29 Pennsylvania opinions name it 6 courts 1959–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Robinsongreen2 sentences2022The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth, holding that “a claim of vindictiveness is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.” Id. at 22 . 22 Cf. Batts, 163 A.3d at 435 (holding that a challenge to the imposition of a life- without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender implicated the legality of sentencing because, under our now abrogated understanding of the relevant decisions by the United States Supreme Court, such a sentence could be imposed “upon a juvenile offender only if [the sentencing court determines that] the crime committed is indicative of the 2021Relying upon Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa.Super. 2007) (en banc), holding that a vindictiveness claim is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of sentence, this Court noted that Appellant had properly complied with the prerequisites for raising such a claim, and addressed it. | 4 | 6 |
Bellotti v. Spaedergreen2 sentences1994See Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 304 Pa. 294 , 156 A. 89 (1931). 1994See Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 304 Pa. 294 , 156 A. 89 (1931). | 2 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Geraldgreen2 sentences2020See Commonwealth v. Gerald, 47 A.3d 858, 861 (Pa. Super. 2012). 2020See Commonwealth v. Gerald, 47 A.3d 858, 861 (Pa. Super. 2012). | 2 | 2 |
Blumer v. Dorfmangreen2 sentences1975Pa.R.C.P. 1030 provides that all affirmative defenses, including the Statute of Frauds, “shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” In Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1968), we ruled the Statute of Frauds relating to sales of interests in real estate presents a waivable defense which must be pleaded in accordance with the provisions *678 of Pa.R.C.P. 1030. 3 See also Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131 , 289 A.2d 463 ; Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105 , 282 A.2d 384 (1971); Goltman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61 , 247 A.2d 455 (1968); Port 1975Pa.R.C.P. 1030 provides that all affirmative defenses, including the Statute of Frauds, “shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” In Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1968), we ruled the Statute of Frauds relating to sales of interests in real estate presents a waivable defense which must be pleaded in accordance with the provisions *678 of Pa.R.C.P. 1030. 3 See also Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131 , 289 A.2d 463 ; Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105 , 282 A.2d 384 (1971); Goltman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61 , 247 A.2d 455 (1968); Port | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Thurgreen1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310-313 (Pa. Super. 2024) (reviewing whether allegations of ineffective assistance had been raised in accordance with Holmes on direct appeal and concluding they had not been and therefore had to be deferred to post-conviction review). - 10 - J-S05040-26 unless that particular legal theory was presented to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Rushgreen1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310-313 (Pa. Super. 2024) (reviewing whether allegations of ineffective assistance had been raised in accordance with Holmes on direct appeal and concluding they had not been and therefore had to be deferred to post-conviction review). - 10 - J-S05040-26 unless that particular legal theory was presented to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Watson, F.green1 sentence2026See Commonwealth v. Watson, 310 A.3d 307, 310-313 (Pa. Super. 2024) (reviewing whether allegations of ineffective assistance had been raised in accordance with Holmes on direct appeal and concluding they had not been and therefore had to be deferred to post-conviction review). - 10 - J-S05040-26 unless that particular legal theory was presented to the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Rush, 959 A.2d 945, 949 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Holmesgreen1 sentence2026See Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c) (where a waivable claim is presented on appeal, the statement of the case in the appellant’s brief must state where in the record and how the claim was preserved for review); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (where waivable claim is presented on appeal, the argument section of the appellant’s brief “must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information). “[F]or an | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Weirgreen1 sentence2025“A challenge to the authority of the trial court to impose an order of restitution is a challenge to the legality of sentence[.]” Commonwealth v. Royal, 312 A.3d 317, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted); see Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d 163, 172-73 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] challenge to the legality of sentence is presented when the defendant claims that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose restitution because the Commonwealth failed to establish one or more of the requirements of section 1106(a).”) (citations omitted). 2 When presented with a challenge to ________________ | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Royal, H.green1 sentence2025“A challenge to the authority of the trial court to impose an order of restitution is a challenge to the legality of sentence[.]” Commonwealth v. Royal, 312 A.3d 317, 325 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted); see Commonwealth v. Weir, 201 A.3d 163, 172-73 (Pa. Super. 2018) (“[A] challenge to the legality of sentence is presented when the defendant claims that the trial court lacked statutory authority to impose restitution because the Commonwealth failed to establish one or more of the requirements of section 1106(a).”) (citations omitted). 2 When presented with a challenge to ________________ | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Bullockgreen1 sentence2024However, a claim that the trial court failed to state the reasons for its sentence is a waivable claim, see Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 826 (Pa. Super. 2008), and Johnson did not object or raise this issue in any post- sentence motion to modify the sentence. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Batts, Q., Aplt.red1 sentence2022The Superior Court agreed with the Commonwealth, holding that “a claim of vindictiveness is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence.” Id. at 22 . 22 Cf. Batts, 163 A.3d at 435 (holding that a challenge to the imposition of a life- without-parole sentence upon a juvenile offender implicated the legality of sentencing because, under our now abrogated understanding of the relevant decisions by the United States Supreme Court, such a sentence could be imposed “upon a juvenile offender only if [the sentencing court determines that] the crime committed is indicative of the | 1 | 1 |
