statutory corroboration requirement in New York

2024"Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d 16, 23-24 [2014] [citations omitted]; accord People v Jones , 166 AD3d 1394 , 1395 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 950 [2019]; People v Slaughter , 150 AD3d 1415, 1416 [3d Dept 2017]).

2024"Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d 16, 23-24 [2014] [citations omitted]; accord People v Jones , 166 AD3d 1394 , 1395 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 950 [2019]; People v Slaughter , 150 AD3d 1415, 1416 [3d Dept 2017]).

2016This statutory corroboration requirement is satisfied by “ ‘some proof, of whatever weight’, that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone” (People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987], quoting People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Cole, 24 AD3d 1021, 1024 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006]) and “does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 [1997]; People v Guillery, 260 AD2d 661, 661 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]).

2014In any event, the record contains ample corroborative evidence that the crimes of which he was convicted were committed, and thus the statutory corroboration requirement was met (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; Green, 43 AD3d at 1281; People v Rutledge, 286 AD2d 962, 962 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 687 [2001]).

2016This statutory corroboration requirement is satisfied by “ ‘some proof, of whatever weight’, that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone” (People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987], quoting People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Cole, 24 AD3d 1021, 1024 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006]) and “does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 [1997]; People v Guillery, 260 AD2d 661, 661 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]).

2008A cardinal rule of evidence in our law is that “[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” (CPL 60.50.) As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Chico ( 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]): “This statutory corroboration requirement does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged (see, People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 ; People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327, 334 , cert denied 430 US 948 ), but instead calls for ‘some proof, of

2016This statutory corroboration requirement is satisfied by “ ‘some proof, of whatever weight’, that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone” (People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987], quoting People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Cole, 24 AD3d 1021, 1024 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006]) and “does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 [1997]; People v Guillery, 260 AD2d 661, 661 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]).

2008A cardinal rule of evidence in our law is that “[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” (CPL 60.50.) As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Chico ( 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]): “This statutory corroboration requirement does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged (see, People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 ; People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327, 334 , cert denied 430 US 948 ), but instead calls for ‘some proof, of

2014Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court erred in admitting the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses on the ground that it improperly bolstered the testimony of two other prosecution witnesses (see People v West, 56 NY2d 662, 663 [1982]; see also People v Comerford, 70 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2010]).

2014Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court erred in admitting the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses on the ground that it improperly bolstered the testimony of two other prosecution witnesses (see People v West, 56 NY2d 662, 663 [1982]; see also People v Comerford, 70 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2010]).

2015The statutory corroboration requirement may be satisfied by evidence that “ ‘tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth’ ” (People v Reome, 15 NY3d at 192 , quoting People v Dixon, 231 NY 111, 116 [1921]; see People v Sage, 23 NY3d at 27 ).

2014The quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement is “enough if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth” (People v Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 192 [2010], quoting People v Dixon, 231 NY 111, 116 [1921]).

2014In any event, the record contains ample corroborative evidence that the crimes of which he was convicted were committed, and thus the statutory corroboration requirement was met (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; Green, 43 AD3d at 1281; People v Rutledge, 286 AD2d 962, 962 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 687 [2001]).

2014In any event, the record contains ample corroborative evidence that the crimes of which he was convicted were committed, and thus the statutory corroboration requirement was met (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; Green, 43 AD3d at 1281; People v Rutledge, 286 AD2d 962, 962 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 687 [2001]).

2014In any event, the record contains ample corroborative evidence that the crimes of which he was convicted were committed, and thus the statutory corroboration requirement was met (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; Green, 43 AD3d at 1281; People v Rutledge, 286 AD2d 962, 962 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 687 [2001]).

2014In any event, the record contains ample corroborative evidence that the crimes of which he was convicted were committed, and thus the statutory corroboration requirement was met (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]; Green, 43 AD3d at 1281; People v Rutledge, 286 AD2d 962, 962 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 687 [2001]).

2014Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court erred in admitting the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses on the ground that it improperly bolstered the testimony of two other prosecution witnesses (see People v West, 56 NY2d 662, 663 [1982]; see also People v Comerford, 70 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2010]).

2014Defendant failed to preserve for our review his further contention that the court erred in admitting the testimony of certain prosecution witnesses on the ground that it improperly bolstered the testimony of two other prosecution witnesses (see People v West, 56 NY2d 662, 663 [1982]; see also People v Comerford, 70 AD3d 1305, 1306 [2010]).

2024"Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d 16, 23-24 [2014] [citations omitted]; accord People v Jones , 166 AD3d 1394 , 1395 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 950 [2019]; People v Slaughter , 150 AD3d 1415, 1416 [3d Dept 2017]).

2024"Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d 16, 23-24 [2014] [citations omitted]; accord People v Jones , 166 AD3d 1394 , 1395 [3d Dept 2018], lv denied 33 NY3d 950 [2019]; People v Slaughter , 150 AD3d 1415, 1416 [3d Dept 2017]).

