27 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2025 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Snidergreen2 sentences2025We therefore held that the detective’s responses to counsel’s cross-examination did not violate the Haseltine rule because they simply 13 No. 2023AP1877-CR recounted how the detective “conducted the interrogation and his thought processes at that time.” Snider, 266 Wis. 2d 830, ¶27 . ¶35 In the same way, Osmond’s repeated responses to Bigger’s counsel’s questions did not violate the Haseltine rule. 2025We therefore held that the detective’s responses to counsel’s cross-examination did not violate the Haseltine rule because they simply 13 No. 2023AP1877-CR recounted how the detective “conducted the interrogation and his thought processes at that time.” Snider, 266 Wis. 2d 830, ¶27 . ¶35 In the same way, Osmond’s repeated responses to Bigger’s counsel’s questions did not violate the Haseltine rule. | 3 | 6 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2025Accordingly, his counsel was not deficient for failing to raise a Haseltine objection, and Molde’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.6 6See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the 9 STATE v. MOLDE Opinion of the Court III. 2025Accordingly, his counsel was not deficient for failing to raise a Haseltine objection, and Molde’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.6 6See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim to approach the 9 STATE v. MOLDE Opinion of the Court III. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025For example, in Smith, we concluded that a detective’s testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule when he testified that an accomplice initially denied involvement in a crime, but he later changed his story to what the detective “felt was the truth.” Smith, 170 Wis. 2d at 706, 718 . 2025For example, in Smith, we concluded that a detective’s testimony did not violate the Haseltine rule when he testified that an accomplice initially denied involvement in a crime, but he later changed his story to what the detective “felt was the truth.” Smith, 170 Wis. 2d at 706, 718 . | 2 | 5 |
State v. Kruegergreen2 sentences2025Thus, an opinion “that a complainant was sexually assaulted or is telling the truth is impermissible.” State v. Krueger, 2008 WI App 162, ¶9 , 314 Wis. 2d 605 , 762 N.W.2d 114 . ¶33 When neither the testimony’s purpose nor its effect is to attest to a witness’s truthfulness, the Haseltine rule is not violated. 2025Thus, an opinion “that a complainant was sexually assaulted or is telling the truth is impermissible.” State v. Krueger, 2008 WI App 162, ¶9 , 314 Wis. 2d 605 , 762 N.W.2d 114 . ¶33 When neither the testimony’s purpose nor its effect is to attest to a witness’s truthfulness, the Haseltine rule is not violated. | 2 | 4 |
Argumedo Alvarez-Madrigal v. State of Indianagreen2 sentences2025Compare, e.g., Alvarez-Madrigal v. State, 71 N.E.3d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that an expert testifying “that less than two to three children out of a thousand are making up claims” is not impermissible vouching), and State v. Harrison, 340 P.3d 780 (Or. 2025Compare, e.g., Alvarez-Madrigal v. State, 71 N.E.3d 887, 892 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (finding that an expert testifying “that less than two to three children out of a thousand are making up claims” is not impermissible vouching), and State v. Harrison, 340 P.3d 780 (Or. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Champagnegreen2 sentences2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). 2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Haseltinegreen2 sentences2023Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96 . ¶34 Under the circumstances, we also agree with the State that the testimony in question does not appear to implicate the Haseltine rule. 2023Haseltine, 120 Wis. 2d at 96 . ¶34 Under the circumstances, we also agree with the State that the testimony in question does not appear to implicate the Haseltine rule. | 1 | 13 |
State v. Stanley J. Maday, Jr.green2 sentences2024Often called the “Haseltine rule,” this principle is rooted in the rules of evidence that say “expert testimony must ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” “Expert testimony does not assist the fact-finder if it conveys to the jury the expert’s own beliefs as to the veracity of another witness.” State v. Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶34 , 374 Wis. 2d 164 , 892 N.W.2d 611 (citations omitted). 2024Often called the “Haseltine rule,” this principle is rooted in the rules of evidence that say “expert testimony must ‘assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” “Expert testimony does not assist the fact-finder if it conveys to the jury the expert’s own beliefs as to the veracity of another witness.” State v. Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶34 , 374 Wis. 2d 164 , 892 N.W.2d 611 (citations omitted). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Pittmangreen2 sentences2020The purpose of the Haseltine rule is to prevent a witness from usurping the jury’s role as “lie detector in the courtroom.” See State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 268 , 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶104 , 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 (“The essence of the rule prohibiting vouching testimony is that such testimony invades the province of the fact-finder as the sole determiner of credibility.”). 2020The purpose of the Haseltine rule is to prevent a witness from usurping the jury’s role as “lie detector in the courtroom.” See State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 268 , 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993) (citation omitted); see also State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶104 , 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 (“The essence of the rule prohibiting vouching testimony is that such testimony invades the province of the fact-finder as the sole determiner of credibility.”). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Tutlewskigreen2 sentences2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth 2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth | 1 | 3 |