Drake Manufacturing Co. v. Polyflow, Inc.green1 sentence2020See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Buterbaughgreen1 sentence2019Because we find that Appellant has raised substantial questions, we forgo any further discussion of this issue. -4- J-S16028-19 Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d 1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 758 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“A challenge to the calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines raises a question of the discretionary aspects of a defendant’s sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (holding that “a claim of vindictiveness is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence”); and Commonwealth v. Hornaman, 920 A.2d 1282, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a claim that trial court imposed excessive and unreasonable sentence implicated a discretionary aspect of sentence). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hornamangreen1 sentence2017See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 758 A.2d 1214, 1216 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“A challenge to the calculation of the Sentencing Guidelines raises a question of the discretionary aspects of a defendant’s sentence.”); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 931 A.2d 15, 20 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (holding that “a claim of vindictiveness is a waivable challenge to the discretionary aspects of the sentence”); and Commonwealth v. Hornaman, 920 A.2d 1282, 1283-84 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that a claim that trial court imposed excessive and unreasonable sentence implicated a discretionary aspect of sentence). | 1 | 1 |
STOLTZFUS v. Hausgreen2 sentences1983See Stoltzfus v. Haus, 234 Pa.Super. 46 , 334 A.2d 738 (1975). 1983See Stoltzfus v. Haus, 234 Pa.Super. 46 , 334 A.2d 738 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shulman v. Wynnewood Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Hahn
green
2 sentences1975Pa.R.C.P. 1030 provides that all affirmative defenses, including the Statute of Frauds, “shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” In Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1968), we ruled the Statute of Frauds relating to sales of interests in real estate presents a waivable defense which must be pleaded in accordance with the provisions *678 of Pa.R.C.P. 1030. 3 See also Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131 , 289 A.2d 463 ; Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105 , 282 A.2d 384 (1971); Goltman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61 , 247 A.2d 455 (1968); Port 1975Pa.R.C.P. 1030 provides that all affirmative defenses, including the Statute of Frauds, “shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” In Brown v. Hahn, 419 Pa. 42 , 213 A.2d 342 (1968), we ruled the Statute of Frauds relating to sales of interests in real estate presents a waivable defense which must be pleaded in accordance with the provisions *678 of Pa.R.C.P. 1030. 3 See also Blumer v. Dorfman, 447 Pa. 131 , 289 A.2d 463 ; Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co., 444 Pa. 105 , 282 A.2d 384 (1971); Goltman v. McShain, 432 Pa. 61 , 247 A.2d 455 (1968); Port | 3 | 1968–1975 |
Smith v. Pennsylvania Railroad
green
2 sentences1994See Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 304 Pa. 294 , 156 A. 89 (1931). 1994See Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Smith v. Pennsylvania R.R., 304 Pa. 294 , 156 A. 89 (1931). | 2 | 1985–1994 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2022This class of cases includes: (1) claims that the sentence fell outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute; (2) claims involving merger/double jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Commonwealth v. Mattison
green
1 sentence2019See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5913(1)-(4); Mattison, 82 A.3d at 394 n.4. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Blakely v. Washington
green
2 sentences2007Thus, even if viewed as a waivable claim of legal error, this act should be viewed as sufficient to properly preserve the matter for appellate review. [24] This is notable as up until now virtually all illegal sentences have been defined by the lacking of statutory authority to impose the sentence imposed. [25] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). 2007Thus, even if viewed as a waivable claim of legal error, this act should be viewed as sufficient to properly preserve the matter for appellate review. [24] This is notable as up until now virtually all illegal sentences have been defined by the lacking of statutory authority to impose the sentence imposed. [25] Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 , 124 S.Ct. 2531 , 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Smith v. Commonwealth, Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board
green
