substantial-compliance standard in Ohio

2024Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] plea and determine whether he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea].” See, State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 881 N.E.2d 1224 , 2008–Ohio–509 at ¶ 19–20.

2024Under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant's] plea and determine whether he subjectively understood [the effect of his plea].” See, State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 881 N.E.2d 1224 , 2008–Ohio–509 at ¶ 19–20.

2024“A trial court, however, is required to only substantially comply with the non-constitutional notifications in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).” Id., citing Veney at ¶ 14-17. {¶21} “An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the rights he waived.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 2008- -10- Case No. 16-23-07, 16-23-08 and 16-23-09 Ohio-509, ¶ 20. “‘Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his gui

2024See Veney at ¶ 14-17. {¶9} “An appellate court reviews the substantial-compliance standard based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s plea and determines whether he subjectively understood the implications of his plea and the rights he waived.” Montgomery at ¶ 12. “‘Furthermore, a defendant who challenges his guilty plea on the basis that it was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made must show a prejudicial effect. * * * The test is whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’” Id., quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990). -4- Case No

2023This court noted that “under the substantial-compliance standard, we review the totality of circumstances surrounding [the defendant’s] plea to determine whether he subjectively understood that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio- 4415, 814 N.E.2d 51 , ¶ 12.

2016When conducting a Crim.R. 11(C)(2) plea colloquy, “the trial judge must convey accurate information to the defendant so that the defendant can understand the consequences of his or her decision and enter a valid plea.” Id. {¶ 12} “[I]f the trial judge imperfectly explained nonconstitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea, a substantial-compliance rule applies.” Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , 893 -6- N.E.2d 462 at ¶ 31, citing State v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85 , 2004-Ohio-4415 , 814 N.E.2d 51 , ¶ 12.

2025But “some compliance” with the rule with respect to postrelease control “prompts a substantial-compliance analysis and the corresponding ‘prejudice’ analysis.” Id. at ¶ 23; see, also, State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , ¶ 32, 893 N.E.2d 462 (“If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect.”).

2025But “some compliance” with the rule with respect to postrelease control “prompts a substantial-compliance analysis and the corresponding ‘prejudice’ analysis.” Id. at ¶ 23; see, also, State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , ¶ 32, 893 N.E.2d 462 (“If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect.”).

2026Errors that are excusable under the substantial- compliance standard are characterized as “minor procedural deviations.” State v. -23- Case No. 1-25-49 Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶ 34, citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Boczar, 2007- Ohio-1251. {¶51} At the suppression hearing in the instant case, admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 3 was a copy of Session 8 of the 2023 NHTSA DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety Testing manual.

2025“Errors that are excusable under the substantial-compliance standard are characterized as ‘minor procedural deviations.’” State v. Parks, 2013-Ohio-2492, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.), quoting Burnside at ¶ 34 , citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 426 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Boczar, 2007-Ohio-1251 . {¶15} The State showed by clear and convincing evidence that Trooper Church administered the HGN test in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards.

2020Taft at ¶ 18, citing McClintock v. Sweitzer, 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 (1941) (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”), Williams v. O’Neill, 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 (1944) (Hart, J., dissenting) (noting that substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election- contest statute), and Hitt at 175 (“We disagree with the result reached by the Williams v. O’Neill majority and adopt the reasoning set forth in Judge Hart’s dissen

2006See, e.g., McClintock v. Sweitzer (1941), 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 , 20 O.O. 383 , 34 N.E.2d 781 (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”); see, also, Williams v. O’Neill (1944), 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 , 27 O.O. 400 , 52 N.E.2d 858 (Hart, J., dissenting) (substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election-contest statute); Hitt, 4 Ohio St.3d at 175 , 4 OBR 453, 447 N.E.2d 1299 (“We disagree with the result reached by th

2020Taft at ¶ 18, citing McClintock v. Sweitzer, 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 (1941) (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”), Williams v. O’Neill, 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 (1944) (Hart, J., dissenting) (noting that substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election- contest statute), and Hitt at 175 (“We disagree with the result reached by the Williams v. O’Neill majority and adopt the reasoning set forth in Judge Hart’s dissen

2006See, e.g., McClintock v. Sweitzer (1941), 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 , 20 O.O. 383 , 34 N.E.2d 781 (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”); see, also, Williams v. O’Neill (1944), 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 , 27 O.O. 400 , 52 N.E.2d 858 (Hart, J., dissenting) (substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election-contest statute); Hitt, 4 Ohio St.3d at 175 , 4 OBR 453, 447 N.E.2d 1299 (“We disagree with the result reached by th

1992Accord State v. Ferguson (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 306 , 535 N.E.2d 708 .

