29 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1956–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Greater Chicago Combine & Center Inc. v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences2008See Greater Chicago Combine & Center, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 431 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Keying off the words ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable’ as well as the other rational basis language in Euclid, our precedent has routinely applied Euclid as a rational basis rule for substantive due process and equal protection challenges to municipal ordinances”). 2008See Greater Chicago Combine & Center, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 431 F.3d 1065, 1071 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Keying off the words ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable’ as well as the other rational basis language in Euclid, our precedent has -12- routinely applied Euclid as a rational basis rule for substantive due process and equal protection challenges to municipal ordinances”). | 2 | 2 |
Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicagogreen2 sentences2003"Purchasers who acquire property with the expectation of using it for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions should not expect loss resulting from denial of the proposed use to be a persuasive argument in securing the change." Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 304, 310 , 196 N.E.2d 682 (1964); National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 204 Ill. 2003“Purchasers who acquire property with the expectation of using it for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions should not expect loss resulting from denial of the proposed use to be a persuasive argument in securing the change.” Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 304, 310 (1964); National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 204 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grovegreen2 sentences2003"Purchasers who acquire property with the expectation of using it for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions should not expect loss resulting from denial of the proposed use to be a persuasive argument in securing the change." Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill.2d 304, 310 , 196 N.E.2d 682 (1964); National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 204 Ill. 2003“Purchasers who acquire property with the expectation of using it for a purpose not permissible under current zoning restrictions should not expect loss resulting from denial of the proposed use to be a persuasive argument in securing the change.” Lapkus Builders, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 30 Ill. 2d 304, 310 (1964); National Advertising Co. v. Village of Downers Grove, 204 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Goffinet v. County of Christiangreen2 sentences2001See Goffinet, 65 Ill. 2d at 51-52 ; Nolan v. City of Taylorville, 95 Ill. 1980(Goffinet v. County of Christian (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 40, 50-51 .) The record in this case does not disclose whether the City of Batavia gave any consideration to the traditional zoning factors in its decision to withdraw its objection. | 1 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Hendersongreen1 sentence2025See Rodriguez v. Henderson, 217 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Napleton v. Village of Hinsdalegreen1 sentence2025The factors include (1) the existing uses of nearby property, (2) the extent to which property values are diminished by the particular zoning restrictions, (3) the extent to which the 4 The supreme court has characterized this standard as “another way of stating the rational basis test in the specific context of a zoning challenge, focusing on whether the regulation promoted the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and, therefore, was a valid exercise of police power.” Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 313 (2008). - 23 - No. 1-23-2174 destruction of property value | 1 | 1 |
In Re LaPinskagreen2 sentences2010LaPinska, 72 Ill. 2d at 467-68 , 381 N.E.2d at 702 . 2010LaPinska, 72 Ill. 2d at 467-68 , 381 N.E.2d at 702 . | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. Village of Glenviewgreen2 sentences2003App.3d 63, 70 , 195 Ill.Dec. 1 , 628 N.E.2d 465 (1993) ("[t]he purchaser's knowledge of the zoning restriction * * * [i]s not an absolute bar to a zoning challenge"). 2003App.3d 63, 70 , 195 Ill.Dec. 1 , 628 N.E.2d 465 (1993) ("[t]he purchaser's knowledge of the zoning restriction * * * [i]s not an absolute bar to a zoning challenge"). | 1 | 1 |
Nolan v. City of Taylorvillegreen1 sentence2001See Goffinet, 65 Ill. 2d at 51-52 ; Nolan v. City of Taylorville, 95 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Echo Lake Concerned Citizens Homeowners Ass'n v. Village of Lake Zurichgreen1 sentence1988(Echo Lake, 68 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority
green
2 sentences2020App. 3d 357, 390 (1986), aff’d, 122 Ill. 2d 462 (1988) (“it is [the] nature of the zoning violation itself that establishes the ‘substantial effect’ sufficient to *** maintain [the] action”). 2020App. 3d 357, 390 (1986), aff’d, 122 Ill. 2d 462 (1988) (“it is [the] nature of the zoning violation itself that establishes the ‘substantial effect’ sufficient to *** maintain [the] action”). | 3 | 1991–2020 |
Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority
green
2 sentences2010Greer, 150 Ill. 1991Stat. 1989, ch. 24, par. 11—13—15.) Moreover, generally “it is the nature of the zoning violation itself that establishes the ‘substantial effect’ sufficient to enable an owner or tenant *** to maintain an action.” (Greer v. Illinois Housing Development Authority (1986), 150 Ill. | 3 | 1991–2010 |
Langendorf v. City of Urbana
green
2 sentences2007The benefit to the Village from including the zoning requirement in the agreement is not merely that the OR-2 zoning per se might be in the Village's interest, but also that fixing the present zoning for at least 20 years could help the Village "ensure the predictability necessary for orderly growth and development." Langendorf, 197 Ill. 2d at 105 . 2007The benefit to the Village from including the zoning requirement in the agreement is not merely that the OR-2 zoning per se might be in the Village’s interest, but also that fixing the present zoning for at least 20 years could help the Village “ensure the predictability necessary for orderly growth and development.” Langendorf, 197 Ill. 2d at 105 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Midway Landfill, Inc.
