26 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Burnettegreen2 sentences2018State v. Burnette, 881 So. 2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“An information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency (1) where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements are not properly charged, or (2) where the wrong or no statutory citation is given, but all elements of the crime are properly charged.”). 2011Coke v. State, 955 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (information charging aggravated battery that made specific reference to enhancement statute and alleged that defendant “shot victim in the legs” sufficiently alleged the element of “great bodily harm” allowing for enhancement of sentence); State v. Burnette, 881 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (an information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements are not properly charged, or where the wrong or no statutory citation is given, but all elements of | 3 | 3 |
Falco v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Untimely post-conviction challenges, which do not establish an exception-to the two-year time limit, are abusive and sanctionable, and an appeal from the denial of an untimely claim is frivolous when no arguable basis for an exception to the time limitation exists.”). 2012See Johnson v. State, 44 So.3d 198, 200 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“Untimely post-conviction challenges, which do not establish an exception to the two-year time limit, are abusive and sanctionable, and an appeal from the denial of an untimely claim is frivolous when no arguable basis for an exception to the time limitation exists.”). | 2 | 4 |
Barnett Bank v. Estate of Readgreen2 sentences2023When no exception applies, an untimely claim is “automatically barred.” Barnett Bank of Palm Beach Cnty. v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447, 448 (Fla. 1986). 1987In Campbell v. Estate of Schleusener, 504 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), this court called attention to the supreme court’s holding in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, not a statute of non-claim, and that therefore the non-moving party should be allowed to plead estoppel or fraud or other valid grounds that, if they exist, may excuse an untimely claim. | 1 | 2 |
Fulcher v. Stategreen2 sentences2006We held: "Because the information in this case referenced the appropriate sections of our criminal code, the information was sufficient." Id. at 245 ; see also State v. Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1985) (finding information heading plus reference to the statute that defined the elements of the crime sufficiently fulfilled the constitutional requirements for a charging instrument); State v. Burnette, 881 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("An information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency (1) where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements 2004See, e.g., Fulcher v. State, 766 So.2d 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (affirming conviction where statutory citation for the crime was given, but all elements were not properly charged); Morales v. State, 785 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (finding no fundamental error and that defendant was not prejudiced by citing to wrong statute where the language in the information placed him on proper notice of the crime with which he was being charged). | 1 | 2 |
Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loansgreen1 sentence2023See Adhin v. First Horizon Home Loans, 44 So. 3d 1245, 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("A statute is a 'nonclaim statute' if there is a clearly evidenced legislative intent in the statute to not merely withhold the remedy, but to take away the right of recovery when a claimant fails to present his or her claim as provided in the statute."). | 1 | 1 |
Elbadramany v. BRYSON CRANE RENTALgreen1 sentence2023Yet, as Allie’s holding makes plain, the dismissal of an untimely claim (like the one here) can amount to an “adjudication on the merits” even if the claim’s underlying merits were never actually “resolve[d].” Id. at 1240-42 ; cf. Elbadramany v. Bryson Crane Rental Servs., Inc., 630 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“A default judgment bars any claims asserted therein and operates as res judicata on the issues.”). | 1 | 1 |
Marc H. Nathan v. Stephen Whittingtongreen2 sentences2016Servs., v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (1996) (“[T]he UFTA-operates in.the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action ... rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex.2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because “[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively ‘extinguish[es]’ the cause of action”). 9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) render 2016App. 1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other - 21 - statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action . . . rather than simply blocking the remedy."); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex. 2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because "[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively 'extinguish[es]' the cause of action").9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) rendered that subsection a statute of limitati | 1 | 1 |
First Southwestern Financial Services v. Pulliamgreen2 sentences2016Servs., v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (1996) (“[T]he UFTA-operates in.the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action ... rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex.2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because “[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively ‘extinguish[es]’ the cause of action”). 9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) render 2016Servs., v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (1996) (“[T]he UFTA-operates in.the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action ... rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex.2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because “[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively ‘extinguish[es]’ the cause of action”). 9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) render | 1 | 1 |
