essential facts constituting claim in New York

2025School Dist. ( 50 AD3d 138, 147-148 [citation omitted], quoting General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]), "a public corporation's knowledge of the accident and the injury, without more, does not constitute 'actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim' at least where the incident and the injury do not necessarily occur only as the result of fault for which it may be liable." The photographs of the accident site annexed to the petition do not constitute evidence that the respondents had "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the

2025School Dist. , 50 AD3d 138, 148 ; see Matter of Ippolito v City of New York , 230 AD3d at 684; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 880-881 ). "'Unsubstantiated and conclusory assertions that the municipality acquired timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim through the contents of reports and other documentation are insufficient'" ( Matter of Ippolito v City of New York , 230 AD3d at 684, quoting Lobos v City of New York , 219 AD3d 720, 721-722 ).

2025Ctr. (6 NY3d 531 [2006]) and various Appellate Division decisions, the City contends that the mere involvement of municipal employees, the existence of internal records, or the fact of an arrest or prosecution does not, without more, establish "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim." The City further asserts that Petitioner has not demonstrated, through competent proof of the contents of the alleged records, that the City had timely, specific notice of the theories of liability he now advances.

2025Ctr. ( 6 NY3d 531 [2006]) and various Appellate Division decisions, the City contends that the mere involvement of municipal employees, the existence of internal records, or the fact of an arrest or prosecution does not, without more, establish "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim." The City further asserts that Petitioner has not demonstrated, through competent proof of the contents of the alleged records, that the City had timely, specific notice of the theories of liability he now advances.

2018"While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance" ( Matter of Iacone v Town of Hempstead , 82 AD3d 888, 888-889 [citations omitted]; see Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2018"While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance" ( Matter of Iacone v Town of Hempstead , 82 AD3d 888, 888-889 [citations omitted]; see Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2025The Second Department has held that "[w]hile the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance'" ( Wieman-Gibson v. County of Suffolk , 206 AD3d 666 , 667 [2d Dept 2022], citing Matter of Snyder v. County of Suffolk , 116 AD3d 1052 , 1053 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Matter of Placido v. County of Orange , 112 AD3d 722, 723 [2d Dept 2013]).

2025The Second Department has held that "[w]hile the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative, whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance'" ( Wieman-Gibson v. County of Suffolk , 206 AD3d 666, 667 [2d Dept 2022], citing Matter of Snyder v. County of Suffolk , 116 AD3d 1052 , 1053 [2d Dept 2014], quoting Matter of Placido v. County of Orange , 112 AD3d 722, 723 [2d Dept 2013]).

2019While "[t]he presence or absence of any one factor is not determinative" ( N.F. v City of New York , 161 AD3d 1046 , 1047), whether the public corporation had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance ( see Matter of Nieto v City of New York , 170 AD3d 1022 , 1023; Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York , 60 AD3d 1058, 1059 ).

2018While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative ( see Matter of Chambers v Nassau County Health Care Corp ., 50 AD3d 1134 ), whether the public corporation had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance ( see Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York , 60 AD3d 1058, 1059 ; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2018In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant was an infant at the time the claim arose and, if so, whether there was a nexus between the claimant's infancy and the delay in service of a notice of claim, (3) the claimant had a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (4) the public corporation was prejudiced by the delay in i

2013In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider whether (1) the claimant had a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in maintaining its defense on the merits (see Education Law § 3813 [2-a]; General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2012]; M

2016“Respondent’s knowledge of the accident and the injury, without more, does not constitute actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Le Mieux v Alden High School, 1 AD3d 995, 996 [2003]).

2016“Respondent’s knowledge of the accident and the injury, without more, does not constitute actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” (id. [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Le Mieux v Alden High School, 1 AD3d 995, 996 [2003]).

2016In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant facts, including whether, inter alia, (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (3) the claimant was mentally or physically incapacitated, and (4) the delay in serving the notice of claim would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its d

2016Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the alleged sidewalk defects indicated on a map filed with the New York City Department of Transportation by the Big Apple Pothole and Sidewalk Protection Corporation, approximately eight years prior to her accident, did not give the City actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting her claim (see Matter of Sanchez v City of New York, 116 AD3d 703, 704 [2014]; Matter of Bell v City of New York, 100 AD3d 990, 991 [2012]; Matter of Khalid v City of New York, 91 AD3d at 780 ).

