Penal Code violation in California

1933In People v. Zuvela, 191 Cal. 223 [ 215 Pac. 907 ], where sentence was not pronounced within the five days mentioned in the statute, the court held (quoting from the syllabus) : “The failure to impose the sentence in a criminal case within the time specified by section 1191 of the Penal Code is an error of procedure, and section 4½ of article VI of the Constitution operates to prevent the granting of a new trial for the error.” This statement of the law is supported by the following cases: People v. Haines, 64 Cal. App. 628 [ 222 Pac. 183 ]; People v. Powell, 83 Cal. App. 62 [ 256 Pac. 561 ] ;

1933In People v. Zuvela, 191 Cal. 223 [ 215 Pac. 907 ], where sentence was not pronounced within the five days mentioned in the statute, the court held (quoting from the syllabus) : “The failure to impose the sentence in a criminal case within the time specified by section 1191 of the Penal Code is an error of procedure, and section 4½ of article VI of the Constitution operates to prevent the granting of a new trial for the error.” This statement of the law is supported by the following cases: People v. Haines, 64 Cal. App. 628 [ 222 Pac. 183 ]; People v. Powell, 83 Cal. App. 62 [ 256 Pac. 561 ] ;

2024Pertinent legal principles regarding criminal threats “A threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury.” (People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 752 (Butler).) “[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened.” (Id. at p. 755.) “A threat is not insufficient simply because it does ‘not communicate a time or precise manner of execution, section 422 does not require those details to be expressed.’ ” (Id. at p. 752.) Nor does section 422 “require an immediate ability to carry out the threat.” (People v. Smith (2009) 178 C

2024Rather, the statements “are judged in their context.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1137 (Ricky T.).) “The surrounding circumstances must be examined to determine if the threat is real and genuine, a true threat.” (Ibid.) Similarly, the determination of “whether the words were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific [that] they conveyed to the victim an immediacy of purpose and immediate prospect of execution of the threat can be based on all the surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.” (People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1340

2024The canon against surplusage, like other canons of construction, is an interpretative aid; it is not absolute and “‘“will be applied only if it results in a reasonable reading of the legislation” [citation].’ [Citations.]” (MCI Communications Services, Inc. v. California Dept. of Tax & Fee Administration (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 635, 650 .) McDowell’s proposed interpretation—reading “enhancement” to mean any statutory mechanism that provides for a harsher sentence—is at odds with the term’s established legal meaning and the Penal Code’s instruction that we follow that established meaning.

2022(Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 500 .) Here, the trial court issued a criminal protective order to protect L.S. from communication and contact by defendant. (§ 646.9, subd. (k).) We note that the Penal Code requires a violation of such a protective order must be knowing. (§ 166, subd. (c)(1).) Section 166, subdivision (c)(1) states in pertinent part: “a willful and knowing violation of a protective order or stay-away court order . . . shall constitute contempt of court, a misdemeanor . . . .” (Italics added.) Because a violation of a protective order must be “willful and knowing” (ibid.), proof

2017The court specifically cautioned the trial judge, on remand, not to run afoul of the rule against broadening the field in which injunctions against criminal activity may be granted. ( Schur , supra , 47 Cal.2d at p. 19 , 300 P.2d 831 .) Neither Leider nor amici curiae refer us to any taxpayer action in which an "illegal expenditure" under *138 Code of Civil Procedure section 526a was premised on a penal code violation.

2017The court specifically cautioned the trial judge, on remand, not to run afoul of the rule against broadening the field in which injunctions against criminal activity may be granted. ( Schur , supra , 47 Cal.2d at p. 19 , 300 P.2d 831 .) Neither Leider nor amici curiae refer us to any taxpayer action in which an "illegal expenditure" under *138 Code of Civil Procedure section 526a was premised on a penal code violation.

2017(See *1135 **1064 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition & State Fairs (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1286 , 1298, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 [noting "the dearth of authority recognizing a section 526a taxpayer action predicated on an alleged criminal violation"].) 12 Schur established the principle that express legislative authorization is required for a taxpayer action to overcome the bar against equitable relief codified in Civil Code section 3369.

