27 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1958–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Nash v. Port Authoritygreen2 sentences2013This Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Port Authority’s motion to set aside the verdict, rejecting the Port Authority’s governmental immunity argument (Nash v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 51 AD3d 337, 344 [1st Dept 2008]). 2013This Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying the Port Authority’s motion to set aside the verdict, rejecting the Port Authority’s governmental immunity argument (Nash v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 51 AD3d 337, 344 [1st Dept 2008]). | 2 | 3 |
Holdampf v. A.C. & S., Inc.green2 sentences2005Plaintiffs provided documentary evidence to show that the Port Authority knew, as early as 1969 when it was building the World Trade Center, that the spraying of asbestos fireproofing during construction presented a risk of harm to “bystanders.” On January 16, 2003, Supreme Court granted the Port Authority’s motion for summary judgment in a one-sentence short-form order, “based on [the] Widera case and absence of duty to plaintiff.” On December 2, 2004, the Appellate Division modified Supreme Court’s order by reinstating plaintiffs’ first cause of action in common-law negligence because the Po 2005Plaintiffs provided documentary evidence to show that the Port Authority knew, as early as 1969 when it was building the World Trade Center, that the spraying of asbestos fireproofing during construction presented a risk of harm to "bystanders." On January 16, 2003, Supreme Court granted the Port Authority's motion for summary judgment in a one-sentence short-form order, "based on [the] Widera case and absence of duty to plaintiff." On December 2, 2004, the Appellate Division modified Supreme Court's order by reinstating plaintiffs' first cause of action in common-law negligence because the Po | 2 | 2 |
Bell v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New Yorkgreen2 sentences2004(See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp., 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York, 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority’s motion. 2004Whether a risk is foreseeable under particular circumstances has traditionally and soundly been left to the trier of fact to resolve, even where the facts are essentially undisputed. ( See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp. , 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York , 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority's motion. | 2 | 2 |
Crosland v. New York City Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences2004Auth., 68 NY2d at 170.) The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Lieberman v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (132 NJ 76, 622 A2d 1295 , supra) is particularly instructive with respect to the Port Authority’s immunity for governmental functions. 2004Auth. , 68 NY2d at 170.) The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lieberman v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (132 NJ 76, 622 A2d 1295 , supra ) is particularly instructive with respect to the Port Authority's immunity for governmental functions. | 2 | 2 |
Valenti v. Caminsgreen2 sentences2025Contrary to the dissent's assertion, this Court has held that "a party may raise even a completely unpleaded issue on summary judgment so long as the other party is not taken by surprise and does not suffer prejudice" ( Valenti v Camins , 95 AD3d 519, 522 [1st Dept 2012]). 2025Contrary to the dissent's assertion, this Court has held that "a party may raise even a completely unpleaded issue on summary judgment so long as the other party is not taken by surprise and does not suffer prejudice" ( Valenti v Camins , 95 AD3d 519, 522 [1st Dept 2012]). | 1 | 1 |
California Suites, Inc. v. Russo Demolition Inc.green2 sentences2025Further, the argument that the Port Authority was acting in its proprietary capacity is the principal ground relied on by plaintiff in support of her complaint and in response to the Port Authority's prior motion to dismiss ( see California Suites, Inc. v Russo Demolition Inc. , 98 AD3d 144 , 156 [1st Dept 2012] ["parties are accorded great latitude in how they conduct litigation and 'may to a large extent chart their own procedural course through the courts'"], quoting Stevenson v News Syndicate Co. , 302 NY 81, 87 [1950]; see also J. 2025Further, the argument that the Port Authority was acting in its proprietary capacity is the principal ground relied on by plaintiff in support of her complaint and in response to the Port Authority's prior motion to dismiss ( see California Suites, Inc. v Russo Demolition Inc. , 98 AD3d 144, 156 [1st Dept 2012] ["parties are accorded great latitude in how they conduct litigation and 'may to a large extent chart their own procedural course through the courts'"], quoting Stevenson v News Syndicate Co. , 302 NY 81, 87 [1950]; see also J. | 1 | 1 |
