referee hearing in Michigan

2025“A party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error.” Hodge v Parks, 303 Mich App 552, 556 ; 844 NW2d 189 (2014) (quotation 10 When denying this request, the trial court stated that “Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this evidence was not available at the referee hearing.” -20- marks and citation omitted).

2025“A party who waives a right is precluded from seeking appellate review based on a denial of that right because waiver eliminates any error.” Hodge v Parks, 303 Mich App 552, 556 ; 844 NW2d 189 (2014) (quotation 10 When denying this request, the trial court stated that “Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this evidence was not available at the referee hearing.” -20- marks and citation omitted).

2025And regarding the retroactive modification of spousal support, the trial court noted that this Court concluded the retroactive modification of the support to February 1, 2020, was inequitable given that defendant did not begin working a full-time job until September 2020, so the court ordered “that the modification be retroactively applied to September 1, 2020, when [defendant] first began working full-time.” The record makes clear that the trial court complied on remand with this Court’s specific directives in Rosin I, id. at 5, 9-10, and we see no reversible error in that regard, see Glenn,

2023Because Makenna did not object to the referee’s recommendation that the right of first refusal be removed from the judgment of divorce,2 or raise this argument before the trial court, this issue is not preserved and our review “is limited to determining whether a plain error occurred that affected 2 MCR 3.215(E)(4) provides: A party may obtain a judicial hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing and that resulted in a statement of findings and a recommended order by filing a written objection and notice of hearing within 21 days after the referee’s recommendation for

2023Because Makenna did not object to the referee’s recommendation that the right of first refusal be removed from the judgment of divorce,2 or raise this argument before the trial court, this issue is not preserved and our review “is limited to determining whether a plain error occurred that affected 2 MCR 3.215(E)(4) provides: A party may obtain a judicial hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing and that resulted in a statement of findings and a recommended order by filing a written objection and notice of hearing within 21 days after the referee’s recommendation for

2022The trial court explicitly acknowledged the delays in the proceedings prior to the referee hearing and de novo hearing, but, citing Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 693 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992), the court stated that it was limited to determining “if a custodial environment has been established and not the reason why it was established.” Defendant claims the trial court’s finding regarding the children’s custodial environment ignored that the children were under the care of both parties for the overwhelming majority of the children’s lives.

2022The trial court explicitly acknowledged the delays in the proceedings prior to the referee hearing and de novo hearing, but, citing Treutle v Treutle, 197 Mich App 690, 693 ; 495 NW2d 836 (1992), the court stated that it was limited to determining “if a custodial environment has been established and not the reason why it was established.” Defendant claims the trial court’s finding regarding the children’s custodial environment ignored that the children were under the care of both parties for the overwhelming majority of the children’s lives.

2020Consequently, the referee applied the framework of Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003).

2020Consequently, the referee applied the framework of Vodvarka v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499 ; 675 NW2d 847 (2003).

2014Therefore, it was an error of law when the circuit court precluded defendant from making certain legal arguments just because they could have been raised at the referee hearing. -8- Second, as this Court has previously stated, “The purpose of a de novo hearing is for the trial court to ‘render its own decision based on the evidence, independent of any prior . . . ruling.’” Sturgis v Sturgis, 302 Mich App 706, 708 ; 840 NW2d 408 (2013), quoting Heindlmeyer v Ottawa Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, 268 Mich App 202, 219 ; 707 NW2d 353 (2005); see also MCL 552.507(6)(a) (providing that the de n

2014Therefore, it was an error of law when the circuit court precluded defendant from making certain legal arguments just because they could have been raised at the referee hearing. -8- Second, as this Court has previously stated, “The purpose of a de novo hearing is for the trial court to ‘render its own decision based on the evidence, independent of any prior . . . ruling.’” Sturgis v Sturgis, 302 Mich App 706, 708 ; 840 NW2d 408 (2013), quoting Heindlmeyer v Ottawa Co Concealed Weapons Licensing Bd, 268 Mich App 202, 219 ; 707 NW2d 353 (2005); see also MCL 552.507(6)(a) (providing that the de n

2008However, our Supreme Court, in Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 187-188 ; 680 NW2d 835 (2004), held that regardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution that parties use, the Child Custody Act 2 requires the circuit court to determine independently what cus *333 todial placement is in the best interests of the children, emphasizing that the statutory best-interest factors control whenever a court enters an order affecting child custody.

2008However, our Supreme Court, in Harvey v Harvey, 470 Mich 186, 187-188 ; 680 NW2d 835 (2004), held that regardless of the type of alternative dispute resolution that parties use, the Child Custody Act 2 requires the circuit court to determine independently what cus *333 todial placement is in the best interests of the children, emphasizing that the statutory best-interest factors control whenever a court enters an order affecting child custody.

