udap claim in Hawaii

2024Shikada v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 152 Hawai#i 418, 526 P.3d 395 (2023), a case arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure, the supreme court declined to recognize a mortgagor's UDAP claim under HRS § 480-2 against the mortgagee's attorney, explaining in part that "in foreclosure actions an attorney's justifiable concern with being sued by the opposing party for UDAP could compromise the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client." 139 Hawai#i at 413, 391 P.3d at 20 .

2024Shikada v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 152 Hawai#i 418, 526 P.3d 395 (2023), a case arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure, the supreme court declined to recognize a mortgagor's UDAP claim under HRS § 480-2 against the mortgagee's attorney, explaining in part that "in foreclosure actions an attorney's justifiable concern with being sued by the opposing party for UDAP could compromise the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client." 139 Hawai#i at 413, 391 P.3d at 20 .

2025With respect to Borrowers’ UDAP claims, they must establish “‘(1) either that the defendant violated the UDAP statute (or that its actions are deemed to violate the UDAP statute by another statute), (2) that the consumer was injured as a result of the violation, and (3) the amount of damages sustained as a result of the UDAP violation.’” Id. at 464–65, 494 P.3d at 1197–98 (quoting Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Invs., LLC, 142 Hawaiʻi 507, 519, 421 P.3d 1277, 1289 (2018)).

2025With respect to Borrowers’ UDAP claims, they must establish “‘(1) either that the defendant violated the UDAP statute (or that its actions are deemed to violate the UDAP statute by another statute), (2) that the consumer was injured as a result of the violation, and (3) the amount of damages sustained as a result of the UDAP violation.’” Id. at 464–65, 494 P.3d at 1197–98 (quoting Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Invs., LLC, 142 Hawaiʻi 507, 519, 421 P.3d 1277, 1289 (2018)).

2025With respect to Borrowers’ UDAP claims, they must establish “‘(1) either that the defendant violated the UDAP statute (or that its actions are deemed to violate the UDAP statute by another statute), (2) that the consumer was injured as a result of the violation, and (3) the amount of damages sustained as a result of the UDAP violation.’” Id. at 464–65, 494 P.3d at 1197–98 (quoting Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Invs., LLC, 142 Hawaiʻi 507, 519, 421 P.3d 1277, 1289 (2018)).

2025With respect to Borrowers’ UDAP claims, they must establish “‘(1) either that the defendant violated the UDAP statute (or that its actions are deemed to violate the UDAP statute by another statute), (2) that the consumer was injured as a result of the violation, and (3) the amount of damages sustained as a result of the UDAP violation.’” Id. at 464–65, 494 P.3d at 1197–98 (quoting Kawakami v. Kahala Hotel Invs., LLC, 142 Hawaiʻi 507, 519, 421 P.3d 1277, 1289 (2018)).

2022Cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i 249, 263, 428 P.3d 761, 775 (2018) (holding that a foreclosure defendant may bring a counterclaim for wrongful foreclosure before the foreclosure actually occurs).

2022Cf. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i 249, 263, 428 P.3d 761, 775 (2018) (holding that a foreclosure defendant may bring a counterclaim for wrongful foreclosure before the foreclosure actually occurs).

2019See Brown v. Gerstein , 17 Mass.App.Ct. 558 , 460 N.E.2d 1043 (1984) (citing Guenard v. Burke , 387 Mass. 802 , 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982) (a couple's UDAP claim against their attorney for allegedly misrepresenting that a foreclosure sale of the clients' property would not take place should have been considered on its merits because "the practice of law constitutes 'trade or commerce' for purposes of liability under [Massachusetts' UDAP statute]")).

2019See Brown v. Gerstein , 17 Mass.App.Ct. 558 , 460 N.E.2d 1043 (1984) (citing Guenard v. Burke , 387 Mass. 802 , 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982) (a couple's UDAP claim against their attorney for allegedly misrepresenting that a foreclosure sale of the clients' property would not take place should have been considered on its merits because "the practice of law constitutes 'trade or commerce' for purposes of liability under [Massachusetts' UDAP statute]")).

