unit of prosecution analysis in Georgia

2023In Scott, this Court said that “[t]he Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis in its unpublished opinion here” and “in its other published opinions holding that multiple counts of child molestation did not merge.” Scott, 306 Ga. at 510 .

2023In Scott, this Court said that “[t]he Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis in its unpublished opinion here” and “in its other published opinions holding that multiple counts of child molestation did not merge.” Scott, 306 Ga. at 510.

2025“When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of-prosecution analysis.” (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. 155, 159 (4) ( 868 SE2d 226 ) (2022).

2025“When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of-prosecution analysis.” (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. State, 313 Ga. 155, 159 (4) ( 868 SE2d 226 ) (2022).

2023Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Wilkins on both of his aggravated assault convictions. 2 As we have previously explained, this Court’s decision in Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 410 (5) ( 714 SE2d 37 ) (2011) applying the unit of prosecution test to the aggravated assault statute is physical precedent only and is, therefore, not binding.

2023Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Wilkins on both of his aggravated assault convictions. 2 As we have previously explained, this Court’s decision in Thomas v. State, 310 Ga. App. 404, 410 (5) ( 714 SE2d 37 ) (2011) applying the unit of prosecution test to the aggravated assault statute is physical precedent only and is, therefore, not binding.

2024See OCGA § 17-10-10 (a) (“Where at one term of court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, or on more than one count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein.”). 17 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14, 15-16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023), quoting Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 215 ( 636 SE2d 530 ) (2006). 8 Here, Kelley argues that he was convicted of two counts of the same crime, so they should merge under the unit-of-prosecution

2024See OCGA § 17-10-10 (a) (“Where at one term of court a person is convicted on more than one indictment or accusation, or on more than one count thereof, and sentenced to imprisonment, the sentences shall be served concurrently unless otherwise expressly provided therein.”). 17 (Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14, 15-16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023), quoting Drinkard v. Walker, 281 Ga. 211, 215 ( 636 SE2d 530 ) (2006). 8 Here, Kelley argues that he was convicted of two counts of the same crime, so they should merge under the unit-of-prosecution

2025(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14 , 16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023).7 “When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of- prosecution analysis.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. 7 “[T]he doctrine of substantive double jeopardy — concerned as it is with multiple convictions

2025(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14 , 16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023).7 “When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of- prosecution analysis.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. 7 “[T]he doctrine of substantive double jeopardy — concerned as it is with multiple convictions

2015As this Court explained in Gipson, 332 Ga. App. at 320, n. 8 , however, Thomas is physical precedent only because one of the judges concurred in the judgment only, and the application of the unit of prosecution test conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in (unrelated) Thomas, 292 Ga. at 434 (5).

2015As this Court explained in Gipson, 332 Ga. App. at 320, n.8 , however, Thomas is physical precedent only because one of the judges concurred in the judgment only, and the application of the unit of prosecution test conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in (unrelated) Thomas, 292 Ga. at 434 (5). 9 Howard intended to kill Davis, which the State was not required to prove for the charge of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon required the State to prove that Howard used a deadly weapon, “a knife, box-cutter[,] or other sharp-edged ins

2015See Thomas, 292 Ga. at 434 (5) (applying the required evidence test, rather than the unit of prosecution test, in determining whether a defendant could he convicted of aggravated assault under both OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (a) (2) for the same act or transaction).

2015As this Court explained in Gipson, 332 Ga. App. at 320, n. 8 , however, Thomas is physical precedent only because one of the judges concurred in the judgment only, and the application of the unit of prosecution test conflicts with the Supreme Court’s decision in (unrelated) Thomas, 292 Ga. at 434 (5).

2025Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. 7, 8 ( 849 SE2d 204 ) (2020). 5 “The Double Jeopardy Clause imposes few limits upon the legislature’s power to define offenses.

2025Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under the statute depends on this legislative choice.” Taylor v. State, 374 Ga. App. 126 , 133 (4) ( 911 SE2d 684 ) (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted). (a) Sexual exploitation of children offenses that occurred prior to July 1, 2022 In Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. at 10 , our Supreme Court applied the unit of prosecution analysis to the former version of the sexual exploitation of children statute, OCGA § 16-12-100 (b) (5) (2017), to determine whether or not a defendant who was in possession of multiple images d

2022In Scott I, the Supreme Court indicated that “the Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis” in opinions addressing the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions. 306 Ga. at 510 (2), citing Carver v. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4) ( 769 SE2d 722 ) (2015) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation convictions and two child molestation convictions), and Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5) ( 677 SE2d 377 ) (2009) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation conviction and chid molestation conviction).

