11 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Claim of Kinggreen2 sentences2018"The lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not a waivable defense and may be raised for the first time on appeal." In re Claim of King , 62 Ohio St.2d 87 , 89, 403 N.E.2d 200 (1980). 2018"The lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not a waivable defense and may be raised for the first time on appeal." In re Claim of King , 62 Ohio St.2d 87 , 89, 403 N.E.2d 200 (1980). | 2 | 6 |
Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2025See Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks, 2016-Ohio-1192, ¶13 (finding miscaptioning a waivable defense and noting that it is “common practice when parties fail to raise the issue simply to correct the error before publication”). {¶7} Weir asserts in his petition that his motion for telephone visitation was denied by the trial court on June 27, 2023. 2021See Salemi v. Cleveland Metroparks, 145 Ohio St.3d 408 , 2016-Ohio-1192, ¶13 (finding miscaptioning a waivable defense and noting that it is “common practice when parties fail to raise the issue simply to correct the error before publication.”) {¶15} “Mandamus is the appropriate action to compel public authorities to institute appropriation proceedings when an involuntary taking of private property is alleged. | 2 | 2 |
Pratts v. Hurleygreen1 sentence2013See In re Claim of King, 62 Ohio St.2d 87, 89 , 403 N.E.2d 200 (1980); see also Rosen v. Celebreeze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241 , 2008- Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420 , ¶ 45 quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2004- Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992 , ¶ 11. {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a right of appeal is conferred by a statute, the appeal can be perfected only in the mode prescribed by that statute, and that “the exercise of the right conferred is conditional upon 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS compliance with the accompanying mandatory requirements.” Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. | 1 | 1 |
Rosen v. Celebrezzegreen2 sentences2013See In re Claim of King, 62 Ohio St.2d 87, 89 , 403 N.E.2d 200 (1980); see also Rosen v. Celebreeze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241 , 2008- Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420 , ¶ 45 quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2004- Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992 , ¶ 11. {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a right of appeal is conferred by a statute, the appeal can be perfected only in the mode prescribed by that statute, and that “the exercise of the right conferred is conditional upon 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS compliance with the accompanying mandatory requirements.” Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. 2013See In re Claim of King, 62 Ohio St.2d 87, 89 , 403 N.E.2d 200 (1980); see also Rosen v. Celebreeze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241 , 2008- Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420 , ¶ 45 quoting Pratts v. Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81 , 2004- Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992 , ¶ 11. {¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that where a right of appeal is conferred by a statute, the appeal can be perfected only in the mode prescribed by that statute, and that “the exercise of the right conferred is conditional upon 4 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS compliance with the accompanying mandatory requirements.” Zier v. Bur. of Unemp. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jenkins v. Keller
green
2 sentences1999Although not raised at the trial court level by OBES, the Ohio Supreme Court has long held that "[t]he lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is not a waivable defense and may be raised for the first time on appeal." In re Claim of King (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 87 , 89 , citing Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d 122 , paragraph six of the syllabus. 1980Jenkins v. Keller (1966), 6 Ohio St. 2d 122 , paragraph six of the syllabus. | 2 | 1980–1999 |
Roe v. Wade
red
2 sentences2018Where mootness is concerned, "an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated," unless the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 , 125, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). {¶ 24} "One commentator has defined mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 2018Where mootness is concerned, "an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated," unless the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 , 125, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). {¶ 24} "One commentator has defined mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty
green
2 sentences2018Where mootness is concerned, "an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated," unless the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 , 125, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). {¶ 24} "One commentator has defined mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , 2018Where mootness is concerned, "an actual controversy must exist at stages of appellate or certiorari review, and not simply at the date the action is initiated," unless the issue is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113 , 125, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). {¶ 24} "One commentator has defined mootness as 'the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).' " United States Parole Comm. v. Geraghty , 445 U.S. 388 , | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nicholson v. Landis
green
1 sentence2006As stated by Porath, improper venue is a waivable defense. 2 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Landis (1985), 27 Ohio App.3d 107 , 108 ; see also, Civ.R. 12(H)(1). {¶ 19} That Porath considered the venue aspect of his demand to be essential to the terms of the agreement is clearly evidenced by the record — both in the express terms of the July 21, 2004 letter issuing the demand, and by Porath's express and continuous rejections of offers only to pay the policy limits. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dudukovich v. Lorain Metropolitan Housing Authority
green
1 sentence2003Housing Auth. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202 , 206 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.