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11 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barbier v. Barrygreen2 sentences2024Id. at 562 . 2024In Barbier v. Barry, a contract required notice of cancellation to be sent by registered mail. 345 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1961, no writ). | 3 | 3 |
First National Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp.green2 sentences2008See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex.1974) (“It is well settled that the mechanic’s and materialman’s lien statutes of this State will be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen.”). 2 Section 53.054 of the property code, which sets forth the requirements of a lien affidavit, provides: (a) The affidavit must be signed by the person claiming the lien or by another person on the claimant’s behalf and must contain substantially: (1) a sworn statement of the amount of the claim; (2) the name and last known address of t 2008See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974) (“It is well settled that the mechanic’s and materialman’s lien statutes of this State will be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen.”).2 Section 53.054 of the property code, which sets forth the requirements of a lien affidavit, provides: (a) The affidavit must be signed by the person claiming the lien or by another person on the claimant’s behalf and must contain substantially: (1) a sworn statement of the amount of the claim; (2) the name and last known address of t | 3 | 3 |
Wesco Distribution, Inc. v. Westport Group, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Wesco, 150 S.W.3d at 559 (“The purposes of notice are: (1) to give those parties entitled to notice an opportunity to protect their interests, and (2) to prevent surprise.”). 2008See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in Dallas v. Whirlpool Corp., 517 S.W.2d 262, 269 (Tex. 1974) (“It is well settled that the mechanic’s and materialman’s lien statutes of this State will be liberally construed for the purpose of protecting laborers and materialmen.”).2 Section 53.054 of the property code, which sets forth the requirements of a lien affidavit, provides: (a) The affidavit must be signed by the person claiming the lien or by another person on the claimant’s behalf and must contain substantially: (1) a sworn statement of the amount of the claim; (2) the name and last known address of t | 3 | 3 |
Ballesteros v. Nueces Countygreen2 sentences2015GOV'T CODEE § 89.004(a). 17 Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic “shall dismiss” mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, p 2011GOV'T CODE § 89.004(a). [17] Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic "shall dismiss" mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, | 2 | 2 |
Dallas County v. Coskeygreen2 sentences2015GOV'T CODEE § 89.004(a). 17 Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic “shall dismiss” mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, p 2011GOV'T CODE § 89.004(a). [17] Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic "shall dismiss" mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, | 2 | 2 |
Howlett v. Tarrant Countygreen2 sentences2015GOV'T CODEE § 89.004(a). 17 Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic “shall dismiss” mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, p 2011GOV'T CODE § 89.004(a). [17] Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic "shall dismiss" mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, | 2 | 2 |
Dallas County v. Autrygreen2 sentences2015GOV'T CODEE § 89.004(a). 17 Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic “shall dismiss” mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, p 2011GOV'T CODE § 89.004(a). [17] Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic "shall dismiss" mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, | 2 | 2 |
Wentworth v. Medellingreen2 sentences2009See generally Wentworth v. Medellin, 529 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ) (‘“Substantial compliance’ means compliance with the essential requirements, whether of a contract or of a statute.”). 2009See generally Wentworth v. Medellin , 529 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. Civ. | 2 | 2 |
Emerald Forest Utility District v. Simonsen Construction Co.green2 sentences2022The Court can hold that the substantial-compliance doctrine applies to construction contracts generally and notice provisions in 27 679 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Id. at 54 . 29 309 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1958). 30 Id. at 66 . 31 Id. 11 particular and carve out a single exception for the form of notice. 2022The Court can hold that the substantial-compliance doctrine applies to construction contracts generally and notice provisions in 27 679 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Id. at 54 . 29 309 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1958). 30 Id. at 66 . 31 Id. 11 particular and carve out a single exception for the form of notice. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas Utilities Electric Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 794 . 3. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Garcia v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2022Further, the Circuit held that “Dresser’s 13 Id. at 24 . 14 575 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2009) (opinion by Haynes, J., joined by Jones, C.J., and Higginbotham, J.). 15 Id. at 506 . 16 Id. 8 arguments are contrary to well-established Texas law, recognizing the applicability of the doctrine of substantial compliance to contractual notice provisions.”17 Dresser knew that the Co-op was consulting with experts, even though the Co-op did not give Dresser written notice that the experts would repair the turbine at Dresser’s expense. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
South Texas Electric Cooperative v. Dresser-Rand Co.
green
2 sentences2022Further, the Circuit held that “Dresser’s 13 Id. at 24 . 14 575 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2009) (opinion by Haynes, J., joined by Jones, C.J., and Higginbotham, J.). 15 Id. at 506 . 16 Id. 8 arguments are contrary to well-established Texas law, recognizing the applicability of the doctrine of substantial compliance to contractual notice provisions.”17 Dresser knew that the Co-op was consulting with experts, even though the Co-op did not give Dresser written notice that the experts would repair the turbine at Dresser’s expense. 2022Further, the Circuit held that “Dresser’s 13 Id. at 24 . 14 575 F.3d 504 (5th Cir. 2009) (opinion by Haynes, J., joined by Jones, C.J., and Higginbotham, J.). 15 Id. at 506 . 16 Id. 8 arguments are contrary to well-established Texas law, recognizing the applicability of the doctrine of substantial compliance to contractual notice provisions.”17 Dresser knew that the Co-op was consulting with experts, even though the Co-op did not give Dresser written notice that the experts would repair the turbine at Dresser’s expense. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Shaller v. Commercial Standard Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2022The Court can hold that the substantial-compliance doctrine applies to construction contracts generally and notice provisions in 27 679 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Id. at 54 . 29 309 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1958). 30 Id. at 66 . 31 Id. 11 particular and carve out a single exception for the form of notice. 2022The Court can hold that the substantial-compliance doctrine applies to construction contracts generally and notice provisions in 27 679 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 28 Id. at 54 . 29 309 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1958). 30 Id. at 66 . 31 Id. 11 particular and carve out a single exception for the form of notice. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Roccaforte v. Jefferson County
green
1 sentence2011GOV'T CODE § 89.004(a). [17] Another point: As the Court notes, some courts of appeals have concluded that a substantial-compliance exception lies hidden within Section 89.0041, notwithstanding the statute's emphatic "shall dismiss" mandate. 341 S.W.3d at 928 (citing Howlett v. Tarrant Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 840, 847 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (holding that substantial compliance with Section 89.0041 was sufficient because the purpose of the statute was to ensure notice, and that purpose was accomplished); Ballesteros v. Nueces Cnty., 286 S.W.3d 566, 570 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2009, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.