2023However, "the minimal statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Guillery , 260 AD2d 661, 662 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]) "need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession" ( People v Flemming , 101 AD3d at 1485 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d 1003, 1004 [3d Dept 2023]) and "does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged" ( People v Scippio , 144 AD3d 1184, 1186 [3d Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 1150 [2017]).

2016This statutory corroboration requirement is satisfied by “ ‘some proof, of whatever weight’, that the offense charged has in fact been committed by someone” (People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 [1987], quoting People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Cole, 24 AD3d 1021, 1024 [2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006]) and “does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged” (People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585, 589 [1997]; People v Guillery, 260 AD2d 661, 661 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]).

2022Testimony from both victims established the younger victim's relation to defendant and the older victim's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement set forth in Penal Law § 255.30 (2) ( see People v Vincent , 34 AD2d 705, 707 [1970], affd 27 NY2d 964 [1970]; cf. Matter of Nevada FF. , 214 AD2d 814, 815 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 703 [1995]).

2022Testimony from both victims established the younger victim's relation to defendant and the older victim's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement set forth in Penal Law § 255.30 (2) ( see People v Vincent , 34 AD2d 705, 707 [1970], affd 27 NY2d 964 [1970]; cf. Matter of Nevada FF. , 214 AD2d 814, 815 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 703 [1995]).

2022Testimony from both victims established the younger victim's relation to defendant and the older victim's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement set forth in Penal Law § 255.30 (2) ( see People v Vincent , 34 AD2d 705, 707 [1970], affd 27 NY2d 964 [1970]; cf. Matter of Nevada FF. , 214 AD2d 814, 815 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 703 [1995]).

2022Testimony from both victims established the younger victim's relation to defendant and the older victim's testimony was sufficient to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement set forth in Penal Law § 255.30 (2) ( see People v Vincent , 34 AD2d 705, 707 [1970], affd 27 NY2d 964 [1970]; cf. Matter of Nevada FF. , 214 AD2d 814, 815 [1995], lv denied 86 NY2d 703 [1995]).

2022Lastly, testimony from an investigator, together with the victims' testimony as to how defendant was related to the younger victim, established that defendant was well over the age of 21 at the time of his sexual encounters with the victims ( compare People v Castro , 286 AD2d 989, 990 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 680 [2001]).

2022Lastly, testimony from an investigator, together with the victims' testimony as to how defendant was related to the younger victim, established that defendant was well over the age of 21 at the time of his sexual encounters with the victims ( compare People v Castro , 286 AD2d 989, 990 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 680 [2001]).

2018If, however, the trial court finds that "different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the proof regarding complicity" ( People v Basch , 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; accord People v Caban , 5 NY3d at 152-153 ), then the court must submit that factual question to the jury for resolution and instruct the jury "to apply the corroboration requirement only if [it] makes a factual finding that the witness is an accomplice in fact" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d at 24 ; see People v Sweet , 78 NY2d 263, 266 [1991]).

2014In a case where the court concludes that a factual dispute exists as to whether the witness is an accomplice under the statute, the factual question is left for the jury to resolve (see People v Vataj, 69 NY2d 985, 987 [1987]; People v Dorler, 53 NY2d 831, 832-833 [1981]; People v Arce, 42 NY2d 179, 186 [1977]; People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12, 23 [1972]; cf. People v Jones, 73 NY2d 902, 903 [1989] [holding that no accomplice in fact instruction was warranted because there was no evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that the alleged accomplice

2015The statutory corroboration requirement may be satisfied by evidence that “ ‘tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth’ ” (People v Reome, 15 NY3d at 192 , quoting People v Dixon, 231 NY 111, 116 [1921]; see People v Sage, 23 NY3d at 27 ).

2014The quantum of evidence necessary to satisfy the statutory corroboration requirement is “enough if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth” (People v Reome, 15 NY3d 188, 192 [2010], quoting People v Dixon, 231 NY 111, 116 [1921]).

2015The trial evidence left open the possibility that Gunness was under duress when he allegedly aided defendant in her criminal conduct, as well as that his marriage had been entered into for legitimate reasons, and Supreme Court properly instructed the jury to determine whether the two were accomplices (see People v Sage, 23 NY3d at 24 ; People v Vataj, 69 NY2d 985, 987 [1987]; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 375 [1973]).

2014In a case where the court concludes that a factual dispute exists as to whether the witness is an accomplice under the statute, the factual question is left for the jury to resolve (see People v Vataj, 69 NY2d 985, 987 [1987]; People v Dorler, 53 NY2d 831, 832-833 [1981]; People v Arce, 42 NY2d 179, 186 [1977]; People v Basch, 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; People v Wheatman, 31 NY2d 12, 23 [1972]; cf. People v Jones, 73 NY2d 902, 903 [1989] [holding that no accomplice in fact instruction was warranted because there was no evidence from which it can be reasonably inferred that the alleged accomplice

2015The trial evidence left open the possibility that Gunness was under duress when he allegedly aided defendant in her criminal conduct, as well as that his marriage had been entered into for legitimate reasons, and Supreme Court properly instructed the jury to determine whether the two were accomplices (see People v Sage, 23 NY3d at 24 ; People v Vataj, 69 NY2d 985, 987 [1987]; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 375 [1973]).