Stevenson v. News Syndicate Co.green2 sentences2025Further, the argument that the Port Authority was acting in its proprietary capacity is the principal ground relied on by plaintiff in support of her complaint and in response to the Port Authority's prior motion to dismiss ( see California Suites, Inc. v Russo Demolition Inc. , 98 AD3d 144 , 156 [1st Dept 2012] ["parties are accorded great latitude in how they conduct litigation and 'may to a large extent chart their own procedural course through the courts'"], quoting Stevenson v News Syndicate Co. , 302 NY 81, 87 [1950]; see also J. 2025Further, the argument that the Port Authority was acting in its proprietary capacity is the principal ground relied on by plaintiff in support of her complaint and in response to the Port Authority's prior motion to dismiss ( see California Suites, Inc. v Russo Demolition Inc. , 98 AD3d 144, 156 [1st Dept 2012] ["parties are accorded great latitude in how they conduct litigation and 'may to a large extent chart their own procedural course through the courts'"], quoting Stevenson v News Syndicate Co. , 302 NY 81, 87 [1950]; see also J. | 1 | 1 |
Arsell v. Mass One LLCgreen1 sentence2022Under the circumstances, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Port Authority and JFK IAT, who have manifestly different defenses to the plaintiff's claim and would not stand or fall together, are united in interest ( see McLaughlin v 22 New Scotland Ave., LLC , 132 AD3d 1190, 1193 ; see also Arsell v Mass One LLC , 73 AD3d 668, 669-670 ; Hilliard v Roc-Newark Assoc. , 287 AD2d 691, 692-693 ). | 1 | 1 |
Mandarin Trading Ltd. v. Wildensteingreen1 sentence2021The complaint adequately alleges the elements of unjust enrichment by pleading, in the alternative, that Port Authority was enriched at Tutor Perini's expense and that it is against equity and good conscience to permit Port Authority to retain what is sought to be recovered ( see Mandarin Trading Ltd. v Wildenstein , 16 NY3d 173, 182 [2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Grucci v. Gruccigreen1 sentence2015Bombing Litig., 17 NY3d 856, 856 [2011]). | 1 | 1 |
Romagnolo v. Pandolfinigreen2 sentences2014Accordingly, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the Port Authority’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) insofar as asserted against it. *536 Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly determined that, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, it was appropriate, upon renewal, to grant those branches of the motion of the defendant Zano Industries, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations 2014Although, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court’s prior determination, under the circumstances presented here, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s invocation of that doctrine (see Pastrana v Cutler, 115 AD3d 725 [2014]; Romagnolo v Pandolfini, 75 AD3d at 634 ). | 1 | 1 |
Strunk v. Revenge Cab Corp.green1 sentence2014Therefore, his motion, although denominated as one for leave to renew, was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Poulard v Judkins, 102 AD3d 665, 665 [2013]; Strunk v Revenge Cab Corp., 98 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2012]; Schoenfeld v Shonfeld, 266 AD2d 449 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2014Therefore, his motion, although denominated as one for leave to renew, was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Poulard v Judkins, 102 AD3d 665, 665 [2013]; Strunk v Revenge Cab Corp., 98 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2012]; Schoenfeld v Shonfeld, 266 AD2d 449 [1999]). | 1 | 1 |
| Jacqueline S. v. City of New Yorkgreen | 1 | 1 |
Sanchez v. State of NYgreen1 sentence2004To obtain summary judgment, the Port Authority must meet a high threshold: only one conclusion can be drawn from the undisputed facts, and that, as a matter of law, the injuries to the plaintiffs were not reasonably foreseeable. ( See Sanchez v State of New York , 99 NY2d 247, 254 [2002].) The record does not support that conclusion. | 1 | 1 |
| Adler v. Deegangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Perlov v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.
