theory behind rule in California

1991“The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case. [Citation.]” (Kibrej v. Fisher (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1115 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 454 ].) The Collateral Order Doctrine Exception to the One Final Judgment Rule “A recognized exception to [the one final judgment] rule is the ‘collateral order doctrine,’ which permits an appeal from a final determination of a collateral matter which requires a party to immediately pay money or perform some ot

1991“The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case. [Citation.]” (Kibrej v. Fisher (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1115 [ 196 Cal.Rptr. 454 ].) The Collateral Order Doctrine Exception to the One Final Judgment Rule “A recognized exception to [the one final judgment] rule is the ‘collateral order doctrine,’ which permits an appeal from a final determination of a collateral matter which requires a party to immediately pay money or perform some ot

1993“Generally speaking, under the one final judgment rule, interlocutory or interim orders are not appeal-able, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [ 285 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784, 785-786 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 356 P.2d 441 ].) “ ‘The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ ” (Rao v. Campo, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d

1993“Generally speaking, under the one final judgment rule, interlocutory or interim orders are not appeal-able, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [ 285 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784, 785-786 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 356 P.2d 441 ].) “ ‘The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ ” (Rao v. Campo, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

1989This doctrine was utilized in Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499, 502 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 176 ], to allow an appeal from an order requiring payment of money as a sanction for failure to attend a mandatory settlement conference.

1989This doctrine was utilized in Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d 499, 502 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 176 ], to allow an appeal from an order requiring payment of money as a sanction for failure to attend a mandatory settlement conference.

2017Co . (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13 , 19, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 .) *135 " 'The theory behind this exception is that "[i]f bail forfeiture is required immediately upon the first nonappearance of a defendant, no matter how valid his reason for nonappearance be, such defendant would be subjected not only to having his bail forfeited but the additional penalty of possibly being required to pay another premium for its reinstatement." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( National Auto , supra , 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 357 .) The determination of whether an excuse is sufficient is within the trial

2017Co . (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 13 , 19, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 807 .) *135 " 'The theory behind this exception is that "[i]f bail forfeiture is required immediately upon the first nonappearance of a defendant, no matter how valid his reason for nonappearance be, such defendant would be subjected not only to having his bail forfeited but the additional penalty of possibly being required to pay another premium for its reinstatement." [Citation.]' [Citation.]" ( National Auto , supra , 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1450 , 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 357 .) The determination of whether an excuse is sufficient is within the trial

2003Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 451 ].) Accordingly, the court can continue a hearing and still retain its jurisdiction to *952 declare a forfeiture at a later time as long as it has a reason to believe that a sufficient excuse exists for the nonappearance.

2003Co. (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 197, 202 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 451 ].) Accordingly, the court can continue a hearing and still retain its jurisdiction to *952 declare a forfeiture at a later time as long as it has a reason to believe that a sufficient excuse exists for the nonappearance.

1993(See, e.g., Reeves v. Hutson (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 445, 451 [ 301 P.2d 264 ].) In numerous cases, this court and the Courts of Appeal have used the phrase “not an appealable order” to characterize an order as being merely interim or interlocutory.

1993(See, e.g., Reeves v. Hutson (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 445, 451 [ 301 P.2d 264 ].) In numerous cases, this court and the Courts of Appeal have used the phrase “not an appealable order” to characterize an order as being merely interim or interlocutory.

1993“Generally speaking, under the one final judgment rule, interlocutory or interim orders are not appeal-able, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [ 285 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784, 785-786 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 356 P.2d 441 ].) “ ‘The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ ” (Rao v. Campo, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d

1993“Generally speaking, under the one final judgment rule, interlocutory or interim orders are not appeal-able, but are only ‘reviewable on appeal’ from the final judgment.” (Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 [ 285 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Oppenheimer (1960) 54 Cal.2d 784, 785-786 [ 8 Cal.Rptr. 657 , 356 P.2d 441 ].) “ ‘The theory behind the rule is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action are oppressive and costly, and review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case.’ ” (Rao v. Campo, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

1991Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding. [Citations.]” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 [ 134 Cal.Rptr. 197 , 556 P.2d 297 ]; Henneberque v. City of Culver City (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 837, 841 [ 218 Cal.Rptr. 704 ]; In re Marriage of Van Sickle (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 728, 734-735 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 568 ].) Discovery Sanction Orders Not Within Scope of Collateral Order Doctrine Monetary discovery sanction orders have never been and are not considered to be final orders in a collateral matter or proceeding.

