obligation defense in New York

1997The same is true of Public Officers Law § 18 (3)(a) which provides for defense of an alleged act or omission, which "occurred or allegedly occurred" while the employee was acting within the scope of his or her duties. 1 In Hassan v. Fraccola , 851 F.2d 602 (2d Cir 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the question whether under section 18 of the Public Officers Law an allegation in the complaint that the act occurred within the defendant's scope of employment established an obligation of defense by the municipality.

1995In Hassan v Fraccola , 851 F.2d 602 (2d Cir 1988), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dealt with the question whether an allegation in the complaint that the act occurred within the defendant's scope of employment established an obligation of defense by the municipality.

1993The prosecution is under an obligation to provide the defense with the envelope containing the undercover officer’s notations (CPL 240.45; see, People v Rogelio, 160 AD2d 359, 360 , affd 79 NY2d 843 ; People v Rosario, 9 NY2d 286 ).

1983It is appropriate in the context of the prosecutions before the court to underscore the fact that the People’s obligation to the defense in Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 , cert den 368 US 866 ) situations is grounded upon principles of basic fairness to facilitate effective cross-examination.

1970Here, the principal’s obligation was changed from making progress payments to making a lump-sum payment; it was not an act of leniency towards the principal by the assured through remission of a part of an obligation or waiver of full performance, such as a reduction in the rate of interest (see Becker v. Faber, supra, p. 150 ; Greenwich Sav.

1940We have not held that an act of leniency towards the principal by the assured through remission of a part of an obligation or waiver of full performance constitutes an alteration of the obligation of the principal which will discharge the surety completely.” (Italics in original.) (Becker v. Faber, 280 N. Y. 146 .) It is the general rule that a surety must pay the debt and himself resort to the collateral.

2025The Court of Appeals held that an insurer's obligation to provide defense to an additional insured was not [*5]contingent upon the additional insured's liability ( see id. ).

2025The Court of Appeals held that an insurer's obligation to provide defense to an additional insured was not [*5]contingent upon the additional insured's liability ( see id. ).

1997The New York Court of Appeals in People v Vilardi ( 76 NY2d 67 [1990]) ruled that a Brady violation discovered post-conviction required the court to set aside such conviction if there was a reasonable possibility that defense counsel could have used such material to his advantage and if counsel had requested such information.

1993Co. v Zuk, 78 NY2d 41 ).

1992"Defendant may not withhold objection to improper arguments, hope for an acquittal, and then raise the improper arguments as error if the jury convicts.” (People v Acosta, 180 AD2d 505, 509 .) We have considered the remaining arguments raised by the defendant and find them to be without merit.

1990Co., 81 AD2d 325 ; Gon v First State Ins.

1985Although discharge of the original contract usually constitutes sufficient consideration for the substituted contract (Town & Country Linoleum & Carpet Co. v Welch, supra), the original obligation at bar was not discharged in light of defendant’s failure to execute the settlement documents.

1985The United States Constitution vests in the Federal Government the obligation to provide defense to the entire Nation and all of its people without regard to their location (see, United States v McGee, 432 F Supp 557, 561 , affd 611 F2d 375).

1984Diamond v Flood (supra), the appellate tribunal repeated the injunction that a parole hearing is administrative in nature and stressed the obligation of the hearing officer to make appropriate factual findings in connection with the alleged parole violations.

1984The Appellate Division also stated in that case, “We note that, in the future, parolees will not be permitted to obtain judicial review of claims of a denial of a prompt hearing unless the matter has been raised in the administrative process” ( 100 AD2d, at p 605 ).

1983It is appropriate in the context of the prosecutions before the court to underscore the fact that the People’s obligation to the defense in Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286 , cert den 368 US 866 ) situations is grounded upon principles of basic fairness to facilitate effective cross-examination.

1982Assuming qualification, it would then become the obligation of the defense to satisfy the trial judge, by a fair preponderance of the evidence including all reasonable inferences, that there was a reasonable probability or likelihood that the information sought by the subpoena was material and relevant to his defense, that it could not be secured from any less intrusive source, and that the defendant had a legitimate need to see and otherwise use it.” But the court followed this declaration with the following caveat (supra, p 277): “We wish to make it clear, however, that this opinion is not t

1982Assuming qualification, it would then become the obligation of the defense to satisfy the trial judge, by a fair preponderance of the evidence including all reasonable inferences, that there was a reasonable probability or likelihood that the information sought by the subpoena was material and relevant to his defense, that it could not be secured from any less intrusive source, and that the defendant had a legitimate need to see and otherwise use it.” But the court followed this declaration with the following caveat (supra, p 277): “We wish to make it clear, however, that this opinion is not t

1982Catering Corp., 285 App Div 506, 509-510 ). 12 NYCRR 350.1 is just such a rule providing, as it does, for a blanket exemption from the employer’s obligation to provide hearing aids for victims with occupational hearing losses.

1982Assuming qualification, it would then become the obligation of the defense to satisfy the trial judge, by a fair preponderance of the evidence including all reasonable inferences, that there was a reasonable probability or likelihood that the information sought by the subpoena was material and relevant to his defense, that it could not be secured from any less intrusive source, and that the defendant had a legitimate need to see and otherwise use it.” But the court followed this declaration with the following caveat (supra, p 277): “We wish to make it clear, however, that this opinion is not t

1980Co., 244 NY 331 ; Courteen Seed Co. v Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 NY 377 ; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 NY 170 .) Thus, in spite of the allegations of intentional acts, American had notice that Diamond might be subject to judgment based upon a "negligent act, error or omission” within the scope of the policy and, with such notice, the obligation to provide a defense attached.

1980Co., 244 NY 331 ; Courteen Seed Co. v Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 NY 377 ; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 NY 170 .) Thus, in spite of the allegations of intentional acts, American had notice that Diamond might be subject to judgment based upon a "negligent act, error or omission” within the scope of the policy and, with such notice, the obligation to provide a defense attached.

1980Co., 244 NY 331 ; Courteen Seed Co. v Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 245 NY 377 ; Ultramares Corp. v Touche, 255 NY 170 .) Thus, in spite of the allegations of intentional acts, American had notice that Diamond might be subject to judgment based upon a "negligent act, error or omission” within the scope of the policy and, with such notice, the obligation to provide a defense attached.

1979While there may be cases in which the withdrawal, disability or incompetence of the attorney provided by a municipality requires the employment of a substitute attorney (see, e.g., Cahn v Town of Huntington, 29 NY2d 451 [disability]), a municipal official for whom counsel has been provided generally has no authority on his own judgment and without the approval of the municipality to make a substitution at its expense (see People ex rel.

1970Bank v. Eckford Bealty Corp., 268 App. Div. 195 ).

1967(See Komar v. Dun & Bradstreet Co., 284 App. Div. 538 ; Conte v. Large Scale Development Corp., 10 N Y 2d 20; Naso v. Wates & Co., 21 A D 2d 679.) Defendant seeks to similarly construe the instant obligation under rule 23-3(i) with respect to the guarding of the hole in question, although it can point to no statutory provision, under section 240 or otherwise, which would warrant the imposition of such obligation upon the subcontractor-employer.

1958Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 205 Misc. 1066, 1075 , and cases there cited). [ 5 Misc 2d 666 .]

1958Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 205 Misc. 1066, 1075 , and cases there cited). [ 5 Misc 2d 666 .]