2014Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006]; Matter of Destine v City of New York, 111 AD3d 629 [2013]; Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2012]; Matter of Diggs v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 79 AD3d 869, 869-870 [2010]).

2014Ctr., 6 NY3d 531, 535 [2006]; Matter of Destine v City of New York, 111 AD3d 629 [2013]; Bazile v City of New York, 94 AD3d 929, 929-930 [2012]; Matter of Diggs v Board of Educ. of City of Yonkers, 79 AD3d 869, 869-870 [2010]).

2020"The most important factor based on its placement in the statute and its relation to other relevant factors is whether the [municipal] corporation acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 [*2]days of the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter" ( Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 880 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776, 777 ).

2019In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, a court must consider, in particular, whether the municipality acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter ( see Matter of Naar v City of New York , 161 AD3d 1081 , 1082; Matter of Maldonado v City of New York , 152 AD3d 522 ; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ. , 71 AD3d 776 ).

2026On the other hand, it has been emphasized that whether the public corporation had "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance" ( see Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk , 89 AD3d 1025, 1026, 933 NYS2d 369 [2d Dept 2011] [citations omitted]).

2026On the other hand, it has been emphasized that whether the public corporation had "actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance" ( see Matter of Joy v County of Suffolk , 89 AD3d 1025, 1026 , 933 NYS2d 369 [2d Dept 2011] [citations omitted]).

2025"In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits" ( Lobos v

2025"In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense on the merits" ( Matter o

2026Even assuming, arguendo, we were to consider the additional materials that were improperly submitted by the petitioner for the first time with her reply papers ( see Matter of Joseph v City of New York , 208 AD3d 1324, 1327 ; Matter of Mitchell v Town of Greenburgh , 96 AD3d 852, 853 ), those materials did not make a connection between the petitioner's alleged injuries and the respondents' alleged negligent conduct so as to afford the respondents actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim ( see Matter of Charbrut v City of New York , 237 AD3d 695 , 697; Matter of Clark v Ci

2014In determining whether to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc or to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the key factors that the court must consider are whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant made an excusable error concerning the identity of the public corporation, (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense, and (4) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the fail

2015The most important factor, based on its placement in the statute and its relation to other relevant factors, is whether the public corporation acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the accrual of the claim or within a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991, 991-992 [2009]; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2013School Dist., 50 AD3d 138, 147 [2008]; see Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776, 778 [2010]; Matter of Devivo v Town of Carmel, 68 AD3d 991 [2009]), is whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days of the accrual of the claim or a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]).

2018The police accident report filed with the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles, which did not connect the accident with any negligence on the part of the State, was insufficient to provide the State with notice of the essential facts constituting the claim ( see Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 881 ; Quilliam v State of New York , 282 AD2d 590, 591 ; see also Matter of Jaffier v City of New York , 148 AD3d 1021, 1022 ; Caselli v City of New York , 105 AD2d 251, 255 ).

2012Moreover, although a police accident report was filed regarding the subject accident, the police accident report did not of itself provide actual knowledge to the City of the essential facts constituting the claim (see Hardayal v City of New York, 281 AD2d 593 [2001]; Matter of Dominguez v City of New York, 272 AD2d 326, 327 [2000]; Matter of Vitali v City of New York, 205 AD2d 636 [1994]; Matter of Dube v City of New York, 158 AD2d 457, 458 [1990]; Caselli v City of New York, 105 AD2d 251, 255 [1984]).

2026"In order for a municipality to have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, it must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim" (<i>Lobos v City of New York</i>, 219 AD3d 720, 721 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]). "[C]ourts should not assume that every municipal employee's knowledge of essential facts is necessarily imputed to the municipality" (<i>Matter of Jaime v City of New York</i>, 41 NY3d 531 , 540; <i>see</i> <i>Parker v City of New York</i>, 206 AD3d 936, 938

2025The petitioner failed to demonstrate that the respondents obtained timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter ( see Parker v City of New York , 206 AD3d 936, 938 ).

2012Here, however, claimants failed to demonstrate that respondent had “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” through the police accident report, which stated that claimant was injured after she failed to “realize” that the street came to a dead end (Wencek v County of Chautauqua, 132 AD2d 950, 951 [1987]; see Washington v City of New York, 72 NY2d 881, 883 [1988]; cf. Innes v County of Genesee, 99 AD2d 642, 643 [1984], affd 62 NY2d 779 [1984]).

