7 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stewart v. Underwoodgreen1 sentence2022But a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a lien or other security agreement associated with the underlying obligation or bar an in rem suit to enforce it. 11 U.S.C. § 524 (j) (discharge “does not operate as an injunction against an act by a creditor that is the holder of a secured claim”); see Stewart, 146 Ariz. at 146 ; Transamerica Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Shaffer v. Heitnergreen1 sentence2022“But a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a lien or other security agreement associated with the underlying obligation or bar an in rem suit to enforce it.” Diaz, 61 Ariz. Cases Digest at ¶ 15; see also Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 199 (explaining that an action in rem “is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability on the property owner”). | 1 | 1 |
Tonnemacher v. Touche Ross & Co.green1 sentence2022Co. v. Trout, 145 Ariz. 355, 359 (App. 1985); Tonnemacher, 186 Ariz. at 129 (action in rem seeks control over property). ¶16 Consequently, while the Diazes received relief of their personal obligation to BBVA when their debt was discharged in bankruptcy, the deed of trust they executed to secure that personal obligation was not extinguished. | 1 | 1 |
Transamerica Insurance v. Troutgreen1 sentence2022Co. v. Trout, 145 Ariz. 355, 359 (App. 1985); Tonnemacher, 186 Ariz. at 129 (action in rem seeks control over property). ¶16 Consequently, while the Diazes received relief of their personal obligation to BBVA when their debt was discharged in bankruptcy, the deed of trust they executed to secure that personal obligation was not extinguished. | 1 | 1 |
Ina Insurance Co. of North America v. Valley Forge Insurancegreen2 sentences2008Id. at 255 , 722 P.2d at 982 (citation omitted). ¶ 24 We then rejected the carrier’s argument that the agency agreement only provided indemnification for damages, not attorneys’ fees: “A party is not ‘held harmless’ unless the indemnitor bears the indemnitee’s costs of defending the third party’s claim.” Id. ¶ 25 In discussing the carrier’s indemnity obligations to the agent, we did not, as MT Builders suggests, establish a rule that a contractual promise to “hold harmless” by itself creates an immediate, up-front duty to defend. 2008Id. at 255 , 722 P.2d at 982 (citation omitted). ¶ 24 We then rejected the carrier’s argument that the agency agreement only provided indemnification for damages, not attorneys’ fees: “A party is not ‘held harmless’ unless the indemnitor bears the indemnitee’s costs of defending the third party’s claim.” Id. ¶ 25 In discussing the carrier’s indemnity obligations to the agent, we did not, as MT Builders suggests, establish a rule that a contractual promise to “hold harmless” by itself creates an immediate, up-front duty to defend. | 1 | 1 |
Carpenter v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2002Carpenter v. Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 486, 490 , 862 P.2d 246, 250 (App.1993) (holding that state law enforcement agencies fall under prosecutor's control for purposes of Rule 15.1 disclosure); Rule 15.1(d) ("The prosecutor's obligation under this rule extends to material and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any other persons who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who are under the prosecutor's control". ) (emphasis added). 2002Carpenter v. Superior Court, 176 Ariz. 486, 490 , 862 P.2d 246, 250 (App.1993) (holding that state law enforcement agencies fall under prosecutor's control for purposes of Rule 15.1 disclosure); Rule 15.1(d) ("The prosecutor's obligation under this rule extends to material and information in the possession or control of members of the prosecutor's staff and of any other persons who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case and who are under the prosecutor's control". ) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1993See also State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 239 , 599 P.2d 187, 195 (1979) (the state has a Rule 15.1 obligation in certain circumstances to disclose information not in its possession or under its control if the state has better access to the information). 1993See also State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 231, 239 , 599 P.2d 187, 195 (1979) (the state has a Rule 15.1 obligation in certain circumstances to disclose information not in its possession or under its control if the state has better access to the information). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mendiola
green
2 sentences1976Our opinion discusses the obligation of the defense attorney, as an officer of the court, to insure that the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with. “ . [E]ven when ‘fundamental’ error has been committed, reversal is not automatic, but rather is required only when found to be prejudicial to the defendant.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. at 254 , 532 P.2d at 196 . 1976Our opinion discusses the obligation of the defense attorney, as an officer of the court, to insure that the Rules of Criminal Procedure are complied with. “ . [E]ven when ‘fundamental’ error has been committed, reversal is not automatic, but rather is required only when found to be prejudicial to the defendant.” State v. Mendiola, 23 Ariz.App. at 254 , 532 P.2d at 196 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. Salcido
green
2 sentences1974It follows from this that the prosecution in no way could be said to have concealed information relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused, required to be disclosed under 15.1(a) or in contravention of our holding that “the state is duty bound to disclose evidence which may be favorable to the defense and which may not be reasonably known to or discoverable by the defense whether or not it is requested.” State v. Salcido, 109 Ariz. 380 , 509 P.2d 1027 (1973). 1974It follows from this that the prosecution in no way could be said to have concealed information relating to the guilt or innocence of the accused, required to be disclosed under 15.1(a) or in contravention of our holding that “the state is duty bound to disclose evidence which may be favorable to the defense and which may not be reasonably known to or discoverable by the defense whether or not it is requested.” State v. Salcido, 109 Ariz. 380 , 509 P.2d 1027 (1973). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.