discretionary power rule in California

2001Proc., supra, foll. § 389, p. 222.) The Supreme Court has warned that courts must “ ‘be careful to avoid converting [section 389 from] a discretionary power or a rule of fairness . . . into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice.’ [Citation.]” (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 793 , quoting Bank of California v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516, 521 [ 106 P.2d 879 ].) Before examining these factors, we turn to defendants’ argument that the trial court’s decision is supported by established precedent

2001Proc., supra, foll. § 389, p. 222.) The Supreme Court has warned that courts must “ ‘be careful to avoid converting [section 389 from] a discretionary power or a rule of fairness . . . into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice.’ [Citation.]” (Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th at p. 793 , quoting Bank of California v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516, 521 [ 106 P.2d 879 ].) Before examining these factors, we turn to defendants’ argument that the trial court’s decision is supported by established precedent

1997We first note the language of subdivision (b), section 389, refers to a determination “in equity and good conscience.” “[T]he decision whether to proceed with the action in the absence of a particular party is one within the court’s discretion, as governed by the various factors enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 389, Code of Civil Procedure.” (Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 500 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], italics added; see also Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 753 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 ] [“in dealing with the doctrine of indispensa

1997The Supreme Court provided guidance in this regard when it cautioned against the common blunder of finding any necessary party as indispensable and observed that ‘. . .we should ... be careful to avoid converting a discretionary power or a rule of fairness in procedure into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice.’ (Bank of California v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516 , 521 . . . ; see Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 368-369 . . . .)” (Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo,

2024Courts must be careful to avoid converting a discretionary power or rule of fairness into an arbitrary and 22 burdensome requirement that may thwart rather than further justice.” (County of Imperial v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 13, 26 .) “In the CEQA context, ‘[t]he public has a right to insist on the adequacy of the environmental document upon which the agency makes its decision,’ and courts should avoid thwarting this purpose through the harsh application of indispensable party rules.” (Ibid.) On the record before us, it does not appear that the trial court adequately considered

2010Courts must be careful to avoid converting a discretionary power or rule of fairness into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement that may thwart rather than further justice.” (County of Imperial v. Superior Court, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at p. 26.) For example, where existing and absent parties’ interests are sufficiently aligned such that the absent party’s rights will not be affected or impaired by the judgment or proceeding, the absent party need not be joined.

1976Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 241 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 398 P.2d 147 ].) In the instant case it is quite clear that no governmental interest has lacked for able and willing advocates in the absence of the Legislature and Governor as parties.

1976Donnelley Corp. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 239, 241 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 107 , 398 P.2d 147 ].) In the instant case it is quite clear that no governmental interest has lacked for able and willing advocates in the absence of the Legislature and Governor as parties.

2021(See County of San Joaquin v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1144, 1151 , quoting Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 753 , italics omitted [“‘in dealing with the doctrine of indispensable . . . parties “we should . . . be careful to avoid converting a discretionary power or a rule of fairness in procedure into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice”’”].) SDC also asserts these parties must be included in any quiet title judgment that results from this case.

1997We first note the language of subdivision (b), section 389, refers to a determination “in equity and good conscience.” “[T]he decision whether to proceed with the action in the absence of a particular party is one within the court’s discretion, as governed by the various factors enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 389, Code of Civil Procedure.” (Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 500 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], italics added; see also Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 753 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 ] [“in dealing with the doctrine of indispensa

2025Proc., § 389, subd. (b).) Those factors “ ‘are not arranged in a hierarchical order, and no factor is determinative or necessarily more important than another.’ ” (Save Berkeley’s Neighborhoods, supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 721, citation omitted.) The statute thus “calls upon the trial court to weigh practical realities and other considerations in determining whether a person is necessary or indispensable.” (Pinto Lake, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 1014, citing Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential Insurance Company of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1173 .) The California Supreme Cour

2007Lungren v. Community Redevelopment Agency (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 868, 876 , 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 786 .) In the CEQA context, "[t]he public has a right to insist on the adequacy of the environmental document upon which the agency makes its decision," and courts should avoid thwarting this purpose through the harsh application of indispensable party rules. ( Deltakeeper, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109 , 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 244 .) Deltakeeper The County asserts the facts before us harken back to our previous decision in Deltakeeper .

