unit of prosecution analysis in Washington

2025For step one, neither party has provided any evidence of explicit or implicit legislative intent with respect to the crimes of second degree assault and false imprisonment, so we move to the second step. 4 In cases involving multiple violations of the same statute, we apply the unit of prosecution analysis which asks, “what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.” Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 980 , 329 P.3d 78 (2014) (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634 , 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)). 5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2024Ed. 306 (1932). 23 No. 57922-7-II statute, the unit of prosecution analysis applies and it asks, “‘what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.’” Id. at 980 (quoting Adel, 136 Wn.2d at 634 ).

2025For step one, neither party has provided any evidence of explicit or implicit legislative intent with respect to the crimes of second degree assault and false imprisonment, so we move to the second step. 4 In cases involving multiple violations of the same statute, we apply the unit of prosecution analysis which asks, “what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.” Villanueva-Gonzalez, 180 Wn.2d 975, 980 , 329 P.3d 78 (2014) (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634 , 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)). 5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S. Ct. 180 , 76 L.

2020A unit of prosecution analysis “asks ‘what act or course of conduct has the Legislature defined as the punishable act.’” Id. at 980 (quoting State v. Adel, 136 Wn.2d 629, 634 , 965 P.2d 1072 (1998)).

2016App. 441 , 820 P.2d 53 (1991), review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1002 (1992), and State v. Lopez, 79 Wn.

2000In State v. Lopez, 79 Wn.

2010The decision in Sutherby precluded the State from charging Furseth with multiple acts of possession of child pornography. ¶ 7 The unit of prosecution analysis is pertinent to this case because the analysis in Sutherby concerns "what act or course of conduct" the legislature has proscribed. 165 Wash.2d at 879 , 204 P.3d 916 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Root, 141 Wash.2d 701, 706 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000)).

2010The decision in Sutherby precluded the State from charging Furseth with multiple acts of possession of child pornography. ¶7 The unit of prosecution analysis is pertinent to this case because the analysis in Sutherby concerns “what act or course of conduct” the legislature has proscribed. 165 Wn.2d at 879 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Root, 141 Wn.2d 701, 706 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000)).

2010The decision in Sutherby precluded the State from charging Furseth with multiple acts of possession of child pornography. ¶ 7 The unit of prosecution analysis is pertinent to this case because the analysis in Sutherby concerns "what act or course of conduct" the legislature has proscribed. 165 Wash.2d at 879 , 204 P.3d 916 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Root, 141 Wash.2d 701, 706 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000)).

2010The decision in Sutherby precluded the State from charging Furseth with multiple acts of possession of child pornography. ¶7 The unit of prosecution analysis is pertinent to this case because the analysis in Sutherby concerns “what act or course of conduct” the legislature has proscribed. 165 Wn.2d at 879 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Root, 141 Wn.2d 701, 706 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000)).

2000However, "[t]his in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read." Bell, 349 U.S. at 83 , 75 S.Ct. 620 . "`The first step in the unit of prosecution inquiry is to analyze the criminal statute.'" Till, 139 Wash.2d at 113 , 985 P.2d 365 (quoting Adel, 136 Wash.2d at 635 , 965 P.2d 1072 ).

2000However, “[t]his in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read.” Bell, 349 U.S. at 83 . “ ‘The first step in the unit of prosecution inquiry is to analyze the criminal statute.’ ” Tili, 139 Wn.2d at 113 (quoting Adel, 136 Wn.2d at 635 ).

2016State v. Delgado, 148 Wn.2d 723, 733 , 63 P.3d 792 (2003). ¶23 In applying the unit of prosecution analysis, courts look to discern “the evil the legislature has criminalized.” Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 731 .

2015Ajury eventually convicted Hall of three counts of witness tampering, but the Supreme Court reversed after conducting a unit of prosecution analysis, holding "that the legislature intended to criminalize inducing 'a' witness not to testify or to testify falsely." Hall, 168 Wn.2d at 737 .

2018State v. Turner, 102 Wn.

2015State v. Turner, 102 Wn.

2005In contrast, the court found the language “any . . . automobile” indicated that only “one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles.” Id. f 16 Similarly, in State v. Root, 141 Wn.2d 701 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000), we considered how the legislature’s use of the words “a minor” in the sexual exploitation of a minor statute, RCW 9.68A.040, impacted the unit of prosecution analysis.

2003It “protectts] a defendant from being convicted more than once under the same statute if the defendant commits only one unit of the crime.” Westling, 145 Wn.2d at 610 .

2000However, "[t]his in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read." Bell, 349 U.S. at 83 , 75 S.Ct. 620 . "`The first step in the unit of prosecution inquiry is to analyze the criminal statute.'" Till, 139 Wash.2d at 113 , 985 P.2d 365 (quoting Adel, 136 Wash.2d at 635 , 965 P.2d 1072 ).

2000However, “[t]his in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read.” Bell, 349 U.S. at 83 . “ ‘The first step in the unit of prosecution inquiry is to analyze the criminal statute.’ ” Tili, 139 Wn.2d at 113 (quoting Adel, 136 Wn.2d at 635 ).

