referee hearing in New York

1933This would represent the actual loss sustained by plaintiff and it can recover no more." ( 230 App. Div. 356 , 357 .) Acting upon this suggestion the plaintiff apparently proceeded before the referee on this hearing, to measure its damage by the difference between the price it received for its "peppered" ice and the market value of clear ice.

1933This would represent the actual loss sustained by plaintiff and it can recover no more.” ( 230 App. Div. 356, 357 .) • Acting upon this suggestion the plaintiff apparently proceeded before the referee on this hearing, to measure its damage by the difference between the price it received for its “ peppered ” ice and the market value of clear ice.

1900In Matthews v. Matthews, 53 Hun, 244 , 6 N. Y.

1900In Matthews v. Matthews, 53 Hun, 244 , 6 N. Y.

1892It is rather, are we so certain that the referee was in error as that we will assume to reverse this judgment?” Crane v. Baudouine, 55 N. Y. 256, 264 .

1891As said by Folger, J., in Crane v. Baudourne( 55 N. Y. 256 ), the question is whether we are so certain that the referee was in error upon the facts as that we will assume to review his judgment % “ The fact that the trial court has the immense advantage of seeing the witnesses as they testify, and can thus observe their general intelligence, their demeanor while under examination and the presence or absence, of fairness and candor; all this always weighed very strongly with appellate courts when asked to review and reverse the findings of fact by a court or referee. “ The plaintiff herein cla

2025Supreme Court (Cahill, J.) granted plaintiff's motion, lifted the stay and denied defendant's cross-motion, which order was affirmed by this Court (196 AD3d 1016).

2025Supreme Court (Cahill, J.) granted plaintiff's motion, lifted the stay and denied defendant's cross-motion, which order was affirmed by this Court ( 196 AD3d 1016 ).

2023Respondent moved for reconsideration, and/or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, and we partially granted respondent's motion, vacated our June 2022 order, suspended respondent from practice on an interim basis and referred the matter to a Referee for hearing and report as to the penalty to be imposed ( Matter of Hamling , 212 AD3d 1077 [3d Dept 2023]).

2021Given defendant's failure to appear at the referee hearing, it cannot be said that Supreme Court abused its discretion in vacating the stay and permitting the sale of the subject real property to go forward ( see HSBC Bank USA N.A. v Pacyna , 112 AD3d 1246 , 1247-1248 [2013]; Citicorp Mtg. v Rodelli , 249 AD2d 736, 738 [1998]; see also Federal Deposit Ins.

2016Respondent’s plea admissions that he “had possession of a computer” and he “had a picture of a minor engaged in sexu *23 ally explicit conduct,” read in conjunction with the information to which he pleaded guilty, and his counsel’s concessions at the sentence hearing, corresponds to the New York felony of possessing a sexual performance by a child (Penal Law § 263.16), and therefore is a proper predicate for automatic disbarment under Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) and (e) (see Matter of Groezinger, 77 AD3d 117 [2d Dept 2010]; Matter of Lipton, 51 AD3d 207 [2d Dept 2008]; cf. People v Kent, 19 NY3

2016Respondent’s plea admissions that he “had possession of a computer” and he “had a picture of a minor engaged in sexu *23 ally explicit conduct,” read in conjunction with the information to which he pleaded guilty, and his counsel’s concessions at the sentence hearing, corresponds to the New York felony of possessing a sexual performance by a child (Penal Law § 263.16), and therefore is a proper predicate for automatic disbarment under Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) and (e) (see Matter of Groezinger, 77 AD3d 117 [2d Dept 2010]; Matter of Lipton, 51 AD3d 207 [2d Dept 2008]; cf. People v Kent, 19 NY3

2016Respondent’s plea admissions that he “had possession of a computer” and he “had a picture of a minor engaged in sexu *23 ally explicit conduct,” read in conjunction with the information to which he pleaded guilty, and his counsel’s concessions at the sentence hearing, corresponds to the New York felony of possessing a sexual performance by a child (Penal Law § 263.16), and therefore is a proper predicate for automatic disbarment under Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b) and (e) (see Matter of Groezinger, 77 AD3d 117 [2d Dept 2010]; Matter of Lipton, 51 AD3d 207 [2d Dept 2008]; cf. People v Kent, 19 NY3

2006While respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to any intent to defraud creditors, even purely circumstantial evidence permits the inference of an intent to defraud creditors (see Matter of Goldstein, 10 AD3d 174 [2004]; Matter of Rose, 286 AD2d 1 [2001]).