2014(See Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 , 247 P.3d 542 ].) This was exactly the context in which the Supreme Court made the remarks quoted in Facebook: The question was whether a statutorily conferred power to decree a sale was mandatory or discretionary, and in adopting the latter reading the court relied in part on the statute’s use of “may” where a predecessor statute had used “shall.” *902 (Facebook, supra, 923 F.Supp.3d at p. 1206, fn. 7, quoting United S

2014(See Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 , 247 P.3d 542 ].) This was exactly the context in which the Supreme Court made the remarks quoted in Facebook: The question was whether a statutorily conferred power to decree a sale was mandatory or discretionary, and in adopting the latter reading the court relied in part on the statute’s use of “may” where a predecessor statute had used “shall.” *902 (Facebook, supra, 923 F.Supp.3d at p. 1206, fn. 7, quoting United S

2014(See Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 , 247 P.3d 542 ].) This was exactly the context in which the Supreme Court made the remarks quoted in Facebook: The question was whether a statutorily conferred power to decree a sale was mandatory or discretionary, and in adopting the latter reading the court relied in part on the statute’s use of “may” where a predecessor statute had used “shall.” *902 (Facebook, supra, 923 F.Supp.3d at p. 1206, fn. 7, quoting United S

2014(See Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325 ]; Tarrant Bell Property, LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 [ 121 Cal.Rptr.3d 312 , 247 P.3d 542 ].) This was exactly the context in which the Supreme Court made the remarks quoted in Facebook: The question was whether a statutorily conferred power to decree a sale was mandatory or discretionary, and in adopting the latter reading the court relied in part on the statute’s use of “may” where a predecessor statute had used “shall.” *902 (Facebook, supra, 923 F.Supp.3d at p. 1206, fn. 7, quoting United S

2014(See Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1192, 1197 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 ] (Redevelopment Agency) [the State of California’s Department of Finance was an indispensable party and a proper real party in interest in proceedings, by a city’s redevelopment agency against the Commission on State Mandates, challenging the commission’s ruling that the agency was not entitled to reimbursement for housing costs the agency had incurred].) They claim that the need for the CDE was “demonstrated by the fact that the [ojrder prematurely terminated the revocation a

2014(See Redevelopment Agency v. Commission on State Mandates (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1188, 1192, 1197 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 100 ] (Redevelopment Agency) [the State of California’s Department of Finance was an indispensable party and a proper real party in interest in proceedings, by a city’s redevelopment agency against the Commission on State Mandates, challenging the commission’s ruling that the agency was not entitled to reimbursement for housing costs the agency had incurred].) They claim that the need for the CDE was “demonstrated by the fact that the [ojrder prematurely terminated the revocation a

2014(See Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 ; Tarrant Bell Property LLC v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 538, 542 .) This was exactly the context in which the Supreme Court made the remarks quoted in Facebook: The question was whether a statutorily conferred power to decree a sale was mandatory or discretionary, and in adopting the latter reading the court relied in part on the statute’s use of “may” where a predecessor statute had used “shall.” (United States v. Rodgers, supra, 461 U.S. at p. 706 , quoted in Facebook, supra, 923 F.Supp.2d at p. 1206, fn. 7 .) States v. Int’l

1997The Supreme Court provided guidance in this regard when it cautioned against the common blunder of finding any necessary party as indispensable and observed that ‘. . .we should ... be careful to avoid converting a discretionary power or a rule of fairness in procedure into an arbitrary and burdensome requirement which may thwart rather than accomplish justice.’ (Bank of California v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Cal.2d 516 , 521 . . . ; see Kraus v. Willow Park Public Golf Course (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 354, 368-369 . . . .)” (Citizens Assn. for Sensible Development of Bishop Area v. County of Inyo,

1997We first note the language of subdivision (b), section 389, refers to a determination “in equity and good conscience.” “[T]he decision whether to proceed with the action in the absence of a particular party is one within the court’s discretion, as governed by the various factors enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 389, Code of Civil Procedure.” (Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 500 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], italics added; see also Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 753 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 ] [“in dealing with the doctrine of indispensa

1997We first note the language of subdivision (b), section 389, refers to a determination “in equity and good conscience.” “[T]he decision whether to proceed with the action in the absence of a particular party is one within the court’s discretion, as governed by the various factors enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 389, Code of Civil Procedure.” (Sierra Club, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 495, 500 [ 157 Cal.Rptr. 190 ], italics added; see also Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18 Cal.3d 728, 753 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 ] [“in dealing with the doctrine of indispensa