2 sentences2001Nevertheless, although the following statements of our Supreme Court in Smith v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 543 Pa. 295 , 670 A.2d 1146 (1996), were made with regard to the question of whether the statute of limitations under Section 413(a) is a waivable defense, we find these statements instructive as to the question now posed to us. 2001Nevertheless, although the following statements of our Supreme Court in Smith v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 543 Pa. 295 , 670 A.2d 1146 (1996), were made with regard to the question of whether the statute of limitations under Section 413(a) is a waivable defense, we find these statements instructive as to the question now posed to us. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Commonwealth v. Hancharik
green
2 sentences1997It appears that our courts have interpreted § 5914 to mean only that a waivable privilege exists, not that the challenged witness is truly “incompetent.” See Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237 , 656 A.2d 1335 (1995) (§ 5914 privilege is waivable by the spouse asserting the privilege); Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435 , 633 A.2d 1074 (1993) (same). 1997It appears that our courts have interpreted § 5914 to mean only that a waivable privilege exists, not that the challenged witness is truly “incompetent.” See Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237 , 656 A.2d 1335 (1995) (§ 5914 privilege is waivable by the spouse asserting the privilege); Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435 , 633 A.2d 1074 (1993) (same). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Commonwealth v. May
green
2 sentences1997It appears that our courts have interpreted § 5914 to mean only that a waivable privilege exists, not that the challenged witness is truly “incompetent.” See Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237 , 656 A.2d 1335 (1995) (§ 5914 privilege is waivable by the spouse asserting the privilege); Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435 , 633 A.2d 1074 (1993) (same). 1997It appears that our courts have interpreted § 5914 to mean only that a waivable privilege exists, not that the challenged witness is truly “incompetent.” See Commonwealth v. May, 540 Pa. 237 , 656 A.2d 1335 (1995) (§ 5914 privilege is waivable by the spouse asserting the privilege); Commonwealth v. Hancharik, 534 Pa. 435 , 633 A.2d 1074 (1993) (same). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Thompson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
green
2 sentences1984Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Leister v. Miller, 376 Pa. 452 , 103 A.2d 656 (1954); Thompson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 280 Pa.Super. 193 , 421 A.2d 471 (1980), and thus, it should not have been raised by preliminary objection. 1984Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Leister v. Miller, 376 Pa. 452 , 103 A.2d 656 (1954); Thompson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 280 Pa.Super. 193 , 421 A.2d 471 (1980), and thus, it should not have been raised by preliminary objection. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Leister v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences1984Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Leister v. Miller, 376 Pa. 452 , 103 A.2d 656 (1954); Thompson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 280 Pa.Super. 193 , 421 A.2d 471 (1980), and thus, it should not have been raised by preliminary objection. 1984Bellotti v. Spaeder, 433 Pa. 219 , 249 A.2d 343 (1969); Leister v. Miller, 376 Pa. 452 , 103 A.2d 656 (1954); Thompson v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 280 Pa.Super. 193 , 421 A.2d 471 (1980), and thus, it should not have been raised by preliminary objection. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Hahnemann Medical College & Hospital v. Hubbard
green
2 sentences1982Such was not the case in Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia v. Hubbard, 267 Pa.Super. 436 , 406 A.2d 1120 (1979) where we considered an appeal from an order striking preliminary objections to the lower court’s jurisdiction. 1982Such was not the case in Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital of Philadelphia v. Hubbard, 267 Pa.Super. 436 , 406 A.2d 1120 (1979) where we considered an appeal from an order striking preliminary objections to the lower court’s jurisdiction. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Sykes v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Walters v. Ditzler
green
2 sentences1980However, mere negotiations toward an amicable settlement do not afford a basis for estoppel nor do mistakes, misunderstandings or lack of knowledge, in and of themselves, toll the running of the statute: Com. v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A. 2d 779 (1979); Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445 , 227 A. 2d 833 (1967); Hocking v. Howard Ins. 1980However, mere negotiations toward an amicable settlement do not afford a basis for estoppel nor do mistakes, misunderstandings or lack of knowledge, in and of themselves, toll the running of the statute: Com. v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A. 2d 779 (1979); Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445 , 227 A. 2d 833 (1967); Hocking v. Howard Ins. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Com., Dept. of Public Wel. v. Uec, Inc.
green
2 sentences1980However, mere negotiations toward an amicable settlement do not afford a basis for estoppel nor do mistakes, misunderstandings or lack of knowledge, in and of themselves, toll the running of the statute: Com. v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A. 2d 779 (1979); Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445 , 227 A. 2d 833 (1967); Hocking v. Howard Ins. 1980However, mere negotiations toward an amicable settlement do not afford a basis for estoppel nor do mistakes, misunderstandings or lack of knowledge, in and of themselves, toll the running of the statute: Com. v. UEC, Inc., 483 Pa. 503 , 397 A. 2d 779 (1979); Walters v. Ditzler, 424 Pa. 445 , 227 A. 2d 833 (1967); Hocking v. Howard Ins. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Royal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Tunnelton Mining Co. green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Portnoy v. Brown green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| GOLDMAN v. McShain green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Fennell v. Guffey green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.