incompatibility doctrine in Texas

2007The self-employment prong of the incompatibility doctrine, while it ultimately derives from a 1928 case, Ehlinger v. Clark , 8 S.W.2d 666 , 674 (Tex. 1928), was not recognized in Texas law until a 1975 attorney general opinion.

2007The self-employment prong of the incompatibility doctrine, while it ultimately derives from a 1928 case, Ehlinger v. Clark, 8 S.W.2d 666, 674 (Tex. 1928), was not recognized in Texas law until a 1975 attorney general opinion.

2008Op. No. DM-303 (1994) at 1 (stating that a county auditor's position on a nonprofit housing corporation — a private venture — does not implicate either article XVI , section 40 of the Texas Constitution or the common-law doctrine of incompatibility); see also Tilley v. Rogers , 405 S.W.2d 220 , 224 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (equating the meaning of "civil officer" in article XVI, section 40 with "public officer"); Tex. Att'y Gen.

2008Ope No. DM-303 (1994) at 1 (stating that a county auditor's. position on a nonprofit housing corporation-a private venture-does not implicate either article XVI, section 40 ofthe Texas Constitution or the common- law doctrine of incompatibility); see also Tilley v. Rogers, 405 S.W.2d 220, 224 (Tex. Civ..

2000Pirtle , 887 S.W.2d 921 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (en banc), the Court of Criminal Appeals "analyzed the question of whether or not the common-law doctrine of incompatibility barred an Assistant Attorney General from serving as an Assistant District Attorney," which it asserts indicates that the court in that case had accepted the argument that conflicting loyalties incompatibility could apply to the two positions.

2000The court actually said: "Assuming arguendo that the incompatibility doctrine applies to a person serving as an assistant attorney general, we fail to see how such an `office' conflicts with the position of assistant district attorney." Pirtle , 887 S.W.2d at 929 .

2018Are the two positions incompatible? [Emphases added.] And even months later, after the May 2016 election and Benson’s swearing(s)-in, when the A.G. opined that the incompatibility doctrine precluded Benson’s dual office-holding, still there was no “law” to that effect: A.G. opinions, though persuasive, are not controlling authority and are therefore not “law.” Comm’rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997); Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind, 523 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.); City of Houston v. S. Pac.

2018Are the two positions incompatible? [Emphases added.] And even months later, after the May 2016 election and Benson’s swearing(s)-in, when the A.G. opined that the incompatibility doctrine precluded Benson’s dual office-holding, still there was no “law” to that effect: A.G. opinions, though persuasive, are not controlling authority and are therefore not “law.” Comm’rs Court of Titus Cty. v. Agan, 940 S.W.2d 77, 82 (Tex. 1997); Skypark Aviation, LLC v. Lind, 523 S.W.3d 869, 874 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2017, no pet.); City of Houston v. S. Pac.