 (2010), our Supreme Court, overruling several of its earlier opinions, enunciated the principles of standing in Michigan going forward: We hold that Michigan standing jurisprudence should be restored to a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent with Michigan’s long-standing historical approach to standing.

2020First, we note that Gary failed to raise this argument below.5 “We review unpreserved challenges for plain error.” Total Armored Car Serv, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 325 Mich App 403, 412 ; 926 NW2d 276 (2018).

2020First, we note that Gary failed to raise this argument below.5 “We review unpreserved challenges for plain error.” Total Armored Car Serv, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 325 Mich App 403, 412 ; 926 NW2d 276 (2018).

2020Thus, in the 4 Gary’s reliance on Killefer v McLain, 78 Mich 249 ; 44 NW 405 (1889); Perrin v Lepper, 72 Mich 454 ; 40 NW 859 (1888), and Heath v Waters, 40 Mich 457 (1879), is misplaced.

2020Thus, in the 4 Gary’s reliance on Killefer v McLain, 78 Mich 249 ; 44 NW 405 (1889); Perrin v Lepper, 72 Mich 454 ; 40 NW 859 (1888), and Heath v Waters, 40 Mich 457 (1879), is misplaced.

2020Thus, in the 4 Gary’s reliance on Killefer v McLain, 78 Mich 249 ; 44 NW 405 (1889); Perrin v Lepper, 72 Mich 454 ; 40 NW 859 (1888), and Heath v Waters, 40 Mich 457 (1879), is misplaced.

2020Thus, in the 4 Gary’s reliance on Killefer v McLain, 78 Mich 249 ; 44 NW 405 (1889); Perrin v Lepper, 72 Mich 454 ; 40 NW 859 (1888), and Heath v Waters, 40 Mich 457 (1879), is misplaced.

2020Thus, in the 4 Gary’s reliance on Killefer v McLain, 78 Mich 249 ; 44 NW 405 (1889); Perrin v Lepper, 72 Mich 454 ; 40 NW 859 (1888), and Heath v Waters, 40 Mich 457 (1879), is misplaced.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.

2014Although Leite was an order of the Michigan Supreme Court, the order is binding because “it constitute[d] a final disposition of an application and contain[ed] a concise statement of the applicable facts and reasons for the decision.” DeFrain v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 491 Mich 359, 369 ; 817 NW2d 504 (2012). 5 See In re Beatrice Rottenberg Living Trust, 300 Mich App 339, 355 ; 833 NW2d 384 (2013) (stating that “the real-party-in-interest rule is essentially a prudential limitation on a litigant’s ability to raise the legal rights of another”). 6 Dalley, 287 Mich App at 304 , quoting MCR 2.