1992Accord State v. Ferguson (1987), 41 Ohio App.3d 306 , 535 N.E.2d 708 .

2014Id. {¶11} The first four assignments of error Rembert raises on appeal regarding his guilty plea concern his nonconstitutional rights, therefore, we review them under a substantial-compliance standard.

2013State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 2008-Ohio-3748 , 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 31 (“if the trial judge imperfectly explained nonconstitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea, a substantial- compliance rule applies”); State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 91-92 , 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). {¶23} “Substantial compliance means that under the totality of the circumstances the defendant subjectively understands the implications of his plea and the rights he is waiving.” State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 , 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). “[A] defend

2015If, on the other hand, the trial judge “imperfectly explained non-constitutional rights such as the right to be informed of the maximum possible penalty and the effect of the plea, a substantial-compliance rule applies.” Id.

2001Id.

2020Taft at ¶ 18, citing McClintock v. Sweitzer, 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 (1941) (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”), Williams v. O’Neill, 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 (1944) (Hart, J., dissenting) (noting that substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election- contest statute), and Hitt at 175 (“We disagree with the result reached by the Williams v. O’Neill majority and adopt the reasoning set forth in Judge Hart’s dissen

2006See, e.g., McClintock v. Sweitzer (1941), 138 Ohio St. 324, 325 , 20 O.O. 383 , 34 N.E.2d 781 (“We hold that there was a substantial compliance with [the statutory bond requirement for election contests], and that no error prejudicial to appellee resulted”); see, also, Williams v. O’Neill (1944), 142 Ohio St. 467, 475-476 , 27 O.O. 400 , 52 N.E.2d 858 (Hart, J., dissenting) (substantial compliance, when no prejudice is shown, is sufficient to satisfy bond requirement of election-contest statute); Hitt, 4 Ohio St.3d at 175 , 4 OBR 453, 447 N.E.2d 1299 (“We disagree with the result reached by th

2026“Advisement of this consequence is nonconstitutional and reviewed under a substantial- compliance standard.” State v. Carder, 2026-Ohio-1061, ¶ 9 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Griggs, 2004-Ohio-4415 , ¶¶ 11-12.

2026(Id. at p. 14-15). {¶18} Based on Appellant’s testimony that he suffers from dissociative identity disorder, he argues “[the plea colloquy] supported a substantial-compliance challenge because the record shows an initial material misadvisement on a mandatory consequence followed by a limited correction.” (Appellant’s App., p. 5). {¶19} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525, 527 (1996).

2025See State v. Reece, 2017-Ohio-222, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.) (“And nothing in the record suggests that Michigan 1 In State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3647 , which we address more fully below, three dissenting Ohio Supreme Court justices opined that the substantial-compliance standard no longer applies in IAD cases and suggested that strict compliance is necessary.

2025See, e.g., State v. Holt, 83 Ohio App.3d 676, 681 (2d Dist. 1992); State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-5404, ¶17 (1st Dist.); State v. Yeigh, 2024-Ohio-2348, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.).1 “In order to start the 180-day period, defendants must ‘substantially comply’ with the IAD’s notice and request requirements.” State v. Denniss, 2009-Ohio-3498 , ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).

2025See, e.g., State v. Holt, 83 Ohio App.3d 676, 681 (2d Dist. 1992); State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-5404, ¶17 (1st Dist.); State v. Yeigh, 2024-Ohio-2348, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.).1 “In order to start the 180-day period, defendants must ‘substantially comply’ with the IAD’s notice and request requirements.” State v. Denniss, 2009-Ohio-3498 , ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).

2025See State v. Reece, 2017-Ohio-222, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.) (“And nothing in the record suggests that Michigan 1 In State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3647 , which we address more fully below, three dissenting Ohio Supreme Court justices opined that the substantial-compliance standard no longer applies in IAD cases and suggested that strict compliance is necessary.

2025See, e.g., State v. Holt, 83 Ohio App.3d 676, 681 (2d Dist. 1992); State v. Harris, 2024-Ohio-5404, ¶17 (1st Dist.); State v. Yeigh, 2024-Ohio-2348, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.).1 “In order to start the 180-day period, defendants must ‘substantially comply’ with the IAD’s notice and request requirements.” State v. Denniss, 2009-Ohio-3498 , ¶ 19 (6th Dist.).

2025“Errors that are excusable under the substantial-compliance standard are characterized as ‘minor procedural deviations.’” State v. Parks, 2013-Ohio-2492, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.), quoting Burnside at ¶ 34 , citing State v. Homan, 89 Ohio St.3d 421, 426 (2000), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in State v. Boczar, 2007-Ohio-1251 . {¶15} The State showed by clear and convincing evidence that Trooper Church administered the HGN test in substantial compliance with NHTSA standards.