2019See Brown v. Gerstein , 17 Mass.App.Ct. 558 , 460 N.E.2d 1043 (1984) (citing Guenard v. Burke , 387 Mass. 802 , 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982) (a couple's UDAP claim against their attorney for allegedly misrepresenting that a foreclosure sale of the clients' property would not take place should have been considered on its merits because "the practice of law constitutes 'trade or commerce' for purposes of liability under [Massachusetts' UDAP statute]")).

2019See Brown v. Gerstein , 17 Mass.App.Ct. 558 , 460 N.E.2d 1043 (1984) (citing Guenard v. Burke , 387 Mass. 802 , 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982) (a couple's UDAP claim against their attorney for allegedly misrepresenting that a foreclosure sale of the clients' property would not take place should have been considered on its merits because "the practice of law constitutes 'trade or commerce' for purposes of liability under [Massachusetts' UDAP statute]")).

2024Shikada v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 152 Hawai#i 418, 526 P.3d 395 (2023), a case arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure, the supreme court declined to recognize a mortgagor's UDAP claim under HRS § 480-2 against the mortgagee's attorney, explaining in part that "in foreclosure actions an attorney's justifiable concern with being sued by the opposing party for UDAP could compromise the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client." 139 Hawai#i at 413, 391 P.3d at 20 .

2024Shikada v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 152 Hawai#i 418, 526 P.3d 395 (2023), a case arising out of a non-judicial foreclosure, the supreme court declined to recognize a mortgagor's UDAP claim under HRS § 480-2 against the mortgagee's attorney, explaining in part that "in foreclosure actions an attorney's justifiable concern with being sued by the opposing party for UDAP could compromise the attorney's ability to zealously represent his or her client." 139 Hawai#i at 413, 391 P.3d at 20 .

2019Short , 691 P.2d 163 , 172 (Pearson, J., concurring).

2019Short , 691 P.2d 163 , 172 (Pearson, J., concurring).

2026See Guieb v. Guieb, 156 Hawai #i 162, 168, 571 P.3d 382 , 388 (2025) ("Because Roland was not a consumer, the AG, or director of the office of consumer protection, he had no standing to bring a UDAP claim."). 2 Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 2

2026See Guieb v. Guieb, 156 Hawai #i 162, 168, 571 P.3d 382 , 388 (2025) ("Because Roland was not a consumer, the AG, or director of the office of consumer protection, he had no standing to bring a UDAP claim."). 2 Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848). 2

2026Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi 277, 298, 172 P.3d 1021, 1042 (2007)).

2026Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 116 Hawaiʻi 277, 298, 172 P.3d 1021, 1042 (2007)).

2024Goodrich Co. v. Mesabi Tire Co., 430 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1988)). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Plaintiffs raise five points of error on cross-appeal, contending that the Legal Trial Court erred in: (1) instructing the jury on the proper measure of damages for a UDAP violation; (2) granting judgment in favor of the Haseko Defendants when instead it should have ordered a new trial on damages; (3) denying Plaintiffs relief based on HRS § 480-12, despite the jury's finding that the Haseko Defendants breached HRS Chapter 480; (4) refusing "Plaintiffs' Propo

2024Goodrich Co. v. Mesabi Tire Co., 430 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1988)). 7 NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER Plaintiffs raise five points of error on cross-appeal, contending that the Legal Trial Court erred in: (1) instructing the jury on the proper measure of damages for a UDAP violation; (2) granting judgment in favor of the Haseko Defendants when instead it should have ordered a new trial on damages; (3) denying Plaintiffs relief based on HRS § 480-12, despite the jury's finding that the Haseko Defendants breached HRS Chapter 480; (4) refusing "Plaintiffs' Propo

2022Stanley v. State, 148 Hawai#i 489, 495 n.13, 479 P.3d 107 , 113 n.13 (2021) (quoting Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 35 , 856 P.2d 1207, 1224 (1993) ("[T]he general rule is that an issue which was not raised in the lower court will not be considered on appeal[.]")).