2016Specifically, may the Court review all matters raised in the demurrers and motions to strike, or is its review limited to “issues related to section 1714.10” (Evans v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 599, 604, fn. 4 , italics added) (See also Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349 (Klotz) [when an appeal based on section 1714.10, subdivision (d) follows an order overruling a demurrer, “our review is limited to whether the trial court properly denied defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ causes on the basis that such claims asserted claims for

2016Specifically, may the Court review all matters raised in the demurrers and motions to strike, or is its review limited to “issues related to section 1714.10” (Evans v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 599, 604, fn. 4 , italics added) (See also Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349 (Klotz) [when an appeal based on section 1714.10, subdivision (d) follows an order overruling a demurrer, “our review is limited to whether the trial court properly denied defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ causes on the basis that such claims asserted claims for

2016Specifically, may the Court review all matters raised in the demurrers and motions to strike, or is its review limited to “issues related to section 1714.10” (Evans v. Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 599, 604, fn. 4 , italics added) (See also Klotz v. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349 (Klotz) [when an appeal based on section 1714.10, subdivision (d) follows an order overruling a demurrer, “our review is limited to whether the trial court properly denied defendants’ demurrer to plaintiffs’ causes on the basis that such claims asserted claims for

2006(Id. at p. 394.) After Matthew C., the Legislature expressly limited the right to appeal from dependency orders. (§ 366.26, subd. (1)(1) [“An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any time unless ....”]; see Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 ]; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ].) The Legislature has not, however, limited a minor’s ability to appeal a section 241.1 determination as it did in the dependency context under section 366.26 after Matthew C.

2006(Id. at p. 394.) After Matthew C., the Legislature expressly limited the right to appeal from dependency orders. (§ 366.26, subd. (1)(1) [“An order by the court that a hearing pursuant to this section be held is not appealable at any time unless ....”]; see Joyce G. v. Superior Court (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1501 [ 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 805 ]; Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798 [ 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 731 ].) The Legislature has not, however, limited a minor’s ability to appeal a section 241.1 determination as it did in the dependency context under section 366.26 after Matthew C.

2000(Ibid.; see e.g., In re Matthew C, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 393, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 862 P.2d 765 ; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 691 ; Kibrej v. Fisher (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1115 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 454 .) The "cost" rationale for the rule needs some elaboration, because the cost of piecemeal review is not confined to the litigants themselves, and sometimes may be willingly and eagerly borne by them.

2000(Ibid.; see e.g., In re Matthew C, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 393, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 765 , 862 P.2d 765 ; Rao v. Campo (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1557, 1565 , 285 Cal.Rptr. 691 ; Kibrej v. Fisher (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 1113, 1115 , 196 Cal.Rptr. 454 .) The "cost" rationale for the rule needs some elaboration, because the cost of piecemeal review is not confined to the litigants themselves, and sometimes may be willingly and eagerly borne by them.

2000Code, § 1652; see also Bingham v. CTS Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 56, 68 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 161 ] [reading regulations “as a whole”].) The theory behind the rule is pretty simple: Authors, whether they be poets, novelists, or on the staff of the office of planning and research (see Guideline 15000) generally do not want to contradict themselves—and when they do, their whimsy should be relatively obvious from the text (e.g., “The sun was shining on the sea/Shining with all his might . . .

2000Code, § 1652; see also Bingham v. CTS Corp. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 56, 68 [ 282 Cal.Rptr. 161 ] [reading regulations “as a whole”].) The theory behind the rule is pretty simple: Authors, whether they be poets, novelists, or on the staff of the office of planning and research (see Guideline 15000) generally do not want to contradict themselves—and when they do, their whimsy should be relatively obvious from the text (e.g., “The sun was shining on the sea/Shining with all his might . . .

1994Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 22, 26 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 204 ].) The theory behind this exception is that “[i]f bail forfeiture is required immediately upon the first nonappearance of a defendant, no matter how valid his reason for nonappearance be, such defendant would be subjected not only to having his bail forfeited but the additional penalty of possibly being required to pay another premium for its reinstatement.” (People v. Surety Ins.

1994Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 22, 26 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 204 ].) The theory behind this exception is that “[i]f bail forfeiture is required immediately upon the first nonappearance of a defendant, no matter how valid his reason for nonappearance be, such defendant would be subjected not only to having his bail forfeited but the additional penalty of possibly being required to pay another premium for its reinstatement.” (People v. Surety Ins.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1994(Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal. 418, 423-424 [ 90 P. 1049 ]; Bird v. American Surety Co. (1917) 175 Cal. 625, 631 [ 166 P. 1009 ]; Cohn v. Smith (1918) 37 Cal.App. 764, 767-768 [ 174 P. 682 ].) The courts have also recognized that certain bond claimants are entitled to recover from a surety the attorney fees they expend to enforce their contract *745 with the principal, if the contract between the principal and the claimant expressly calls for the payment of attorney fees.

1993Discussion A. The Majority Has Not Established Any Persuasive Rationale for Complete Abolition of the Rule in Small Claims Proceedings, and Has Failed to Consider the Possible Negative Ramifications of Adopting Such a Holding “Except as provided by law,” hearsay evidence is inadmissible. (§ 1200.) The basic theory behind the rule “is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examination.” (Buchanan v. Nye (1954) 128 Cal.Ap

1993Discussion A. The Majority Has Not Established Any Persuasive Rationale for Complete Abolition of the Rule in Small Claims Proceedings, and Has Failed to Consider the Possible Negative Ramifications of Adopting Such a Holding “Except as provided by law,” hearsay evidence is inadmissible. (§ 1200.) The basic theory behind the rule “is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examination.” (Buchanan v. Nye (1954) 128 Cal.Ap