26 California opinions name it 3 courts 1992–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B.green2 sentences2013Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 .) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty 8 must be resolved in the insured's favor. [Citations.]" (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 (Montrose I).) " ' "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. [Citations.] If a duty to defend arises, the insurer must defend t 2010Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1086 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ].) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured's favor." ( Montrose, supra, at pp. 299-300 .) (6) "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. ( Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 655 ; Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 298-300.) If a du | 5 | 6 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.green2 sentences2025While the denials in Composti I and Composti II could arguably be read to foreclose the possibility of a potentially covered claim (since the allegations of an unrecorded easement or easement under the 1970 agreement were already excepted from coverage), the duty to defend is “fixed by the facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources” ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276) and not by the causes of action or theories pled by the third party complaint. 2025While the denials in Composti I and Composti II could arguably be read to foreclose the possibility of a potentially covered claim (since the allegations of an unrecorded easement or easement under the 1970 agreement were already excepted from coverage), the duty to defend is “fixed by the facts which the insurer learns from the complaint, the insured, or other sources” (Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276 ) and not by the causes of action or theories pled by the third party complaint. | 3 | 6 |
Buss v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2014Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643, 654 (Scottsdale).) “The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage. [Citation.] When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, ‘it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.’” (Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 655 , citing Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 46 (Buss).) As explained in Buss, “before, the insurer had a duty to defend; 2010Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1086 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ].) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured's favor." ( Montrose, supra, at pp. 299-300 .) (6) "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. ( Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 655 ; Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 298-300.) If a du | 3 | 5 |
Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2013Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 .) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty 8 must be resolved in the insured's favor. [Citations.]" (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 (Montrose I).) " ' "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. [Citations.] If a duty to defend arises, the insurer must defend t 2011In other words, the insured need only show that the underlying claim may fall within policy coverage; the insurer must prove it cannot.” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 300 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ].) “[T]he duty to defend arises when the facts alleged in the underlying complaint give rise to a potentially covered claim regardless of the technical legal cause of action pleaded by the third party. [Citation.]” (Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. | 3 | 5 |
GGIS Insurance Services, Inc. v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1505 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 ].) Thus, the fact that the underlying actions were settled has no impact on the existence of a duty to defend if such a duty arose before the settlements. (7) "If any facts stated or fairly inferable in the complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest a claim potentially covered by the policy, the insurer's duty to defend arises and is not extinguished until the insurer negates all facts suggesting potential coverage. 2010Services, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1493, 1505 [ 86 Cal.Rptr.3d 515 ].) Thus, the fact that the underlying actions were settled has no impact on the existence of a duty to defend if such a duty arose before the settlements. (7) "If any facts stated or fairly inferable in the complaint, or otherwise known or discovered by the insurer, suggest a claim potentially covered by the policy, the insurer's duty to defend arises and is not extinguished until the insurer negates all facts suggesting potential coverage. | 3 | 3 |
Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. MV TRANSP.green2 sentences2019Our Supreme Court stated in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643 , 655, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 , 115 P.3d 460 : "The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage. [Citation.] When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, 'it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.' " We recognize that Scottsdale Insurance Co. is an insurance case, and that there are some differenc 2019Our Supreme Court stated in Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. MV Transportation (2005) 36 Cal.4th 643 , 655, 31 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 , 115 P.3d 460 : "The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that there is no potential for coverage. [Citation.] When the duty, having arisen, is extinguished by a showing that no claim can in fact be covered, 'it is extinguished only prospectively and not retroactively.' " We recognize that Scottsdale Insurance Co. is an insurance case, and that there are some differenc | 2 | 8 |
CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co.green2 sentences2005(Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 275-276 ; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that the 2005(Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 275-276 ; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that the | 2 | 3 |
Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2005(Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 338, 342-343 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 ]; Union Oil Co. v. International Ins. 2005(Alex Robertson Co. v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 338, 342-343 [ 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 ]; Union Oil Co. v. International Ins. | 2 | 2 |
Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc.green2 sentences2019(See Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. , supra , 44 Cal.4th at p. 552 , 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 721 , 187 P.3d 424 .) But R-Help cites no authority for a difference in treatment as it relates to the prospective application of the extinguishing of the duty to defend. 2013Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 .) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty 8 must be resolved in the insured's favor. [Citations.]" (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 (Montrose I).) " ' "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. [Citations.] If a duty to defend arises, the insurer must defend t | 1 | 3 |
Barnett v. Fireman's Fund Insurancegreen2 sentences2014Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 510 .) "[C]ourts do not examine only the pleaded word but the potential liability created by the suit." 10 (Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276 .) "The scope of the duty does not depend on the labels given to the causes of action in the third party complaint; instead it rests on whether the alleged facts or known extrinsic facts reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy." (Atlantic Mutual Ins. 2014Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 763 .) The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 288 ) including “[w]hether a third party action asserts a potentially covered claim under the policy triggering the duty to defend.” ( Barnett, supra, at p. 508 .) We independently review an insurance policy for the proper construction. | 1 | 3 |
Waller v. Truck Insurance Exchange, Inc.green2 sentences2007Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 ].) “Any doubt as to whether the facts *1466 establish the existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Montrose, supra, at pp. 299-300.) A duty to defend arises under California law upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. 2007Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 19 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 ].) “Any doubt as to whether the facts *1466 establish the existence of the defense duty must be resolved in the insured’s favor.” (Montrose, supra, at pp. 299-300.) A duty to defend arises under California law upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Universal Underwritersgreen2 sentences2005(Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 ].) An insurer must defend any action that seeks damages potentially within the coverage of the policy; however, no duty to defend exists when the third party complaint “ ‘can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue [that] could bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ], quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ] (Gray), ital 2005(Cunningham v. Universal Underwriters (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1141, 1149 [ 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 162 ].) An insurer must defend any action that seeks damages potentially within the coverage of the policy; however, no duty to defend exists when the third party complaint “ ‘can by no conceivable theory raise a single issue [that] could bring it within the policy coverage.’ ” (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 467 , 861 P.2d 1153 ], quoting Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 276, fn. 15 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ] (Gray), ital | 1 | 1 |
Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co.green2 sentences2005(Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 275-276 ; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that the 2005(Ibid.) Moreover, that the precise causes of action pled by the third party complaint may fall outside policy coverage does not excuse the duty to defend where, under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or otherwise known, the complaint could fairly be amended to state a covered liability. ( Gray, supra, 65 Cal.2d 263, 275-276 ; CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co. (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 598, 610-611 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 276 ].) The defense duty arises upon tender of a potentially covered claim and lasts until the underlying lawsuit is concluded, or until it has been shown that the | 1 | 1 |
Western Mutual Ins. Co. v. Yamamotogreen2 sentences2001Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) Whether a third party action asserts a potentially covered claim under the policy triggering the duty to defend requires us to interpret the language of the insuring agreement and is a question of law. 2001Co. v. Yamamoto (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1481 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 698 ].) Whether a third party action asserts a potentially covered claim under the policy triggering the duty to defend requires us to interpret the language of the insuring agreement and is a question of law. | 1 | 1 |
Truck Ins. Exchange v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2001Exchange v. Bennett (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 75, 83-86 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 497 ].) Appellants argue the underlying action raised a potentially covered claim for defamation because the complainants alleged that appellants told numerous persons that MedPartners’ methods of doing business were flawed and would result in MedPartners’ failure, and made other representations that disparaged and damaged MedPartners and SCMC. *510 These allegations, argue appellants, trigger the personal injury coverage of the CGL policy. 2001Exchange v. Bennett (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 75, 83-86 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 497 ].) Appellants argue the underlying action raised a potentially covered claim for defamation because the complainants alleged that appellants told numerous persons that MedPartners’ methods of doing business were flawed and would result in MedPartners’ failure, and made other representations that disparaged and damaged MedPartners and SCMC. *510 These allegations, argue appellants, trigger the personal injury coverage of the CGL policy. | 1 | 1 |