Coke v. Stategreen1 sentence2011Coke v. State, 955 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (information charging aggravated battery that made specific reference to enhancement statute and alleged that defendant “shot victim in the legs” sufficiently alleged the element of “great bodily harm” allowing for enhancement of sentence); State v. Burnette, 881 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (an information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements are not properly charged, or where the wrong or no statutory citation is given, but all elements of | 1 | 1 |
State v. Phillipsgreen1 sentence2006We held: "Because the information in this case referenced the appropriate sections of our criminal code, the information was sufficient." Id. at 245 ; see also State v. Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1985) (finding information heading plus reference to the statute that defined the elements of the crime sufficiently fulfilled the constitutional requirements for a charging instrument); State v. Burnette, 881 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("An information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency (1) where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements | 1 | 1 |
Cuevas v. Stategreen1 sentence2006We held: "Because the information in this case referenced the appropriate sections of our criminal code, the information was sufficient." Id. at 245 ; see also State v. Phillips, 463 So.2d 1136, 1138 (Fla.1985) (finding information heading plus reference to the statute that defined the elements of the crime sufficiently fulfilled the constitutional requirements for a charging instrument); State v. Burnette, 881 So.2d 693, 695 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) ("An information may withstand an untimely challenge to a technical deficiency (1) where a statutory citation for the crime is given, but all elements | 1 | 1 |
Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairsgreen2 sentences2003See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96 , 111 S.Ct. 453 (filing period in federal law counterpart to Chapter 760 is not jurisdictional); Donald v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 19 F.A.L.R. 4357, 4371 (FCHR 1995) (noting that the "period for filing the Petition for Relief is not jurisdictional but is subject to equitable tolling") (citing Clark v. Department of Corrections, 8 F.A.L.R. 679 (FCHR 1985)). 2003See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96 , 111 S.Ct. 453 (filing period in federal law counterpart to Chapter 760 is not jurisdictional); Donald v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 19 F.A.L.R. 4357, 4371 (FCHR 1995) (noting that the "period for filing the Petition for Relief is not jurisdictional but is subject to equitable tolling") (citing Clark v. Department of Corrections, 8 F.A.L.R. 679 (FCHR 1985)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
DeMario v. Franklin Mortg. & Inv. Co.
green
2 sentences2015In its answer brief, the subordinate lien-holder seeks affirmance of the circuit court’s order based on three arguments: (1) sections 45.031 and 45.032 cannot be interpreted as imposing a sixty-day bar for subordinate lienholders’ claims to the surplus, pursuant to DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co., 648 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); (2) the subordinate lienholder’s untimely claim should be excused because it did not receive a copy of the final judgment or certificate of disbursements; and (3) the homeowners’ claim did not acknowledge that the subordinate lienholder may have a clai 2015In its answer brief, the subordinate lien-holder seeks affirmance of the circuit court’s order based on three arguments: (1) sections 45.031 and 45.032 cannot be interpreted as imposing a sixty-day bar for subordinate lienholders’ claims to the surplus, pursuant to DeMario v. Franklin Mortgage & Investment Co., 648 So.2d 210 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); (2) the subordinate lienholder’s untimely claim should be excused because it did not receive a copy of the final judgment or certificate of disbursements; and (3) the homeowners’ claim did not acknowledge that the subor dinate lienholder may have a cla | 3 | 2015–2015 |
Miller v. Nolte
green
2 sentences2006Miller v. Nolte, 453 So.2d 397 (Fla.1984). 2000Miller v. Nolte, 453 So.2d 397 (Fla.1984). | 3 | 1986–2006 |
Allie v. Ionata
green
2 sentences2023Yet, as Allie’s holding makes plain, the dismissal of an untimely claim (like the one here) can amount to an “adjudication on the merits” even if the claim’s underlying merits were never actually “resolve[d].” Id. at 1240-42 ; cf. Elbadramany v. Bryson Crane Rental Servs., Inc., 630 So. 2d 214, 216 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (“A default judgment bars any claims asserted therein and operates as res judicata on the issues.”). 1996I disagree and find support for the ability of the debtor to raise the claim defensively in both Allie v. Ionata, 503 So.2d 1237 (Fla. 1987), and Beekner v. L.P. | 2 | 1996–2023 |
Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules—Criminal Procedure
green
2 sentences1997Although not specifically adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in its adoption of the amendments to Rule 3.191, see The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules Criminal Procedure, 462 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1984), the committee note appended to Rule 3.191(i)(4) provides that "[t]he intent of (i)(4) is to provide the state attorney with 15 days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge. 1988Although not specifically adopted by the Florida Supreme Court in its adoption of the amendments to Rule 3.191, see The Florida Bar Re: Amendment to Rules Criminal Procedure, 462 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1984), the committee note appended to Rule 3.191(i)(4) provides that "[t]he intent of (i)(4) is to provide the state attorney with 15 days within which to bring a defendant to trial from the date of the filing of the motion for discharge. | 2 | 1988–1997 |
