DPS plea in Texas

2011On appeal, DPS contends that Sergeant Parker did not have to satisfy the heightened need/risk assessment elaborated in Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex.1997), for determining whether a public official acts in good faith for purposes of the official immunity defense for police pursuit cases.

2011On appeal, DPS contends that Sergeant Parker did not have to satisfy the heightened need/risk assessment elaborated in Wadewitz v. Montgomery , 951 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Tex. 1997), for determining whether a public official acts in good faith for purposes of the official immunity defense for police pursuit cases.

2009See Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Tex. 1993) (standing element of subject matter jurisdiction).

2000Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993).

2000See United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir.1994).

2000See United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 390 (5th Cir.1994).

2023Safety v. Stacy, 954 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ). 1 At the hearing before the County Court at Law on August 30, over DPS’s motion to quash Kennedy’s second subpoena of Jordan, the court permitted Officer Jordan to testify about the circumstances surrounding her stop of Kennedy’s vehicle, the subsequent arrest, and her technical difficulties in appearing at the administrative hearing via Zoom.

2023See id.

2022See id. at 338–39; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26 .

2022See id. at 338–39; Garcia, 387 S.W.3d at 26 .

2022See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (recognizing that the UDJA “waives sovereign immunity in particular cases” but otherwise it is “merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction” (quoting Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011))).

2022See Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 622 (Tex. 2011) (recognizing that the UDJA “waives sovereign immunity in particular cases” but otherwise it is “merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction” (quoting Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384, 388 (Tex. 2011))).

2021Appellees replied to DPS’s plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the evidence supported a finding that “Trooper Hernandez acted with conscious indifference and/or 9 reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Namely, appellees asserted: (1) Trooper Hernandez’s “vision was obstructed as to the outside lane of travel,” (2) Trooper Hernandez “failed to continuously operate his siren while proceeding through the intersection where the accident occurred, which would have alerted those whose vision was obstructed to his presence”; (3) “Trooper Hernandez proceeded into the intersection against the

2020See T.S.N., 547 S.W.3d at 623 .

2019See id.

2019See id.

2018See 38 U.S.C.A. § 4323 (b)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 115-223); Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (interpreting section 4323(b)(2) to mean that “for an individual to sustain an action against a state pursuant to USERRA, the action must be permitted by state law”).

2014See Leggett, 396 S.W.3d at 28 .

2012A. Statutory Construction Principles We review questions of statutory construction with the objective to “give effect to the Legislature’s intent.” City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003). “[W]e determine legislative intent from the entire act and not just from isolated portions.” State ex rel.

2009See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 373 ; Brammer v. Martinaire, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) (verified complaint relates back to the date the original complaint—an unverified questionnaire—was filed and satisfies any deficiencies). [16] Despite DPS's agreement of the jurisdictional facts as to Garza and Ralls, the majority proceeds with its own fact-finding to conclude that all the appellees failed to timely file their administrative complaints. *90 In its analysis concerning Garza, the majority concedes that a timely filed intake questionnaire may satisfy section 21

2009See Hennigan, 858 S.W.2d at 373 ; Brammer v. Martinaire, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ) (verified complaint relates back to the date the original complaint—an unverified questionnaire—was filed and satisfies any deficiencies). [16] Despite DPS's agreement of the jurisdictional facts as to Garza and Ralls, the majority proceeds with its own fact-finding to conclude that all the appellees failed to timely file their administrative complaints. *90 In its analysis concerning Garza, the majority concedes that a timely filed intake questionnaire may satisfy section 21

2008This case is very similar to Texas Department of Public Safety v. Riley , 773 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1989, no writ), in which an expunction ordered on the same day the petition was filed, and entered without prior notice to the DPS of the hearing was found to be a proceeding in direct violation of the statute.