2012Here, however, claimants failed to demonstrate that respondent had “actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim” through the police accident report, which stated that claimant was injured after she failed to “realize” that the street came to a dead end (Wencek v County of Chautauqua, 132 AD2d 950, 951 [1987]; see Washington v City of New York, 72 NY2d 881, 883 [1988]; cf. Innes v County of Genesee, 99 AD2d 642, 643 [1984], affd 62 NY2d 779 [1984]).

2025The involvement of a public corporation's employee in the accident itself, "without more, is not sufficient to establish that the respondents acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim" ( Matter of Vincent v City of New York , 208 AD3d 589, 590 ; see Matter of Robinson v City of New York , 208 AD3d 587, 588 ; Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , 146 AD3d 880, 881 ). "[C]ourts should not assume that every [public corporation] employee's knowledge of essential facts is necessarily imputed to the [public corporation]" ( Matter of Jaime v City of New York , 41 NY3d 5

2025Contrary to the petitioner's contentions, the various reports submitted in support of the petition, which were generated shortly after the incident, did not demonstrate that the respondents obtained timely actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim ( see Matter of D'Agostino v City of New York , [*2] 146 AD3d 880, 881 ).

2018While the presence or the absence of any one of the factors is not necessarily determinative ( see Matter of Chambers v Nassau County Health Care Corp ., 50 AD3d 1134 ), whether the public corporation had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance ( see Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York , 60 AD3d 1058, 1059 ; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2013Middle School, 52 AD3d at 839 ; Matter of Chambers v Nassau County Health Care Corp., 50 AD3d 1134 [2008]), whether the municipality had actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim is of great importance (see Matter of Gonzalez v City of New York, 60 AD3d 1058 [2009]; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2026"In order for a municipality to have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, it must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim" (<i>Lobos v City of New York</i>, 219 AD3d 720, 721 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]). "[C]ourts should not assume that every municipal employee's knowledge of essential facts is necessarily imputed to the municipality" (<i>Matter of Jaime v City of New York</i>, 41 NY3d 531 , 540; <i>see</i> <i>Parker v City of New York</i>, 206 AD3d 936, 938

2025"In order for a municipality to have actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim, '[it] must have knowledge of the facts that underlie the legal theory or theories on which liability is predicated in the notice of claim'" ( Lobos v City of New York , 219 AD3d 720, 721, quoting Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2025"Timely service of a notice of claim is a condition precedent to the commencement of an action sounding in tort against the New York City Transit Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority" ( Durand v MV Transp., Inc. , 186 AD3d 564, 564-565 ; see Public Authorities Law §§ 1212[2]; 1276[2]; General Municipal Law § 50-e[1][a]). "'In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired ac

2025Dist. , 28 NY3d 455, 460 ). "'In determining whether to grant a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim or to deem a late notice of claim timely served nunc pro tunc, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, (2) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defe

2024Here, the NYCTA did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day statutory period ( see Matter of Ashkenazie v City of New York , 165 AD3d 785 , 786; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York , 116 AD3d 703, 704 ).

2022Here, the City did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within a reasonable time after the expiration of the 90-day period ( see Matter of Ashkenazie v City of New York , 165 AD3d 785 , 786; Matter of Sanchez v City of New York , 116 AD3d 703, 704 ; Matter of Valila v Town of Hempstead , 107 AD3d 813, 815 ).

2017Pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e (5), a court considering a petition for leave to serve a late notice of claim upon a municipal corporation must consider whether the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after it arose or within a reasonable time thereafter (see General Municipal Law § 50-e [5]; Matter of Whittaker v New York City Bd. of Educ., 71 AD3d 776 [2010]; Matter of Leeds v Port Washington Union Free School Dist., 55 AD3d 734 [2008]; Matter of Felice v Eastport/South Manor Cent.

2015Ordered that the orders are affirmed, with one bill of costs payable to the respondents. *998 In determining whether to grant leave to serve a late notice of claim, the court must consider all relevant circumstances, including whether (1) the claimant demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the failure to serve a timely notice of claim, (2) the public corporation acquired actual knowledge of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days after the claim arose or a reasonable time thereafter, and (3) the delay would substantially prejudice the public corporation in its defense (see Gene