2003Plaintiff subcontractor was entitled to summary judgment against individual defendants Conde and Campi based upon evidence establishing that those defendants were, inter alia, officers of the corporate defendant and that the corporate defendant, a general contractor, although dissolved by proclamation for nonpayment of franchise taxes (see Tax Law § 203-a; Business Corporation Law §§ 1009, 1005), was utilized to enter into subcontract agreements with plaintiff, and then failed to pay plaintiff for its services thereunder (see Brandes Meat Corp. v Cromer, 146 AD2d 666 [1989]; WorldCom, Inc. v S

2003Plaintiff subcontractor was entitled to summary judgment against individual defendants Conde and Campi based upon evidence establishing that those defendants were, inter alia, officers of the corporate defendant and that the corporate defendant, a general contractor, although dissolved by proclamation for nonpayment of franchise taxes (see Tax Law § 203-a; Business Corporation Law §§ 1009, 1005), was utilized to enter into subcontract agreements with plaintiff, and then failed to pay plaintiff for its services thereunder (see Brandes Meat Corp. v Cromer, 146 AD2d 666 [1989]; WorldCom, Inc. v S

2002By a per curiam opinion of this Court dated April 19, 2001 ( 293 AD2d 131 ) and an order dated May 11, 2001 ( 283 AD2d 234 ), respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (a) (4), (7) and DR 2-106 (a) (22 NYCRR 1200.3, 1200.11), and this matter was referred to a referee for a hearing as to sanction only.

2002By a per curiam opinion of this Court dated April 19, 2001 ( 293 AD2d 131 ) and an order dated May 11, 2001 ( 283 AD2d 234 ), respondent was found guilty of professional misconduct in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102 (a) (4), (7) and DR 2-106 (a) (22 NYCRR 1200.3, 1200.11), and this matter was referred to a referee for a hearing as to sanction only.

2001By failing to raise a timely objection at the hearing to the Referee’s stated intention to apply section 1104-a, and by thereafter actively litigating the case under that statute through entry of judgment, Haimil is deemed to have elected to proceed with the case as one brought under section 1104-a, and to have waived any previously existing right to insist on application of section 1104 alone (cf, Sherrill v Grayco Bldrs. , 64 NY2d 261, 272 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

2000None of the employees or non-equity partners in the law firm stood “to gain or lose * * * by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment” (Matter of Will of Sheehan, 51 AD2d 645, 647 ), to an extent that was present, certain and vested (see, Stay v Horvath, 177 AD2d 897, 899 ), and not a mere possibility (see, Curtis v Hennequin, 27 Misc 2d 1042, 1044 ).

1999To prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party so charged violated a clear and unequivocal court order (see, Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 ; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 ; Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 261 AD2d 576 ; Matter of CBS Rubbish Removal v Town of Babylon Sanitation Commn., 249 AD2d 541 ).

1999To prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party so charged violated a clear and unequivocal court order (see, Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 ; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 ; Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 261 AD2d 576 ; Matter of CBS Rubbish Removal v Town of Babylon Sanitation Commn., 249 AD2d 541 ).

1999To prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party so charged violated a clear and unequivocal court order (see, Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 ; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 ; Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 261 AD2d 576 ; Matter of CBS Rubbish Removal v Town of Babylon Sanitation Commn., 249 AD2d 541 ).

1999To prevail on a motion to punish a party for civil contempt, the movant must demonstrate that the party so charged violated a clear and unequivocal court order (see, Judiciary Law § 753 [A] [3]; McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216 ; Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574 ; Goldsmith v Goldsmith, 261 AD2d 576 ; Matter of CBS Rubbish Removal v Town of Babylon Sanitation Commn., 249 AD2d 541 ).