2014Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement (see Sweet, 78 NY2d at 268 ; People v Minarich, 46 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 378 [1973]; People v Jenner, 29 NY2d 695 [1971]; see also CJI2d[NY] Accomplice As A Matter of Law [rev Jan. 2011], available at http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/ CJI2d.Accomplice_law.pdf [accessed Mar. 9, 201

2012When a statutory corroboration requirement governs, the possibility exists that an acquittal flows not from a factual issue being resolved in the defendant’s favor as a purely factual matter, but “merely [because] the People had not met the requirement of corroboration” (People v Goodman, 69 NY2d 32, 42 [1986]).

2012When a statutory corroboration requirement governs, the possibility exists that an acquittal flows not from a factual issue being resolved in the defendant’s favor as a purely factual matter, but “merely [because] the People had not met the requirement of corroboration” (People v Goodman, 69 NY2d 32, 42 [1986]).

2008A cardinal rule of evidence in our law is that “[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” (CPL 60.50.) As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Chico ( 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]): “This statutory corroboration requirement does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged (see, People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 ; People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327, 334 , cert denied 430 US 948 ), but instead calls for ‘some proof, of

1997This statutory corroboration requirement does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged (see, People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 ; People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327, 334 , cert denied 430 US 948 ), but instead calls for "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” (People v Daniels, 37 NY2d 624 , *590 629; see also, People v Booden, supra, at 187; People v Lipsky, 57 NY2d 560, 571 , rearg denied 58 NY2d 824 ; People v Cuozzo, 292 NY 85, 92 ).

2008A cardinal rule of evidence in our law is that “[a] person may not be convicted of any offense solely upon evidence of a confession or admission made by him without additional proof that the offense charged has been committed.” (CPL 60.50.) As the Court of Appeals explained in People v Chico ( 90 NY2d 585, 589-590 [1997]): “This statutory corroboration requirement does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged (see, People v Booden, 69 NY2d 185, 187 ; People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327, 334 , cert denied 430 US 948 ), but instead calls for ‘some proof, of

1999Under these circumstances, the minimal statutory corroboration requirement was sufficiently satisfied (see, People v Lipsky, supra, at 571).

2018If, however, the trial court finds that "different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the proof regarding complicity" ( People v Basch , 36 NY2d 154, 157 [1975]; accord People v Caban , 5 NY3d at 152-153 ), then the court must submit that factual question to the jury for resolution and instruct the jury "to apply the corroboration requirement only if [it] makes a factual finding that the witness is an accomplice in fact" ( People v Sage , 23 NY3d at 24 ; see People v Sweet , 78 NY2d 263, 266 [1991]).

2014Where the court determines on the evidence that a witness comes within the meaning of CPL 60.22 (2), the witness is an accomplice as a matter of law, and the court must instruct the jury that the witness is an accomplice and subject to the statutory corroboration requirement (see Sweet, 78 NY2d at 268 ; People v Minarich, 46 NY2d 970, 971 [1979]; People v Beaudet, 32 NY2d 371, 378 [1973]; People v Jenner, 29 NY2d 695 [1971]; see also CJI2d[NY] Accomplice As A Matter of Law [rev Jan. 2011], available at http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/cji/1-General/ CJI2d.Accomplice_law.pdf [accessed Mar. 9, 201

2023Rather, the corroboration requirement is satisfied by "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was [*2]committed by someone" ( People v Daniels , 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Bateman , 212 AD3d at 995 ; People v Baltes , 75 AD3d 656, 659 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d at 1004 ).

2023Rather, the corroboration requirement is satisfied by "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was [*2]committed by someone" ( People v Daniels , 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Bateman , 212 AD3d at 995 ; People v Baltes , 75 AD3d 656, 659 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d at 1004 ).

2023However, "the minimal statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Guillery , 260 AD2d 661, 662 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]) "need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession" ( People v Flemming , 101 AD3d at 1485 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d 1003, 1004 [3d Dept 2023]) and "does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged" ( People v Scippio , 144 AD3d 1184, 1186 [3d Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 1150 [2017]).

2023Rather, the corroboration requirement is satisfied by "some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was [*2]committed by someone" ( People v Daniels , 37 NY2d 624, 629 [1975]; accord People v Bateman , 212 AD3d at 995 ; People v Baltes , 75 AD3d 656, 659 [3d Dept 2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 918 [2010]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d at 1004 ).

2023However, "the minimal statutory corroboration requirement" ( People v Guillery , 260 AD2d 661, 662 [3d Dept 1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 971 [1999]) "need not establish guilt or every detail of the crime or confession" ( People v Flemming , 101 AD3d at 1485 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v Hebert , 218 AD3d 1003, 1004 [3d Dept 2023]) and "does not mandate submission of independent evidence of every component of the crime charged" ( People v Scippio , 144 AD3d 1184, 1186 [3d Dept 2016] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted], lv denied 28 NY3d 1150 [2017]).