172 Texas opinions name it 6 courts 1976–2026 33 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Almanza v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. “[J]ury charge error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the charge and we find ‘some harm’ to his rights.” Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. 2026“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. “[J]ury[-]charge error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the charge and we find ‘some harm’ to his rights.” Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. | 31 | 35 |
Olivas v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g). 2013If error is found, the degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objecting to the complained of instruction. *742 Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Lovings, 376 S.W.3d at 337 . | 15 | 15 |
Hutch v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. 2015Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. | 6 | 11 |
Middleton v. Stategreen2 sentences2021“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. (citing Middleton, 125 S.W.3d at 453 ). 2021“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. (citing Middleton, 125 S.W.3d at 453 ). | 5 | 16 |
Arline v. Stategreen2 sentences2003App. 1984); see also Arline v. State , 721 S.W.2d 348 , 351 B 53 (holding “any harm” not “some harm” will mandate a reversal if the appellant preserved error). 2003See Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); see also Arline v. State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 351-53 (holding “any harm” not “some harm” will mandate a reversal if the appellant preserved error). | 4 | 4 |
Ngo v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. “[J]ury charge error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the charge and we find ‘some harm’ to his rights.” Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. 2026“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. “[J]ury charge error requires reversal when the defendant has properly objected to the charge and we find ‘some harm’ to his rights.” Id. (quoting Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 83 |
Ferreira v. Stategreen2 sentences2019Id. at 743–44; Ferreira v. State, 514 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). 2018Id. at 743; Ferreira v. State, 514 S.W.3d 297, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). | 3 | 3 |
Stokes v. Stategreen2 sentences2007If he or she did not object at trial, then the "appropriate standard [of review] is the one for fundamental error in the charge." Jimenez , 32 S.W.3d at 239 ; see also Stokes , 74 S.W.3d at 50 . 2003If he or she did not object at trial, then the "appropriate standard [of review] is the one for fundamental error in the charge." Jimenez , 32 S.W.3d at 239 ; see also Stokes , 74 S.W.3d at 50 . | 2 | 2 |
Jimenez v. Stategreen2 sentences2008If the appellant did not preserve the error by raising an objection to it at trial, the "appropriate standard [of review] is the one for fundamental error in the charge." Jimenez v. State , 32 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Tex. Crim. 2007If he or she did not object at trial, then the "appropriate standard [of review] is the one for fundamental error in the charge." Jimenez , 32 S.W.3d at 239 ; see also Stokes , 74 S.W.3d at 50 . | 1 | 3 |
Bill Boyd Kuhn v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Id.; Kuhn v. State, 393 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tex. App.—Austin, 2013, pet. ref’d). 2015Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 ; Kuhn, 393 S.W.3d at 524 . | 1 | 2 |
Herron v. Stategreen1 sentence2024App. 1985) (en banc) (op. on reh’g); see also Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 ; Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Saunders v. Stategreen1 sentence2024App. 1985) (en banc) (op. on reh’g); see also Herron, 86 S.W.3d at 632 ; Saunders v. State, 817 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Villarreal, Rene Danielgreen1 sentence2023Villarreal v. State, 453 S.W.3d 429, 433 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Marshall v. Stategreen1 sentence2019Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Long v. Stategreen1 sentence2018He argues that “[a] general hearsay objection is sufficient to preserve all appellate claims under Article 38.072,” and he cites the fact that “the Courts of Appeals have compared the similarity in terms of preservation of error requirements between Article 38.072 and Article 38.37.” Appellant relies on Long v. State, which acknowledged the “rule that an objection must be specific in order to inform the trial judge of the basis of the objection and to afford counsel the opportunity to remove the objection or supply other testimony” and held that the appellant preserved error by raising an obje | 1 | 1 |
Carmichael v. Stategreen1 sentence2018App. 1990); see also Carmichael, 505 S.W.3d at 102–03 (noting similarities between articles 38.37 and 38.072 in concluding that failure to make specific objection to lack of adequate hearing is subject to general requirement of preservation and is therefore subject to forfeiture); Taylor v. State, 509 S.W.3d 468 , 472–73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. ref’d) (examining article 38.072’s hearing requirement and holding that appellant waived any alleged error). | 1 | 1 |
Thieleman v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Compara Thieleman v. State, 187 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that the appellant preserved error about a sleeping juror by moving for a mistrial at the conclusion of the guilt phase of .the trial when a juror had "slept continuously throughout the trial"), with Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 279 (Tex.App.-Houstori [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that Exxon failed to preserve error by waiting until after the verdict and including the complaint about a sleeping juror for the first time in a motion for new trial), and Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 886-87 (Tex.Crim.A | 1 | 1 |