May v. Illinois Nat. Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2023Section 733.710(1) is in that sense “a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time . . . more than 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate.” May, 771 So. 2d at 1156 (quoting Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 167 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Comerica Bank v. SDI Operating Partners
green
1 sentence2023Section 733.710(1) is in that sense “a self-executing, absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time . . . more than 2 years after the death of the person whose estate is undergoing probate.” May, 771 So. 2d at 1156 (quoting Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 167 ). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Jones v. MTLC Investment, Ltd. (In Re Hill)
green
2 sentences2016Servs., v. Pulliam, 121 N.M. 436 , 912 P.2d 828, 830 (1996) (“[T]he UFTA-operates in.the same manner as other statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action ... rather than simply blocking the remedy.”); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex.2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because “[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively ‘extinguish[es]’ the cause of action”). 9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) render 2016App. 1996) ("[T]he UFTA operates in the same manner as other - 21 - statutes of repose that extinguishes a cause of action . . . rather than simply blocking the remedy."); Nathan v. Whittington, 408 S.W.3d 870, 874 (Tex. 2013) (holding that provision is a statute of repose because "[b]y its own terms, the provision does not just procedurally bar an untimely claim, it substantively 'extinguish[es]' the cause of action").9 Notwithstanding this statutory text, the bankruptcy court in Hill II held that the one-year savings clause of section 726.110(1) rendered that subsection a statute of limitati | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Florida Dhrs v. Sap
green
2 sentences2016In S.A.P., for example, the court held that the state can be equitably estopped from asserting section 768.28(13), Florida Statutes (1993), which sets a period of four years from the accrual of a caúse of action to commence suit against it, as a defense to an untimely claim. 835 So.2d at 1097-98 . 2016In S.A.P., for example, the court held that the state can be equitably estopped from asserting section 768.28(13), Florida Statutes (1993), which sets a period of four years from the accrual of a cause of action to commence suit against it, as a defense to an untimely claim. 835 So. 2d at 1097-98 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Boyd
green
1 sentence2008Cf. State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458 (Fla.2003) (addressing the merits of the trial court's ruling on a motion for enlargement of time in the appeal of the denial of the appellant's rule 3.850 motion). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Morales v. State
green
1 sentence2004See, e.g., Fulcher v. State, 766 So.2d 243 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (affirming conviction where statutory citation for the crime was given, but all elements were not properly charged); Morales v. State, 785 So.2d 612 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (finding no fundamental error and that defendant was not prejudiced by citing to wrong statute where the language in the information placed him on proper notice of the crime with which he was being charged). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Climpson v. State
green
1 sentence1997In Climpson v. State, 528 So.2d 1296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988), where the hearing was held nine days after the filing of the Notice (instead of the required five), but the trial was commenced within four days thereafter (well within the total "window period" of fifteen days), the First District Court of Appeal held that: [A]lthough the hearing itself exceeded the five-day time limit required by Rule 3.191(i)(4), the fact that appellant was to be tried within fifteen days from the date of the filing of his motion for discharge renders the untimely hearing harmless. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Brevard Cty. Bd., Pub. Instr. v. Spec. Disability Trust Fund
green
1 sentence1989In Special Disability Trust Fund v. Brevard County Board of Public Instruction, 9 FCR 164 (1975), cert. denied, 320 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1975), the carrier voluntarily accepted the claimant as PTD and subsequently filed an untimely claim for reimbursement, which was denied for untimeliness. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Campbell v. Estate of Schleusener
green
1 sentence1987In Campbell v. Estate of Schleusener, 504 So.2d 417 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), this court called attention to the supreme court’s holding in Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447 (Fla.1986), that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, not a statute of non-claim, and that therefore the non-moving party should be allowed to plead estoppel or fraud or other valid grounds that, if they exist, may excuse an untimely claim. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Picchione v. Asti
green
1 sentence1987The supreme court, citing Picchione v. Asti, 354 So.2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978), further held that a creditor wishing to raise the defense of estoppel or fraud to such a motion to strike must file a reply pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
In re the Estate of Williams
neutral
1 sentence1983Cf. In re Estate of Williams, 381 So.2d 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980), in which this court affirmed the probate judge's refusal to strike an untimely claim on the premise that the nature of the demand was not such as to be encompassed by the claim filing requirements of section 733.702(1). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.