green
2 sentences2004Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in denying John's and Susan's motions for directed findings on the ordinance violations, because no evidence was presented that they, as owners of the subject property, knew about the zoning violation brought about by the construction of the grain bin or aided or abetted the construction of the grain bin. (footnote: 2) Defendants cite People v. Midway Landfill, Inc. , 23 Ill. 2004Defendants also argue that the trial court erred in denying John’s and Susan’s motions for directed findings on the ordinance violations, because no evidence was presented that they, as owners of the subject property, knew about the zoning violation brought about by the construction of the grain bin or aided or abetted the construction of the grain bin. 2 Defendants cite People v. Midway Landfill, Inc., 23 Ill. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook
green
2 sentences2001Rather, the focus must be on the application of the traditional zoning factors enunciated in La Salle (La Salle National Bank, 12 Ill. 2d 40 ). 1990Downers Grove’s answer brief in the instant cause appears to suggest that the traditional zoning test used in La Salle National Bank v. County of Cook (1957), 12 Ill. 2d 40 , would allow consideration of statewide industry practice in analyzing the validity of the sign ordinance. | 2 | 1990–2001 |
People Ex Rel. Klaeren v. Village of Lisle
green
2 sentences2005The supreme court agreed with the appellate court’s determination that “any increase in noise, traffic or light pollution created by the development would affect the use and enjoyment of plaintiffs’ properties in a manner distinct in both quantity and quality from any injury suffered by the public as a whole.” Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d at 176 . 2005Klaeren, 202 Ill. 2d at 183 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Horn v. the City of Chicago
green
1 sentence2001However, in Horn v. City of Chicago, 403 Ill. 549 (1949), this court considered a plaintiffs contention that the five-year statute of limitations in section 15 of the Limitations Act (Ill. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Goslin v. Zoning Board of Appeals
neutral
1 sentence1993(Goslin v. Zoning Board of Appeals (1976), 40 Ill. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Cain v. AMERICAN NAT'L BK. & T. CO. OF CHICAGO
green
1 sentence1991(Cf. Cain v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1975), 26 Ill. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
City of Chicago v. Westphalen
green
2 sentences1986In this manner the section achieves the legislative purpose of expanding the scope of persons entitled to rely upon the section in order to seek injunctive redress for zoning ordinance violations (see City of Chicago v. Westphalen (1981), 93 Ill. 1986In this manner the section achieves the legislative purpose of expanding the scope of persons entitled to rely upon the section in order to seek injunctive redress for zoning ordinance violations (see City of Chicago v. Westphalen (1981), 93 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
222 East Chestnut Street Corp. v. LaSalle National Bank
neutral
2 sentences1986App. 2d 460, 462-63 , 146 N.E.2d 717 .) In view of the amendment, it is the nature of the zoning violation itself that establishes the “substantial effect” sufficient to enable an owner or tenant within the requisite 1,200 feet' to maintain an action for injunctive relief. 1986App.2d 460, 462-63 , 146 N.E.2d 717 .) In view of the amendment, it is the nature of the zoning violation itself that establishes the "substantial effect" sufficient to enable an owner or tenant within the requisite 1,200 feet to maintain an action for injunctive relief. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Richardson v. Kitchin
green
2 sentences1986(See Richardson v. Kitchin (1979), 75 Ill. 1986(See Richardson v. Kitchin (1979), 75 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
green
2 sentences1980While litigiousness may become so egregious as to give rise to a tort of constitutional dimension (Beker Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead (5th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 1187 ; cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), 404 U.S. 508 , 30 L. 1980While litigiousness may become so egregious as to give rise to a tort of constitutional dimension (Beker Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead (5th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 1187 ; cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), 404 U.S. 508 , 30 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Beker Phosphate Corporation v. Muirhead
green
1 sentence1980While litigiousness may become so egregious as to give rise to a tort of constitutional dimension (Beker Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead (5th Cir. 1978), 581 F.2d 1187 ; cf. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited (1972), 404 U.S. 508 , 30 L. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Tully
green
1 sentence1980App. 3d 336, 344 , 395 N.E.2d 42, 48 .) Nor was any evidence submitted that the mayor ordered the arrests; he merely directed the building inspector to charge plaintiffs with the zoning violation, and a complaint and notice to appear were served upon them. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
First Nat. Bk. of Skokie v. Vil. of Morton Grove
green
1 sentence1979(First National Bank v. Village of Morton Grove (1973), 12 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
O'BRIEN v. Kawazoye
green
1 sentence1979Nor may Osadjan rely upon O’Brien v. Kawazoye (1975), 27 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Brown v. County of Lake
green
1 sentence1973Litigation to obtain the special-use permit, which included an appeal to the appellate court (Brown v. County of Lake, 67 Ill. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Peoria County
green
1 sentence1956We have heretofore held that the right to review a final administrative decision is limited to those parties of record in the proceeding before the administrative agency “whose rights, privileges, or duties are affected by the decision.” (Winston v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 407 Ill. 588 .) In that case a variance had been granted for construction of a 40-unit apartment building on certain property classified in a “B” country home district of Peoria County. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.