2022In Scott I, the Supreme Court indicated that “the Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis” in opinions addressing the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions. 306 Ga. at 510 (2), citing Carver v. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4) ( 769 SE2d 722 ) (2015) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation convictions and two child molestation convictions), and Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5) ( 677 SE2d 377 ) (2009) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation conviction and chid molestation conviction).

2022In Scott I, the Supreme Court indicated that “the Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis” in opinions addressing the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions. 306 Ga. at 510 (2), citing Carver v. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4) ( 769 SE2d 722 ) (2015) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation convictions and two child molestation convictions), and Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5) ( 677 SE2d 377 ) (2009) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation conviction and chid molestation conviction).

2022In Scott I, the Supreme Court indicated that “the Court of Appeals failed to engage in the applicable unit-of-prosecution analysis” in opinions addressing the merger of aggravated child molestation and child molestation convictions. 306 Ga. at 510 (2), citing Carver v. State, 331 Ga. App. 120, 122 (4) ( 769 SE2d 722 ) (2015) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation convictions and two child molestation convictions), and Metts v. State, 297 Ga. App. 330, 336 (5) ( 677 SE2d 377 ) (2009) (analyzing merger of aggravated child molestation conviction and chid molestation conviction).

2022Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. 7, 8 (849 SE2d 204) (2020) (quoting Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 330 (818 SE2d 622) (2018) (punctuation omitted)). “‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which [an appellate court] review[s] de novo.’” Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 684 (808 SE2d 709) (2017) (citation omitted).

2022Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. 7, 8 (849 SE2d 204) (2020) (quoting Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 330 (818 SE2d 622) (2018) (punctuation omitted)). “‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which [an appellate court] review[s] de novo.’” Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 684 (808 SE2d 709) (2017) (citation omitted).

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2020See Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2) ( 832 SE2d 426 ) (2019); State v. Marlowe, 277 Ga. 383 ( 589 SE2d 69 ) (2003).

2025(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14 , 16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023).7 “When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of- prosecution analysis.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. 7 “[T]he doctrine of substantive double jeopardy — concerned as it is with multiple convictions

2025(Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) State v. Shropshire, 318 Ga. 14 , 16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023).7 “When a defendant enumerates a merger error after being convicted of multiple counts of the same crime, the correct merger analysis requires courts to ask whether those crimes arose from a single course of conduct and, if so, whether the defendant can face multiple convictions and sentences under a unit-of- prosecution analysis.” (Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Johnson v. 7 “[T]he doctrine of substantive double jeopardy — concerned as it is with multiple convictions

2025See Miller v. State, 293 Ga. 638, 640 (2) ( 748 SE2d 893 ) (2013). 8 Here, the trial court sentenced Williams to five years, to be served consecutively, on each of the two counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, with the predicate felonies being armed robbery and aggravated assault committed against the cashier of the retail establishment.

2025See Miller v. State, 293 Ga. 638, 640 (2) ( 748 SE2d 893 ) (2013). 8 Here, the trial court sentenced Williams to five years, to be served consecutively, on each of the two counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, with the predicate felonies being armed robbery and aggravated assault committed against the cashier of the retail establishment.

2025By contrast, a required evidence analysis, which considers whether each crime requires proof of a fact which the other does not, applies to a merger analysis [if] the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions.4 Because Spencer’s convictions are based on two distinct statutory provisions — pandering (OCGA § 16-6-12) and pimping (OCGA § 16-6-11 (3)) — we apply the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Shopshire, 318 Ga. 14, 15-16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023), quoting Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2) ( 832 SE2d 426 ) (2019); Drinkard v. Walk

2025By contrast, a required evidence analysis, which considers whether each crime requires proof of a fact which the other does not, applies to a merger analysis [if] the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions.4 Because Spencer’s convictions are based on two distinct statutory provisions — pandering (OCGA § 16-6-12) and pimping (OCGA § 16-6-11 (3)) — we apply the 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Shopshire, 318 Ga. 14, 15-16 (2) ( 896 SE2d 541 ) (2023), quoting Scott v. State, 306 Ga. 507, 509 (2) ( 832 SE2d 426 ) (2019); Drinkard v. Walk

2024Based on that, this Court held in Rozier that the two convictions merged under the unit-of-prosecution analysis. 24 Compare Taylor v. State, 307 Ga. 755, 756 (1) ( 838 SE2d 261 ) (2020) (explaining that “a defendant may not be convicted of two or more counts of the same crime where the evidence shows that the two counts are part of a single incident”) (emphasis supplied); Rozier, 365 Ga. App. at 182-183 (3) (addressing multiple counts of “the same crime,” and stating that “the merger issue turns on whether the evidence showed that the two different types of harm to the dog were caused by a sin