2022Stanley v. State, 148 Hawai#i 489, 495 n.13, 479 P.3d 107 , 113 n.13 (2021) (quoting Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 35 , 856 P.2d 1207, 1224 (1993) ("[T]he general rule is that an issue which was not raised in the lower court will not be considered on appeal[.]")).

2022Aloha Unlimited, Inc. v. Coughlin, 79 Hawai#i 527, 536-37, 904 P.2d 541, 550-51 (App. 1995).

2022Aloha Unlimited, Inc. v. Coughlin, 79 Hawai#i 527, 536-37, 904 P.2d 541, 550-51 (App. 1995).

2022Malabe, 147 Hawai#i at 338, 465 P.3d at 785; Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i at 257, 428 P.3d at 769 ("The appellate court must . . . view a plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in order to determine whether the allegations contained therein could warrant relief under any alternative theory."); HRS § 480-24 ("For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation."); see also Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1199 , 1227- 29 (D.Haw. 1980).

2022Malabe, 147 Hawai#i at 338, 465 P.3d at 785; Reyes-Toledo, 143 Hawai#i at 257, 428 P.3d at 769 ("The appellate court must . . . view a plaintiff's complaint in a light most favorable to him or her in order to determine whether the allegations contained therein could warrant relief under any alternative theory."); HRS § 480-24 ("For the purpose of this section, a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed to accrue at any time during the period of the violation."); see also Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 1199 , 1227- 29 (D.Haw. 1980).

2021Zanakis-Pico, 98 Hawaiʻi at 319, 47 P.3d at 1232 (“HRS § 480-13(b) enumerates the specific damages that a consumer may recover under this chapter . . . and makes no provision for punitive damages.”). 18 *** FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER *** position they would have been in prior to the alleged tortious act.

2018Cf. Davis , 122 Hawai'i at 439 , 228 P.3d at 319 (explaining in the context of a claim for unfair method of competition (UMOC) that "although the deeming language of HRS § 481B-4 eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's conduct that violates chapter 481B (including HRS § 481B-14 ) constitutes an unfair method of competition, it does not purport to modify the causation requirement of HRS § 480-13."); Gurrobat , 133 Hawai'i at 23 , 323 P.3d at 814 (interpreting the causation element for a UMOC claim based on a violation of HRS § 481B-4, and stating that "a plaintiff n

2018Cf. Davis , 122 Hawai'i at 439 , 228 P.3d at 319 (explaining in the context of a claim for unfair method of competition (UMOC) that "although the deeming language of HRS § 481B-4 eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's conduct that violates chapter 481B (including HRS § 481B-14 ) constitutes an unfair method of competition, it does not purport to modify the causation requirement of HRS § 480-13."); Gurrobat , 133 Hawai'i at 23 , 323 P.3d at 814 (interpreting the causation element for a UMOC claim based on a violation of HRS § 481B-4, and stating that "a plaintiff n

2018Cf. Davis , 122 Hawai'i at 439 , 228 P.3d at 319 (explaining in the context of a claim for unfair method of competition (UMOC) that "although the deeming language of HRS § 481B-4 eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's conduct that violates chapter 481B (including HRS § 481B-14 ) constitutes an unfair method of competition, it does not purport to modify the causation requirement of HRS § 480-13."); Gurrobat , 133 Hawai'i at 23 , 323 P.3d at 814 (interpreting the causation element for a UMOC claim based on a violation of HRS § 481B-4, and stating that "a plaintiff n

2018Cf. Davis , 122 Hawai'i at 439 , 228 P.3d at 319 (explaining in the context of a claim for unfair method of competition (UMOC) that "although the deeming language of HRS § 481B-4 eliminates the requirement that a plaintiff prove that a defendant's conduct that violates chapter 481B (including HRS § 481B-14 ) constitutes an unfair method of competition, it does not purport to modify the causation requirement of HRS § 480-13."); Gurrobat , 133 Hawai'i at 23 , 323 P.3d at 814 (interpreting the causation element for a UMOC claim based on a violation of HRS § 481B-4, and stating that "a plaintiff n