green
2 sentences2021On appeal, the Second Department reversed, finding that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity in the design and maintenance of the bridge, and, therefore was subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties ( see id. at 1627-1628 , citing Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d at 478-480 ). 2021On appeal, the Second Department reversed, finding that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity in the design and maintenance of the bridge, and, therefore was subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties ( see id. at 1627-1628 , citing Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d at 478-480 ). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Turturro ex rel. Turturro v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2021On appeal, the Second Department reversed, finding that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity in the design and maintenance of the bridge, and, therefore was subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties ( see id. at 1627-1628 , citing Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d at 478-480 ). 2021On appeal, the Second Department reversed, finding that the Port Authority was acting in a proprietary capacity in the design and maintenance of the bridge, and, therefore was subject to suit under the ordinary rules of negligence applicable to nongovernmental parties ( see id. at 1627-1628 , citing Turturro v City of New York, 28 NY3d at 478-480 ). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
McMahon v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2013Since the judgment in plaintiffs favor was based on an order that had been reversed, the trial court properly vacated the judgment (see CPLR 5015 [a] [5]; McMahon v City of New York, 105 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 1984]). 2013Since the judgment in plaintiffs favor was based on an order that had been reversed, the trial court properly vacated the judgment (see CPLR 5015 [a] [5]; McMahon v City of New York, 105 AD2d 101 [1st Dept 1984]). | 2 | 2013–2013 |
Rotz v. City of New York
green
2 sentences2004(See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp., 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York, 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority’s motion. 2004Whether a risk is foreseeable under particular circumstances has traditionally and soundly been left to the trier of fact to resolve, even where the facts are essentially undisputed. ( See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp. , 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York , 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority's motion. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Lieberman v. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW JERSEY
green
2 sentences2004Auth., 68 NY2d at 170.) The New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Lieberman v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (132 NJ 76, 622 A2d 1295 , supra) is particularly instructive with respect to the Port Authority’s immunity for governmental functions. 2004Auth. , 68 NY2d at 170.) The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Lieberman v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. (132 NJ 76, 622 A2d 1295 , supra ) is particularly instructive with respect to the Port Authority's immunity for governmental functions. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Todorovich v. Columbia University
green
2 sentences2004(See Todorovich v Columbia Univ., 245 AD2d at 46 .) The Port Authority’s claim that this bombing was unforeseeable as a matter of law strains credulity. 2004Whether knowledge of prior activities is sufficient to make injuries foreseeable "must depend on the location, nature and extent of those previous criminal activities and their similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question." ( Jacqueline S. v City of New York , 81 NY2d at 295 [citations omitted].) Where ambient crime has infiltrated a landlord's premises, or where the landlord is otherwise on notice of a serious risk of such infiltration, the landlord's duty to protect arises. ( See Todorovich v Columbia Univ ., 245 AD2d at 46 .) The Port Authority's claim that this bomb | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Kahane v. Marriott Hotel Corp.
green
2 sentences2004(See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp., 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York, 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority’s motion. 2004Whether a risk is foreseeable under particular circumstances has traditionally and soundly been left to the trier of fact to resolve, even where the facts are essentially undisputed. ( See Bell v Board of Educ. of City of N.Y. , 90 NY2d 944, 946 [1997]; Kahane v Marriott Hotel Corp. , 249 AD2d at 165 ; Rotz v City of New York , 143 AD2d at 304 .) The court finds that there are triable issues of fact as to the foreseeability of this catastrophic event, warranting denial of the Port Authority's motion. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Valdez v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2024The "'common-law doctrine of governmental immunity . . . shield[s] public entities from liability for discretionary actions taken during the performance of governmental functions'" ( Santaiti v Town of Ramapo , 162 AD3d 921 , 928, quoting Valdez v City of New York , 18 NY3d 69, 75-76 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ofulue v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey
green
1 sentence2023Accordingly, the Port Authority's motion to dismiss the complaint should have been denied ( cf. Ofulue v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. , 307 AD2d 258, 259 ; Lumbermens Mut. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
McLaughlin v. 22 New Scotland Avenue, LLC
green
1 sentence2022Under the circumstances, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Port Authority and JFK IAT, who have manifestly different defenses to the plaintiff's claim and would not stand or fall together, are united in interest ( see McLaughlin v 22 New Scotland Ave., LLC , 132 AD3d 1190, 1193 ; see also Arsell v Mass One LLC , 73 AD3d 668, 669-670 ; Hilliard v Roc-Newark Assoc. , 287 AD2d 691, 692-693 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Hill v. YM/YWHA of Northern Westchester, Inc.