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2005However, “[t]he court shall hold a de novo hearing on any matter that has been the subject of a referee hearing, upon the written request of either party or upon motion of the court.” MCL 552.507(5). 17 Crompton v Crompton, 178 Mich App 362, 363 ; 443 NW2d 419 (1989), citing Truitt v Truitt, 172 Mich App 38,43 ; 431 NW2d 454 (1988). 18 Id. at 364. 19 Truitt, supra at 44 . 20 Id. at 43 , quoting Nichols v Nichols, 106 Mich App 584, 588 ; 308 NW2d 291 (1981), quoting Brugel v Hildebrandt, 332 Mich 475, 484 ; 52 NW2d 190 (1952). 21 As the trial court has yet to mate an independent determination r

2003The statute and the court rule grant the parties the ability to make this decision, and there is nothing in the statute, court rule, or case law prohibiting them from exercising that discretion before the hearing takes place. 5 Indeed, in Balabuch v Balabuch; 199 Mich App 661 ; 502 NW2d 381 (1993), this Court specifically upheld a parties’ consent order, entered into before the friend of the court hearing, which provided that the friend of the court decision on child support would be binding.

2003The statute and the court rule grant the parties the ability to make this decision, and there is nothing in the statute, court rule, or case law prohibiting them from exercising that discretion before the hearing takes place. 5 Indeed, in Balabuch v Balabuch; 199 Mich App 661 ; 502 NW2d 381 (1993), this Court specifically upheld a parties’ consent order, entered into before the friend of the court hearing, which provided that the friend of the court decision on child support would be binding.

1996The economic necessity of a claimant securing a means of support pending resolution of a disability claim was noted by this Court in Paschke, supra at 517 , and in Bower, supra at 193 . [I]t is important to recognize that if the employer does not pay compensation voluntarily, the employee may be without any means of support until an award of benefits is made by the referee at the hearing, [id.] We do recognize, however, that if Mr. Derr has permanently removed himself from the job market, he may no longer be available for a reasonable-employment position.

1996The economic necessity of a claimant securing a means of support pending resolution of a disability claim was noted by this Court in Paschke, supra at 517 , 519 N.W.2d 441 , and in Bower, supra at 193 , 312 N.W.2d 640 . [I]t is important to recognize that if the employer does not pay compensation voluntarily, the employee may be without any means of support until an award of benefits is made by the referee at the hearing. [ Id. ] We do recognize, however, that if Mr. Derr has permanently removed himself from the job market, he may no longer be available for a reasonable-employment position.

1996The economic necessity of a claimant securing a means of support pending resolution of a disability claim was noted by this Court in Paschke, supra at 517 , and in Bower, supra at 193 . [I]t is important to recognize that if the employer does not pay compensation voluntarily, the employee may be without any means of support until an award of benefits is made by the referee at the hearing, [id.] We do recognize, however, that if Mr. Derr has permanently removed himself from the job market, he may no longer be available for a reasonable-employment position.

1996The economic necessity of a claimant securing a means of support pending resolution of a disability claim was noted by this Court in Paschke, supra at 517 , 519 N.W.2d 441 , and in Bower, supra at 193 , 312 N.W.2d 640 . [I]t is important to recognize that if the employer does not pay compensation voluntarily, the employee may be without any means of support until an award of benefits is made by the referee at the hearing. [ Id. ] We do recognize, however, that if Mr. Derr has permanently removed himself from the job market, he may no longer be available for a reasonable-employment position.

1990Also relying on Knight-Morley Corp, supra, the Court of Appeals held that "[although strikers should be disqualified from receiving benefits during a strike even if the employer hires replacements, the disqualification should end when and if the employer announces that the replacements will be kept permanently.” 168 Mich App 21, 32 ; 424 NW2d 530 (1988).

1990Also relying on Knight-Morley Corp, supra, the Court of Appeals held that "[although strikers should be disqualified from receiving benefits during a strike even if the employer hires replacements, the disqualification should end when and if the employer announces that the replacements will be kept permanently.” 168 Mich App 21, 32 ; 424 NW2d 530 (1988).

1988Gormley v General Motors Corp, 125 Mich App 781, 784-785 ; 336 NW2d 873 (1983).

1988Gormley v General Motors Corp, 125 Mich App 781, 784-785 ; 336 NW2d 873 (1983).

1981The opinion quotes from In the Matter of Watson, 273 NC 629, 635; 161 SE2d 1 (1968), stating: "[W]e conclude that an employee, having been separated from his job through no fault of his own, rejects other tendered employment for 'good cause’ when his reason for such rejection would be deemed by reasonable men and women valid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work.” Although we disagree, the record supports the decision of the referee even under that standard stated in the dissent in Keith.

1980The purpose of this hearing was noted in Farrell v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 392 Mich 344, 346 ; 220 NW2d 450 (1974).

1980The purpose of this hearing was noted in Farrell v Campbell, Wyant & Cannon Foundry Co, 392 Mich 344, 346 ; 220 NW2d 450 (1974).

1960The referee hearing the matter granted an award, which was affirmed by the appeal board and sustained by this Court in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Company, 353 Mich 363 .

1960The referee hearing the matter granted an award, which was affirmed by the appeal board and sustained by this Court in Wilson v. Doehler-Jarvis Division of National Lead Company, 353 Mich 363 .