2010Again, a multiple acts prosecution occurs where "several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged." Kitchen, 110 Wash.2d at 411 , 756 P.2d 105 .

2010Again, a multiple acts prosecution occurs where “several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged.” Kitchen, 110 Wn.2d at 411 .

2008Rather, we adhere to State v. Gailus, 136 Wn.

2008Rather, we adhere to State v. Gailus, 136 Wash.App. 191 , 147 P.3d 1300 (2006) in which we held that the unit of prosecution is one crime for each photograph, regardless of whether they are stored in a single location.

2005The Root court ultimately concluded that because “[t]he statute specifically states ‘a minor,’ [the defendant] may be charged per child involved.” Id. at 710-11. f 17 Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wn.2d 402 , 68 P.3d 1065 (2003), we interpreted RCW 9.94A.533(3) and (4), which allows sentence enhancement if a defendant or an accomplice was armed with “ ‘a’ firearm” or “ ‘a’ deadly weapon.” Id. at 418.

2005The Root court ultimately concluded that because "[t]he statute specifically states `a minor,' ... [the defendant] may be charged per child involved." Id. at 710-11, 9 P.3d 214 . ¶ 17 Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wash.2d 402 , 68 P.3d 1065 (2003), we interpreted RCW 9.94A.533(3) and (4), which allows sentence enhancement if a defendant or an accomplice was armed with "`a' firearm" or "`a' deadly weapon." Id. at 418, 68 P.3d 1065 .

2005The Root court ultimately concluded that because “[t]he statute specifically states ‘a minor,’ [the defendant] may be charged per child involved.” Id. at 710-11. f 17 Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wn.2d 402 , 68 P.3d 1065 (2003), we interpreted RCW 9.94A.533(3) and (4), which allows sentence enhancement if a defendant or an accomplice was armed with “ ‘a’ firearm” or “ ‘a’ deadly weapon.” Id. at 418.

2005The Root court ultimately concluded that because "[t]he statute specifically states `a minor,' ... [the defendant] may be charged per child involved." Id. at 710-11, 9 P.3d 214 . ¶ 17 Likewise, in State v. DeSantiago, 149 Wash.2d 402 , 68 P.3d 1065 (2003), we interpreted RCW 9.94A.533(3) and (4), which allows sentence enhancement if a defendant or an accomplice was armed with "`a' firearm" or "`a' deadly weapon." Id. at 418, 68 P.3d 1065 .

2005In contrast, the court found the language "any ... automobile" indicated that only "one conviction is appropriate where one fire damages multiple automobiles." Id. ¶ 16 Similarly, in State v. Root, 141 Wash.2d 701 , 9 P.3d 214 (2000), we considered how the legislature's use of the words "a minor" in the sexual exploitation of a minor statute, RCW 9.68A.040, impacted the unit of prosecution analysis.

2003It "protect[s] a defendant from being convicted more than once under the same statute if the defendant commits only one unit of the crime." Westling, 145 Wash.2d at 610 , 40 P.3d 669 . [1] Armando and Enrique DeSantiago were also charged with leading organized crime.

1998State v. O’Connor, 87 Wn.

1998State v. O'Connor, 87 Wash.App. 119 , 940 P.2d 675 (1997), closely follows Lopez , but the case does not actually present a unit of prosecution question.

2025Id. at 400 .

2023State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 710 , 107 P.3d 728 (2005).

2023State v. Tvedt, 153 Wn.2d 705, 710 , 107 P.3d 728 (2005).

2021App. 395 , 416-17, 109 P.3d 429 (2005) (applying same evidence test to determine whether convictions under two different subsections of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) (2000) implicated double jeopardy), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 500 , 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). 7 Larsen does not argue that the two convictions constitute double jeopardy under the same evidence test. 8 No. 54353-2-II III.

2021App. 2d 468 , 475, 416 P.3d 725 (2018).

2021App. 395 , 416-17, 109 P.3d 429 (2005) (applying same evidence test to determine whether convictions under two different subsections of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) (2000) implicated double jeopardy), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 500 , 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). 7 Larsen does not argue that the two convictions constitute double jeopardy under the same evidence test. 8 No. 54353-2-II III.

2021App. 395 , 416-17, 109 P.3d 429 (2005) (applying same evidence test to determine whether convictions under two different subsections of former RCW 69.50.401(a)(1) (2000) implicated double jeopardy), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 500 , 150 P.3d 1121 (2007). 7 Larsen does not argue that the two convictions constitute double jeopardy under the same evidence test. 8 No. 54353-2-II III.

2021Because Larsen was convicted under two separate statutory provisions, the unit of prosecution test does not apply and this argument fails.7 State v. O’Neal, 126 Wn.

2020State v. Jensen, 164 Wn.2d 943, 949 , 195 P.3d 512 (2008).

2020App. 513, 522 , 384 P.3d 252 (2016) (quoting State v. Hall, 168 Wn.2d 726, 731 , 230 P.3d 1048 (2010)).