green
1 sentence2022Under the circumstances, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the Port Authority and JFK IAT, who have manifestly different defenses to the plaintiff's claim and would not stand or fall together, are united in interest ( see McLaughlin v 22 New Scotland Ave., LLC , 132 AD3d 1190, 1193 ; see also Arsell v Mass One LLC , 73 AD3d 668, 669-670 ; Hilliard v Roc-Newark Assoc. , 287 AD2d 691, 692-693 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Forde v. Vornado Realty Trust
green
1 sentence2017Although the Port Authority, like Schindler, established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Vilardi v Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc., 145 AD3d at 711 ; Forde v Vornado Realty Trust, 89 AD3d at 679 ), the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with respect to the Port Authority (see generally Hall v Barist El. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Vilardi v. Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc.
green
1 sentence2017Although the Port Authority, like Schindler, established its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Vilardi v Jones Lang LaSalle, Inc., 145 AD3d at 711 ; Forde v Vornado Realty Trust, 89 AD3d at 679 ), the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur with respect to the Port Authority (see generally Hall v Barist El. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Pastrana v. Cutler
green
2 sentences2014Accordingly, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, upon renewal, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the Port Authority’s motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) insofar as asserted against it. *536 Furthermore, the Supreme Court properly determined that, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, it was appropriate, upon renewal, to grant those branches of the motion of the defendant Zano Industries, Inc., which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations 2014Although, pursuant to the law-of-the-case doctrine, this Court is not bound by the Supreme Court’s prior determination, under the circumstances presented here, we decline to disturb the Supreme Court’s invocation of that doctrine (see Pastrana v Cutler, 115 AD3d 725 [2014]; Romagnolo v Pandolfini, 75 AD3d at 634 ). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Schoenfeld v. Shonfeld
neutral
1 sentence2014Therefore, his motion, although denominated as one for leave to renew, was, in actuality, one for leave to reargue, the denial of which is not appealable (see Poulard v Judkins, 102 AD3d 665, 665 [2013]; Strunk v Revenge Cab Corp., 98 AD3d 1030, 1031 [2012]; Schoenfeld v Shonfeld, 266 AD2d 449 [1999]). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Nash v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
green
1 sentence2013A divided Appellate Division affirmed, with the majority holding that Supreme Court “did not abuse its discretion by vacating [Nash’s] final judgment,” given this Court’s determination in Ruiz ( 102 AD3d 420 , 421 [1st Dept 2013]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| In re World Trade Center Bombing Litigation green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Tripee v. Port of New York Authority green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Basso v. Miller green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Kush v. City of Buffalo green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Love v. Port Authority green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| D'Orlando v. Port Authority of NY & NJ green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| L.I.R. Management Corp. v. Mid-City Associates green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Velazquez v. Tyler Graphics, Ltd. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Stark v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Phoenix Garden Restaurant, Inc. v. Chu green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Urena v. New York City Transit Authority green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Lopez v. City of New York green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Romano v. Browne neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| O'Neill v. City of Port Jervis green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Urquhart v. . City of Ogdensburg green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Bush Terminal Co. v. City of New York green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Hassan v. Magistrates' Court green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Lewis v. Goldstein neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Lewis v. Goldstein neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Admiral Realty Co. v. . City of New York green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.