State v. Klesergreen2 sentences2022McReynolds counters that pursuant to State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶104 , 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 , the Haseltine rule also applies “where an expert vouches for an out-of-court declarant.” As we conclude no Haseltine violation occurred here, we need not address this issue. 15 No. 2021AP943-CR to attest to the accomplice’s truthfulness, as the testimony “was not an attempt to bolster [the accomplice’s] credibility, but was simply an explanation of the course of events during the interrogation.” Id. at 718-19. 2022McReynolds counters that pursuant to State v. Kleser, 2010 WI 88, ¶104 , 328 Wis. 2d 42 , 786 N.W.2d 144 , the Haseltine rule also applies “where an expert vouches for an out-of-court declarant.” As we conclude no Haseltine violation occurred here, we need not address this issue. 15 No. 2021AP943-CR to attest to the accomplice’s truthfulness, as the testimony “was not an attempt to bolster [the accomplice’s] credibility, but was simply an explanation of the course of events during the interrogation.” Id. at 718-19. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Morales-Pedrosagreen2 sentences2024His testimony would inevitably be seen by the jury as ‘a personal or particularized’ endorsement of [the victim’s] credibility.” Id. (citing Morales-Pedrosa, 369 Wis. 2d 75, ¶23 ). ¶29 Moreover, the “extreme rarity of false reports to which [the therapist] and [the investigator] attested also weigh[ed] in favor of finding a Haseltine violation.” Mader, 408 Wis. 2d 632 , ¶39. 2024His testimony would inevitably be seen by the jury as ‘a personal or particularized’ endorsement of [the victim’s] credibility.” Id. (citing Morales-Pedrosa, 369 Wis. 2d 75, ¶23 ). ¶29 Moreover, the “extreme rarity of false reports to which [the therapist] and [the investigator] attested also weigh[ed] in favor of finding a Haseltine violation.” Mader, 408 Wis. 2d 632 , ¶39. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2021The Haseltine rule prohibits vouching for the truthfulness of another witness because it invades the “jury’s role as the sole determiner of credibility.” Miller, 341 Wis. 2d 737, ¶11 . 2021The Haseltine rule prohibits vouching for the truthfulness of another witness because it invades the “jury’s role as the sole determiner of credibility.” Miller, 341 Wis. 2d 737, ¶11 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Romerogreen2 sentences2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth 2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth | 1 | 2 |
United Cooperative v. Frontier FS Cooperativegreen2 sentences2023See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39 , 304 Wis. 2d 750 , 738 6 We reject the State’s implicit invitation to reach a broader conclusion that limits the Haseltine rule only to testimony by expert witnesses, or only to testimony by one witness as to the truthfulness of another witness’s in-court testimony. 7 WISCONSIN STAT. § 906.08(1) provides: the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to the following limitations: (a) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. ( 2023See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39 , 304 Wis. 2d 750 , 738 6 We reject the State’s implicit invitation to reach a broader conclusion that limits the Haseltine rule only to testimony by expert witnesses, or only to testimony by one witness as to the truthfulness of another witness’s in-court testimony. 7 WISCONSIN STAT. § 906.08(1) provides: the credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence in the form of reputation or opinion, but subject to the following limitations: (a) The evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. ( | 1 | 1 |
State v. Elmgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 462-63 , 549 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1996). 2020See State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 462-63 , 549 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. 1996). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Davis, 199 Wis. 2d 513, 519 , 545 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1996). ¶17 Here, we are not persuaded that H.L.’s testimony violated the Haseltine rule. 2020See State v. Davis, 199 Wis. 2d 513, 519 , 545 N.W.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1996). ¶17 Here, we are not persuaded that H.L.’s testimony violated the Haseltine rule. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Echolsgreen2 sentences2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth 2018See Romero , 147 Wis. 2d at 277-78 (witness said another witness "was being totally truthful with us"), State v. Echols , 2013 WI App 58 , 348 Wis. 2d 81 , 831 N.W.2d 768 (trial court erred in admitting testimony from defendant's employer that defendant spoke normally but stuttered when he was lying), and State v. Tutlewski , 231 Wis. 2d 379 , 605 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1999) (expert witness testified that developmentally disabled witness was incapable of lying). ¶ 25 In contrast, this court has found it not to be a Haseltine violation where testimony has revealed a witness's assessment of truth | 1 | 1 |
State v. Truaxgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362 , 444 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We presume that the jury follows the instructions given to it."). 2012See State v. Truax, 151 Wis. 2d 354, 362 , 444 N.W.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1989) ("We presume that the jury follows the instructions given to it."). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2025We summarize several key cases that reinforce this distinction. ¶13 In State v. Robinson, we permitted the expert testimony of a rape crisis center worker who opined on the common emotional reactions of sexual assault victims following an assault. 146 Wis. 2d 315 , 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). 2025We summarize several key cases that reinforce this distinction. ¶13 In State v. Robinson, we permitted the expert testimony of a rape crisis center worker who opined on the common emotional reactions of sexual assault victims following an assault. 146 Wis. 2d 315 , 431 N.W.2d 165 (1988). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Williams v. State
