statutory fraud claim in Texas

2026Co. v. Entech, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)); Lake v. Cravens, 488 S.W.3d 867, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (“Indeed, reliance is a necessary element of a statutory fraud claim, and we assume that the reliance must have been justifiable.”); Nelson v. McCall Motors, Inc., 630 S.W.3d 141 , 147 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2020, no pet.).

2025See, e.g., Lake v. Cravens, 488 S.W.3d 867, 892 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (finding a statutory fraud claim to be supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence where a doctor entered into a development agreement, testified that the inducing party falsely represented that he had previously developed and overseen the development of a hospital, and “clarified at trial that he was complaining about representations that were not addressed in the [agreement] but that induced him to enter into it, i.e., [the inducing party’s] representations about his past experience”). 20 1.

2022But see Harstan, Ltd. v. Si Kyu Kim, 441 S.W.3d 791, 799 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (refusing to consider whether there was sufficient evidence of justifiable reliance when measuring the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a fraud finding because no party complained of the jury charge’s failure to require that the plaintiff’s reliance was justified); Ghosh v. Grover, 412 S.W.3d 749, 756 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (same). 27 “In measuring justifiability, we must inquire whether, ‘given a fraud plaintiff’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of f

2014See Ghosh, 412 S.W.3d at 756 ; Sandt, 401 S.W.3d at 214 . 2.

2011Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 182 (Tex. 1997).

2011Corp. v. Swanson , 959 S.W.2d 171, 182 (Tex. 1997).

2015Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Wright v. Modern Grp., Ltd., No. 13-12-00293-CV, 2013 WL 4714930 , at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (no statutory-fraud claim because “stock was unvested”); Beebe v. Compaq Computer Corp., 940 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1997, no pet.) (relying on Stephanz and holding claim under “Texas Securities Act’s anti-fraud provisions” barred because “stock options did not vest”).

2015Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 905 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Wright v. Modern Grp., Ltd., No. 13-12-00293-CV, 2013 WL 4714930 , at *9-10 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (no statutory-fraud claim because “stock was unvested”); Beebe v. Compaq Computer Corp., 940 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (relying on Stephanz and holding claim under “Texas Securities Act’s anti-fraud provisions” barred because “stock options did not vest”).

2015Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 905 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Wright v. Modern Grp., Ltd., No. 13-12-00293-CV, 2013 WL 4714930 , at *9–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (no statutory-fraud claim because “stock was unvested”); Beebe v. Compaq Computer Corp., 940 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 1997, no pet.) (relying on Stephanz and holding claim under “Texas Securities Act’s anti-fraud provisions” barred because “stock options did not vest”).

2015Stephanz v. Laird, 846 S.W.2d 895, 905 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); see also Wright v. Modern Grp., Ltd., No. 13-12-00293-CV, 2013 WL 4714930 , at *9-10 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 30, 2013, pet. denied) (mem.op.) (no statutory-fraud claim because “stock was unvested”); Beebe v. Compaq Computer Corp., 940 S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (relying on Stephanz and holding claim under “Texas Securities Act’s anti-fraud provisions” barred because “stock options did not vest”).

2014See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs and Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex.1998).

2014See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs and Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Tex. 1998).

2011See Brush v. Reata Oil & Gas Corp., 984 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet denied); see also Poteet v. Kaiser, No. 02-06- 00397-CV, 2007 WL 4371359 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 13, 2007, pet. denied) (citing Robbins‘s conclusion that causation is an essential element of fraud in a real estate transaction). ―[R]eliance is a necessary element of a statutory fraud claim under section 27.01.‖ Schlumberger Tech.

2011See Brush v. Reata Oil & Gas Corp., 984 S.W.2d 720, 726 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet denied); see also Poteet v. Kaiser , No. 02-06-00397-CV, 2007 WL 4371359 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 13, 2007, pet. denied) (citing Robbins ’s conclusion that causation is an essential element of fraud in a real estate transaction). “[R]eliance is a necessary element of a statutory fraud claim under section 27.01.” Schlumberger Tech.

2007See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697 . 47: Because we have held that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s liability and damages findings on the Walkers’ statutory fraud claim, and that those findings support the trial court’s judgment for $242,199 in actual damages, we need not consider appellants’ ninth, eleventh, and fifteenth issues, in which they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s liability and damages findings on the Walkers’ negligent misrepresentations claim.

2007See McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697 . 47 .Because we have held that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s liability and damages findings on the Walkers’ statutory fraud claim, and that those findings support the trial court’s judgment for $242,199 in actual damages, we need not consider appellants' ninth, eleventh, and fifteenth issues, in which they challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s liability and damages findings on the Walkers’ negligent misrepresentations claim.

2014See Ghosh, 412 S.W.3d at 756 ; Sandt, 401 S.W.3d at 214 . 2.

2014See Ghosh, 412 S.W.3d at 756 ; Sandt, 401 S.W.3d at 214 . 2.

2026Co. v. Entech, Inc., 86 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.)); Lake v. Cravens, 488 S.W.3d 867, 895 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, no pet.) (“Indeed, reliance is a necessary element of a statutory fraud claim, and we assume that the reliance must have been justifiable.”); Nelson v. McCall Motors, Inc., 630 S.W.3d 141 , 147 (Tex. App.— Eastland 2020, no pet.).

2024See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that, when trial court does not specify basis for its summary judgment, “we may affirm . . . if any of the theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious”). 16 III.

2019See, e.g., G & H Towing Co. v. Magee, 347 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. 2011).

2017See Thomas, 500 S.W.3d at 610 (jury’s finding that parties agreed to a purchase agreement, rather than a rental agreement, was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence); cf. Arredondo v. Mora, 340 S.W.2d 322, 324 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court’s finding that the parties had agreed to a rental agreement was consistent with the manner in which the appellant possessed the property and the nature of the improvements made on the premises). 20 Statute of Limitations Burrus contends that the Reyes Family’s statutory fraud claim was barred by the statute of l

2015Jensen v. Southwest Rodeo, L.P., 350 S.W.3d 755, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).

2015See Werner v. KPMG LLP, 415 F. Supp. 2d 688, 703 (S.D.

2010Wells Fargo and Lewis cite Davis v. Es-tridge, 85 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied), for its conclusion that Chapter 33 does not apply to a statutory fraud claim because the DTPA was the only statute expressly mentioned in section 33.002(a).

2001See Scott v. Sebree, 986 S.W.2d 364, 371 (Tex.App. — Austin 1999, pet. denied); Tex. Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 27.01 (Vernon 1987).

1995See Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10-12 (Tex.1991).