2017(See *1135 **1064 Animal Legal Defense Fund v. California Exposition & State Fairs (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1286 , 1298, 192 Cal.Rptr.3d 89 [noting "the dearth of authority recognizing a section 526a taxpayer action predicated on an alleged criminal violation"].) 12 Schur established the principle that express legislative authorization is required for a taxpayer action to overcome the bar against equitable relief codified in Civil Code section 3369.

2004Workers (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 1353 , 1357-1358 [claim that union job-targeting program violated California law not preempted; if preemption were extended to such a claim, then "parties would be able to immunize themselves from suit under state-laws of general applicability by simply including their unlawful behavior in a labor contract"]; cf. Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 98-100, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 365 [finding Ninth Circuit decision controlling by reason of the law of the case doctrine, state court concluded that 301 did not preempt action against employer alle

2004Workers (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 1353 , 1357-1358 [claim that union job-targeting program violated California law not preempted; if preemption were extended to such a claim, then "parties would be able to immunize themselves from suit under state-laws of general applicability by simply including their unlawful behavior in a labor contract"]; cf. Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 98-100, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 365 [finding Ninth Circuit decision controlling by reason of the law of the case doctrine, state court concluded that 301 did not preempt action against employer alle

2004Workers (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 1353 , 1357-1358 [claim that union job-targeting program violated California law not preempted; if preemption were extended to such a claim, then "parties would be able to immunize themselves from suit under state-laws of general applicability by simply including their unlawful behavior in a labor contract"]; cf. Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 98-100, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 365 [finding Ninth Circuit decision controlling by reason of the law of the case doctrine, state court concluded that 301 did not preempt action against employer alle

2004Workers (9th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 1353 , 1357-1358 [claim that union job-targeting program violated California law not preempted; if preemption were extended to such a claim, then "parties would be able to immunize themselves from suit under state-laws of general applicability by simply including their unlawful behavior in a labor contract"]; cf. Adams v. Pacific Bell Directory, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at pp. 98-100, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 365 [finding Ninth Circuit decision controlling by reason of the law of the case doctrine, state court concluded that 301 did not preempt action against employer alle

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

2003(CALJIC No. 9.94.) "[T]here is no requirement that a specific crime or Penal Code violation be threatened." ( People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 755 , 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "willfully threatens to commit a crime" is included in the criminal threats statute in order to criminalize those threats that truly pose a danger to society and thus pass muster under the First Amendment. ( Id. at p. 757, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 269 .) The phrase "will result in great bodily injury" means objectively, i.e., to a reasonable person, likely to result in great bodily injury based on all the surrou

1994I recognize the rule of statutory construction "`that when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.'" ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 725 .) In this context, however, that rule would seem to be irrelevant since there is no reason to believe that in 1872 the Legislature had nongovernmental "official proceedings" in mind.

1994I recognize the rule of statutory construction “ ‘that when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and has excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.’ ” (Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d 711, 725 .) In this context, however, that rule would seem to be irrelevant since there is no reason to believe that in 1872 the Legislature had nongovernmental “official proceedings” in mind.

1975The municipal court judge who denied the original section 1000 Penal Code motion felt that he had no discretion to do otherwise, not only because of the refusal of the district attorney to initiate diversion proceedings, 4 but also because of the strict interpretation given to this section in People v. Cina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 136 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 758 ] (an authority to be hereinafter referred to and discussed).

1975The municipal court judge who denied the original section 1000 Penal Code motion felt that he had no discretion to do otherwise, not only because of the refusal of the district attorney to initiate diversion proceedings, 4 but also because of the strict interpretation given to this section in People v. Cina (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 136 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 758 ] (an authority to be hereinafter referred to and discussed).

1971Second, again because the record is a blank, the immediate circumstances of the seizure could have been violative of due process under the rule of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [ 96 L.Ed. 183 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ].

1971Second, again because the record is a blank, the immediate circumstances of the seizure could have been violative of due process under the rule of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 [ 96 L.Ed. 183 , 72 S.Ct. 205 , 25 A.L.R.2d 1396 ].

1971If they had gained the relative sanctuary of a home, the seizure of the baggies could have been effected in violation of section 844 of the Penal Code or the rule of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ], or both.

1971If they had gained the relative sanctuary of a home, the seizure of the baggies could have been effected in violation of section 844 of the Penal Code or the rule of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 685 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 ], or both.