green
2 sentences2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). 2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jensen
green
2 sentences2017As such, Gainey was not "allowed to convey to the jury . . . her own beliefs as to the veracity of the complainant with respect to the assault," Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256-57 . ¶39 Unlike the social worker in Krueger, Gainey did not take that extra step that turned her testimony into a subjective opinion about K.L.'s veracity, and thus into a violation of the Haseltine rule. 2017As such, Gainey was not "allowed to convey to the jury . . . her own beliefs as to the veracity of the complainant with respect to the assault," Jensen, 147 Wis. 2d at 256-57 . ¶39 Unlike the social worker in Krueger, Gainey did not take that extra step that turned her testimony into a subjective opinion about K.L.'s veracity, and thus into a violation of the Haseltine rule. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Wembley
green
2 sentences2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). 2017E.g., Wembley, 712 N.W.2d at 790–92; Williams, 970 So. 2d 727, ¶¶15-17 ; State v. Champagne, 305 P.3d 61, ¶¶33-36 (Mont. 2013). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2005State v. Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431, 437-38 , 523 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1994). 2005State v. Jackson, 187 Wis. 2d 431, 437-38 , 523 N.W.2d 126 (Ct. App. 1994). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
State v. Thiel
green
2 sentences2022Cumulative Prejudice ¶39 McKinnon argues that, taken together, trial counsel’s two errors— the Haseltine error and the erroneous admission of A.B.’s grandmother’s conviction—are sufficiently unfairly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. ¶40 In State v. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶59 , our supreme court directed that “prejudice should be assessed based on the cumulative effect of” trial counsel’s errors even when “the specific errors, evaluated individually, do not satisfy the prejudice standard in Strickland.” The court noted that, “in most cases errors, even unreasonable errors, will not have 2022Cumulative Prejudice ¶39 McKinnon argues that, taken together, trial counsel’s two errors— the Haseltine error and the erroneous admission of A.B.’s grandmother’s conviction—are sufficiently unfairly prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. ¶40 In State v. Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶59 , our supreme court directed that “prejudice should be assessed based on the cumulative effect of” trial counsel’s errors even when “the specific errors, evaluated individually, do not satisfy the prejudice standard in Strickland.” The court noted that, “in most cases errors, even unreasonable errors, will not have | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Patterson
green
2 sentences2021It is improper for an attorney to ask “a witness to testify about the truthfulness of another witness’ testimony”; however, “Haseltine violations do not result in reversible error unless the opinion testimony ‘creates too great a possibility that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role’ to the witness and did not independently find the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶58 , 329 Wis. 2d 599 , 790 N.W.2d 909 (citation omitted). ¶21 We review the record on Lanier-Cotton’s allegation. 2021It is improper for an attorney to ask “a witness to testify about the truthfulness of another witness’ testimony”; however, “Haseltine violations do not result in reversible error unless the opinion testimony ‘creates too great a possibility that the jury abdicated its fact-finding role’ to the witness and did not independently find the defendant’s guilt.” State v. Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶58 , 329 Wis. 2d 599 , 790 N.W.2d 909 (citation omitted). ¶21 We review the record on Lanier-Cotton’s allegation. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Ringer
green
2 sentences2018STAT. § 972.11(2) (2015-16) 3 , which "generally prohibits the introduction of any evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct 'regardless of the purpose.' " State v. Ringer , 2010 WI 69 , ¶ 25, 326 Wis. 2d 351 , 785 N.W.2d 448 (citation omitted). ¶ 3 The postconviction court denied Walker's postconviction motion without a hearing. 4 It concluded that the mother's testimony was admissible because it "was more about her own emotional struggle rather than vouching for her daughter's truthfulness" and therefore did not violate the Haseltine rule. 2018STAT. § 972.11(2) (2015-16) 3 , which "generally prohibits the introduction of any evidence of the complainant's prior sexual conduct 'regardless of the purpose.' " State v. Ringer , 2010 WI 69 , ¶ 25, 326 Wis. 2d 351 , 785 N.W.2d 448 (citation omitted). ¶ 3 The postconviction court denied Walker's postconviction motion without a hearing. 4 It concluded that the mother's testimony was admissible because it "was more about her own emotional struggle rather than vouching for her daughter's truthfulness" and therefore did not violate the Haseltine rule. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Neuser
green
2 sentences2010Fourth, there was no prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial because the single Haseltine violation in the seven-day trial in this case did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." State v. Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d 131, 136 , 528 N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1995). 2010Fourth, there was no prosecutorial misconduct warranting a new trial because the single Haseltine violation in the seven-day trial in this case did not "so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." State v. Neuser, 191 Wis. 2d 131, 136 , 528 N.W.2d 49 (Ct. App. 1995). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.