2024Based on that, this Court held in Rozier that the two convictions merged under the unit-of-prosecution analysis. 24 Compare Taylor v. State, 307 Ga. 755, 756 (1) ( 838 SE2d 261 ) (2020) (explaining that “a defendant may not be convicted of two or more counts of the same crime where the evidence shows that the two counts are part of a single incident”) (emphasis supplied); Rozier, 365 Ga. App. at 182-183 (3) (addressing multiple counts of “the same crime,” and stating that “the merger issue turns on whether the evidence showed that the two different types of harm to the dog were caused by a sin

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024The conviction for Count 2 was predicated on the separate conduct, after Kelley began to walk away, of returning to the dumpster to trap the dog by closing the lid.22 Despite the fact that the two counts arose from the single 20 See generally Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) ( 808 SE2d 696 ) (2017) (explaining that appellate courts “have the discretion to correct merger errors sua sponte — regardless of who is harmed by the error and who benefits from its correction — because a merger error results in an illegal and void judgment of conviction and sentence.”). 21 See Waits v. State, 282 Ga

2024As noted above, the unit-of-prosecution analysis addresses multiple convictions of the same crime.19 Therefore, Kelley’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to apply the unit-of- prosecution analysis is without merit. 18 See Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 723 (5) ( 878 SE2d 247 ) (2022) (“The felony offense of aggravated cruelty to animals and the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals are different offenses.”).

2024As noted above, the unit-of-prosecution analysis addresses multiple convictions of the same crime.19 Therefore, Kelley’s argument that the trial court erred by failing to apply the unit-of- prosecution analysis is without merit. 18 See Peacock v. State, 314 Ga. 709, 723 (5) ( 878 SE2d 247 ) (2022) (“The felony offense of aggravated cruelty to animals and the misdemeanor offense of cruelty to animals are different offenses.”).

2023See State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 223-224 (6) ( 862 SE2d 125 ) (2021) (applying the “unit of prosecution” test to two aggravated assault convictions indicted under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)).

2023See State v. Owens, 312 Ga. 212, 223-224 (6) ( 862 SE2d 125 ) (2021) (applying the “unit of prosecution” test to two aggravated assault convictions indicted under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2)).

2023The Court of Appeals applied a unit-of- prosecution analysis to the convictions to answer this question and See Coe v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 314 Ga. 519 , 530 n. 19 ( 878 SE2d 235 ) (2022). 2 The niece reported this incident when she was about 15 years old. 2 concluded that the two child molestation counts merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction because the three acts alleged—“touching [the victim’s] vagina with his tongue, finger, and penis”—were “‘part of a single course of conduct occurring in a relatively short time frame.’” Shropshire v. State, 365 Ga. App. 653 , 662-663 (

2023See Coe, 314 Ga. at 530. 5 aggravated child molestation).5 Thus, a required evidence analysis, rather than a unit-of-prosecution analysis, should be applied when considering whether those different crimes merge.

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. 7, 8 (849 SE2d 204) (2020) (quoting Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 330 (818 SE2d 622) (2018) (punctuation omitted)). “‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which [an appellate court] review[s] de novo.’” Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 684 (808 SE2d 709) (2017) (citation omitted).

2022Edvalson v. State, 310 Ga. 7, 8 (849 SE2d 204) (2020) (quoting Coates v. State, 304 Ga. 329, 330 (818 SE2d 622) (2018) (punctuation omitted)). “‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which [an appellate court] review[s] de novo.’” Womac v. State, 302 Ga. 681, 684 (808 SE2d 709) (2017) (citation omitted).

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022See Sears v. State, 292 Ga. 64, 73-74 (6) ( 734 SE2d 345 ) (2012); Mikell v. State, 286 Ga. 722, 724-725 (3) ( 690 SE2d 858 ) (2010); Carr, 363 Ga. App. at 46 (2) (b) (i)-(ii); Haynes v. State, 322 Ga. App. 57, 62 (2) ( 743 SE2d 617 ) (2013). 7 This holding is in accord with several decisions that pre-dated the Supreme Court’s adoption of the unit-of-prosecution analysis.

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the

2022See Woods v. State, 209 Ga. App. 604, 604, 606 (2) ( 434 SE2d 146 ) (1993) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking cash from a store merged into his conviction for theft by taking a pickup truck from the store because the two thefts “were committed at the same time and place and [were] parts of one continuous criminal act”); Hubbard v. State, 168 Ga. App. 778, 778-779 (1)-(2) ( 310 SE2d 556 ) (1983) (holding that the defendant’s conviction for theft by taking a stereo, checkwriter, and keys from a car dealership merged into his conviction for theft by taking a car from the