Melendez v. Exxon Corp.green1 sentence2016Compara Thieleman v. State, 187 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that the appellant preserved error about a sleeping juror by moving for a mistrial at the conclusion of the guilt phase of .the trial when a juror had "slept continuously throughout the trial"), with Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 279 (Tex.App.-Houstori [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that Exxon failed to preserve error by waiting until after the verdict and including the complaint about a sleeping juror for the first time in a motion for new trial), and Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 886-87 (Tex.Crim.A | 1 | 1 |
Horrocks v. Texas Department of Transportationgreen1 sentence2016See Horrocks v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 852 S.W.2d 498, 498-99 (Tex.1993) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Ocon v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Compara Thieleman v. State, 187 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex.Crim.App.2005) (holding that the appellant preserved error about a sleeping juror by moving for a mistrial at the conclusion of the guilt phase of .the trial when a juror had "slept continuously throughout the trial"), with Melendez v. Exxon Corp., 998 S.W.2d 266, 279 (Tex.App.-Houstori [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (holding that Exxon failed to preserve error by waiting until after the verdict and including the complaint about a sleeping juror for the first time in a motion for new trial), and Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 886-87 (Tex.Crim.A | 1 | 1 |
| Lagrone v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grant v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wiseman v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cooks v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Recer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Virts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dixon v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Abdnor v. State
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 732 . 2009Id. | 4 | 2009–2019 |
Palmer Well Services Inc. v. MacK Trucks, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 576-77 . 2001Id. at 576-77 . | 3 | 2001–2005 |
Raven Ryon Lovings v. State
green
2 sentences2013If error is found, the degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objecting to the complained of instruction. *742 Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on reh’g); Lovings, 376 S.W.3d at 337 . 2013Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); see also Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (op. on reh’g); Lovings, 376 S.W.3d at 337 . | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Druery v. State
green
2 sentences2011Id. 2011Id. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Casanova, Matthew John
green
2 sentences2024“The degree of harm necessary for reversal depends on whether the appellant preserved the error by objection.” Id. (quoting Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743 ). 2024Error is harmless under this standard when the corroborating evidence is so strong that “it becomes implausible that a jury would fail to find that it tends to connect the accused to the commission of the charged offense.” Id. at *8 (quoting Casanova, 383 S.W.3d at 539–40). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Teal v. State
green
1 sentence2021In circumstances in which the indictment contains a defect in form because, for example, it fails to allege sufficient facts, and the appellant preserved the error by raising a pretrial objection for lack of notice, see Teal, 230 S.W.3d at 182 , we ask whether the substantial rights of the defendant were prejudiced by the defect. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Brian Taylor v. State
green
1 sentence2018App. 1990); see also Carmichael, 505 S.W.3d at 102–03 (noting similarities between articles 38.37 and 38.072 in concluding that failure to make specific objection to lack of adequate hearing is subject to general requirement of preservation and is therefore subject to forfeiture); Taylor v. State, 509 S.W.3d 468 , 472–73 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. ref’d) (examining article 38.072’s hearing requirement and holding that appellant waived any alleged error). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Kirsch, Scott Alan
green
1 sentence2018Id. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Guadalupe-Blanco River Authority v. Kraft
green
1 sentence2016See, e.g. , Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft , 77 S.W.3d 805 , 807 (Tex. 2002) (holding that when the appellant objected to a witness's appraisal testimony and was overruled, the appellant preserved error on the admission of the testimony even though the appellant did not object when the appellee tendered a summary of the witness's appraisal). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
City of Fort Worth v. Holland
green
1 sentence2016Cf. City of Fort Worth v. Holland , 748 S.W.2d 112 , 113 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (recognizing a line of cases expressing that "a party making a proper objection to the introduction of testimony of a witness, which objection is overruled, may assume that the judge will make a similar ruling as to other offers of similar evidence" and limiting that rule "to those instances where the similar evidence is elicited from the same witness"). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Grayson v. State green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Pena, Jose Luis green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Whitsey v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Kirkpatrick v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Riojas v. State green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.