zoning violation in New Jersey

1965N.J.S.A. 40:55-47; Mayor, etc., of Alpine v. Brewster, 7 N.J. 42 (1951).

1951I am, however, bound by the most recent decision of our new Supreme Court in Mayor, &c., of Alpine Borough v. Brewster, supra .

2019N.J.S.A. 40:55D- 70(c)(2); Kaufmann, 110 N.J. at 553 .

2018Relying on Tumpson v. Farina , 218 N.J. 450 , 95 A.3d 210 (2014), the panel reasoned that "[t]he failure to transmit a zoning appeal and the unauthorized cancellation of a board meeting give rise to a cause of action to compel compliance." The panel essentially concluded that Harz's prerogative-writs action was the means by which Harz vindicated her substantive right to secure the "[B]oard's review of an alleged zoning violation." **328 We granted the Borough's petition for certification challenging the reinstatement of Harz's state civil rights claim. 229 N.J. 591 , 164 A.3d 393 (2017).

2018Relying on Tumpson v. Farina , 218 N.J. 450 , 95 A.3d 210 (2014), the panel reasoned that "[t]he failure to transmit a zoning appeal and the unauthorized cancellation of a board meeting give rise to a cause of action to compel compliance." The panel essentially concluded that Harz's prerogative-writs action was the means by which Harz vindicated her substantive right to secure the "[B]oard's review of an alleged zoning violation." **328 We granted the Borough's petition for certification challenging the reinstatement of Harz's state civil rights claim. 229 N.J. 591 , 164 A.3d 393 (2017).

2018Relying on Tumpson v. Farina , 218 N.J. 450 , 95 A.3d 210 (2014), the panel reasoned that "[t]he failure to transmit a zoning appeal and the unauthorized cancellation of a board meeting give rise to a cause of action to compel compliance." The panel essentially concluded that Harz's prerogative-writs action was the means by which Harz vindicated her substantive right to secure the "[B]oard's review of an alleged zoning violation." **328 We granted the Borough's petition for certification challenging the reinstatement of Harz's state civil rights claim. 229 N.J. 591 , 164 A.3d 393 (2017).

2018Relying on Tumpson v. Farina , 218 N.J. 450 , 95 A.3d 210 (2014), the panel reasoned that "[t]he failure to transmit a zoning appeal and the unauthorized cancellation of a board meeting give rise to a cause of action to compel compliance." The panel essentially concluded that Harz's prerogative-writs action was the means by which Harz vindicated her substantive right to secure the "[B]oard's review of an alleged zoning violation." **328 We granted the Borough's petition for certification challenging the reinstatement of Harz's state civil rights claim. 229 N.J. 591 , 164 A.3d 393 (2017).

2009That information will apprise the public of governmental waste without requiring inferential disclosure of the identity of the neighbor who called to complain of a zoning violation, or the neighbor who had called to report a terrible case of child abuse, or of the community member reputed to oppose *1137 the official who called to make peace. [ N. Jersey Newspapers, supra, 127 N.J. at 18 , 601 A. 2d 693 .] These observations are strikingly relevant to the circumstances in this case.

2009That information will apprise the public of governmental waste without requiring inferential disclosure of the identity of the neighbor who called to complain of a zoning violation, or the neighbor who had called to report a terrible case of child abuse, or of the community member reputed to oppose *1137 the official who called to make peace. [ N. Jersey Newspapers, supra, 127 N.J. at 18 , 601 A. 2d 693 .] These observations are strikingly relevant to the circumstances in this case.

2008Few laymen have any idea of the difference between a variance and [other technical zoning terms.]'" Perlmart, supra, 295 N.J.Super. at 239 , 684 A. 2d 1005 (emphasis deleted; citations omitted).

2008Few laymen have any idea of the difference between a variance and [other technical zoning terms.]'" Perlmart, supra, 295 N.J.Super. at 239 , 684 A. 2d 1005 (emphasis deleted; citations omitted).

2007Ibid.

2007Christian Benevolent Assoc. of Greater Cincinnati v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 296, 631 N.E.2d 1034 (1994); Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So.2d 1185 (Ct.App.Fl.1990); Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of the County of Nassau, 266 A.D. 2d 286, 698 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2nd Dept.1999).

2007Christian Benevolent Assoc. of Greater Cincinnati v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 296, 631 N.E.2d 1034 (1994); Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So.2d 1185 (Ct.App.Fl.1990); Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of the County of Nassau, 266 A.D. 2d 286, 698 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2nd Dept.1999).

2007Christian Benevolent Assoc. of Greater Cincinnati v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 296, 631 N.E.2d 1034 (1994); Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So.2d 1185 (Ct.App.Fl.1990); Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of the County of Nassau, 266 A.D. 2d 286, 698 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2nd Dept.1999).

2007Christian Benevolent Assoc. of Greater Cincinnati v. Limbach, 69 Ohio St.3d 296, 631 N.E.2d 1034 (1994); Robbins v. Yusem, 559 So.2d 1185 (Ct.App.Fl.1990); Colella v. Bd. of Assessors of the County of Nassau, 266 A.D. 2d 286, 698 N.Y.S.2d 291 (2nd Dept.1999).

2005See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F. 3d 342 , 347, 353-54 (2d Cir.2005) (concluding that the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was not ripe and noting *1226 that "the ripeness doctrine's `basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 , 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 , 97 S.Ct. 980, 984 , 51 L.Ed. 2d 192 (1977)); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., 983 F. 2d 1285 ,

2005See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F. 3d 342 , 347, 353-54 (2d Cir.2005) (concluding that the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was not ripe and noting *1226 that "the ripeness doctrine's `basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 , 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 , 97 S.Ct. 980, 984 , 51 L.Ed. 2d 192 (1977)); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., 983 F. 2d 1285 ,

2005See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F. 3d 342 , 347, 353-54 (2d Cir.2005) (concluding that the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was not ripe and noting *1226 that "the ripeness doctrine's `basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 , 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 , 97 S.Ct. 980, 984 , 51 L.Ed. 2d 192 (1977)); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., 983 F. 2d 1285 ,

2005See Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n, 402 F. 3d 342 , 347, 353-54 (2d Cir.2005) (concluding that the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim was not ripe and noting *1226 that "the ripeness doctrine's `basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements'") (quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 , 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1515 , 18 L.Ed. 2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 , 97 S.Ct. 980, 984 , 51 L.Ed. 2d 192 (1977)); Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Tp., 983 F. 2d 1285 ,

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

2001In the context of a zoning challenge, the means selected must have real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the problem sought to be ameliorated. [Kirsch Holding Co. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 251 , 281 A.2d 513 (1971).] Put another way, the fundamental question in all zoning cases “is whether the requirements of the ordinance are reasonable under th

1997We declined “to conclude that [the] drafters intended to abrogate this settled zoning principle simply because [the ordinance] enumerated specific ‘permitted’ accessory uses.” Id. 7 Under the appropriate two-step analysis, we conclude that a private landing strip cannot, as a matter of law, be deemed a permitted accessory use in any zone involved here.

1997In our view, it is not consistent with “the letter and underlying philosophy” Keller, supra, 39 N.J.Super. at 435 , 121 A.2d 419 , of Washington Township’s ordinance to conclude that its drafters intended to abrogate this settled zoning principle simply because it enumerated specific “permitted” accessory uses.

1997In our view, it is not consistent with “the letter and underlying philosophy” Keller, supra, 39 N.J.Super. at 435 , 121 A.2d 419 , of Washington Township’s ordinance to conclude that its drafters intended to abrogate this settled zoning principle simply because it enumerated specific “permitted” accessory uses.