Giddings v. Industrial Indemnity Co.green2 sentences1992There Was No Potential for McNairs to Assert a Covered Claim for Property Damage (4b) We first reject Devins' claim that there was a potentially covered claim for "property damage." The policy specifically limits coverage to occurrences causing property damage, and defines property damage as "physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of, tangible property." (11) Where a third party's suit alleges the insured's wrongful conduct caused only economic injury, and there is no suggestion of any wrongful conduct causing injury to tangible property, the insurer does not owe a defense, there b 1992There Was No Potential for McNairs to Assert a Covered Claim for Property Damage (4b) We first reject Devins' claim that there was a potentially covered claim for "property damage." The policy specifically limits coverage to occurrences causing property damage, and defines property damage as "physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of, tangible property." (11) Where a third party's suit alleges the insured's wrongful conduct caused only economic injury, and there is no suggestion of any wrongful conduct causing injury to tangible property, the insurer does not owe a defense, there b | 1 | 1 |
Fresno Economy Import Used Cars, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green2 sentences1992Co. (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 272, 279 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 681 ]), even though the insurer’s investigation produces facts showing the claim is baseless. 1992Co. (1977) 76 Cal.App.3d 272, 279 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 681 ]), even though the insurer’s investigation produces facts showing the claim is baseless. | 1 | 1 |
Stout v. Turneygreen2 sentences1992There Was No Potential for McNairs to Assert a Covered Claim for Property Damage (4b) We first reject Devins' claim that there was a potentially covered claim for "property damage." The policy specifically limits coverage to occurrences causing property damage, and defines property damage as "physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of, tangible property." (11) Where a third party's suit alleges the insured's wrongful conduct caused only economic injury, and there is no suggestion of any wrongful conduct causing injury to tangible property, the insurer does not owe a defense, there b 1992There Was No Potential for McNairs to Assert a Covered Claim for Property Damage (4b) We first reject Devins' claim that there was a potentially covered claim for "property damage." The policy specifically limits coverage to occurrences causing property damage, and defines property damage as "physical injury to, destruction of, or loss of use of, tangible property." (11) Where a third party's suit alleges the insured's wrongful conduct caused only economic injury, and there is no suggestion of any wrongful conduct causing injury to tangible property, the insurer does not owe a defense, there b | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Mirpad, LLC v. California Insurance Guarantee Ass'n
green
2 sentences2007Guarantee Assn., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 .) This settled principle has a significant impact on the analysis of the insured's claim that an insurer has acted in bad faith when it refused to provide the insured with a defense to a potentially covered claim. 2007Guarantee Assn., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1068 , 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 136 .) This settled principle has a significant impact on the analysis of the insured's claim that an insurer has acted in bad faith when it refused to provide the insured with a defense to a potentially covered claim. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
National Union Fire Insurance v. Siliconix Inc.
green
1 sentence2015Co. v. Siliconix, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 1989) 726 F.Supp. 264, 272 .) There is nothing in City's tender of the suit that even hinted at a potentially covered claim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Safeco Insurance of America v. Robert S.
green
1 sentence2014Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 763 .) The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 288 ) including “[w]hether a third party action asserts a potentially covered claim under the policy triggering the duty to defend.” ( Barnett, supra, at p. 508 .) We independently review an insurance policy for the proper construction. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Hartford Casualty Insurance v. Swift Distribution, Inc.
green
1 sentence2014Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 763 .) The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law (Hartford, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 288 ) including “[w]hether a third party action asserts a potentially covered claim under the policy triggering the duty to defend.” ( Barnett, supra, at p. 508 .) We independently review an insurance policy for the proper construction. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sprinkles v. Associated Indemnity Corp.
green
1 sentence2013Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 .) "Any doubt as to whether the facts establish the existence of the defense duty 8 must be resolved in the insured's favor. [Citations.]" (Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Superior Court (1993) 6 Cal.4th 287, 299-300 (Montrose I).) " ' "A duty to defend arises upon the tender to the insurer of a potentially covered claim and continues until the lawsuit is concluded or until the insurer shows that facts extrinsic to the third party complaint conclusively negate the potential for coverage. [Citations.] If a duty to defend arises, the insurer must defend t | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lomes v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001Fireman’s does not explain how the exhibits contradict appellants’ allegation that they were acting as officers or employees seeking to further the interests of their corporation at the time of making the statements. 7 The Milazo court also noted that a partner who acts to misappropriate a partnership asset or opportunity is necessarily engaged in conduct contrary to, rather than on behalf of, the partnership, and thus necessarily was acting in his capacity as an individual rather than as a partner. ( Milazo, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1531-1533.) 8 The procedural posture of the present case 2001Fireman’s does not explain how the exhibits contradict appellants’ allegation that they were acting as officers or employees seeking to further the interests of their corporation at the time of making the statements. 7 The Milazo court also noted that a partner who acts to misappropriate a partnership asset or opportunity is necessarily engaged in conduct contrary to, rather than on behalf of, the partnership, and thus necessarily was acting in his capacity as an individual rather than as a partner. ( Milazo, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1531-1533.) 8 The procedural posture of the present case | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.