Monell claim in California

2021The complaint alleged seven causes of action, as follows: • First cause of action for violation of civil rights under section 1983, brought by the Mekikyans against all defendants except the State of California and OC, alleging that defendants conspired to create, cause, encourage or seek unlawful investigations and prosecutions by district attorney offices, and unlawful investigations and administrative prosecutions by DLSE. • Second cause of action for violation of civil rights under section 1983, brought by the Mekikyans against OC (a Monell claim),9 alleging that OC and its district attorn

2021The complaint alleged seven causes of action, as follows: • First cause of action for violation of civil rights under section 1983, brought by the Mekikyans against all defendants except the State of California and OC, alleging that defendants conspired to create, cause, encourage or seek unlawful investigations and prosecutions by district attorney offices, and unlawful investigations and administrative prosecutions by DLSE. • Second cause of action for violation of civil rights under section 1983, brought by the Mekikyans against OC (a Monell claim),9 alleging that OC and its district attorn

2023In sum, to state a Monell claim, “[t]he plaintiff must establish that[:] (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the government entity had a policy; (3) this policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” (Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 94, 105-106 .) As our division has explained, to establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must identify a policy (or practice), attribute it to the city, and show a link between the policy and a constitutional

2023In sum, to state a Monell claim, “[t]he plaintiff must establish that[:] (1) the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the government entity had a policy; (3) this policy amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” (Perry v. County of Fresno (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 94, 105-106 .) As our division has explained, to establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must identify a policy (or practice), attribute it to the city, and show a link between the policy and a constitutional

2018F. Leave To Amend "`Where the complaint is defective, "[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]"' [Citations.] This abuse of discretion is reviewable on appeal `even in the absence of a request for leave to amend' [citation], and even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaini

2018F. Leave To Amend "`Where the complaint is defective, "[i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his complaint, and it ordinarily constitutes an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment. [Citations.]"' [Citations.] This abuse of discretion is reviewable on appeal `even in the absence of a request for leave to amend' [citation], and even if the plaintiff does not claim on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in sustaini

2023Rather, a city can be liable only “when execution of a government policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” (Id. at p. 694; Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 349 .) Thus, a Monell claim arises from either “an express government policy” or “a custom or practice so widespread in usage as to constitute the functional equivalent of an express policy.” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 328 ; City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 389 [“a municipality can be liable under § 15 1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutio

2023Rather, a city can be liable only “when execution of a government policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” (Id. at p. 694; Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 349 .) Thus, a Monell claim arises from either “an express government policy” or “a custom or practice so widespread in usage as to constitute the functional equivalent of an express policy.” (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 312, 328 ; City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris (1989) 489 U.S. 378, 389 [“a municipality can be liable under § 15 1983 only where its policies are the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutio

2023(Id. at p. 1064.) As appellants argued to the trial court, the “critical point” is that “the Monell claim is necessarily based and arises out of a municipality’s policies and regulations.” They argued that the City had the “unwritten policy . . . to treat religiously affiliated schools differently than non-religiously affiliated schools.” They stated in their opposition to the City’s anti-SLAPP motion that their Monell claim “arise[s] from City’s selective enforcement of the Resolution, and not from [] Burnett or any City employee’s protected activity.” At the hearing on the motion, they empha

2023(Id. at p. 1064.) As appellants argued to the trial court, the “critical point” is that “the Monell claim is necessarily based and arises out of a municipality’s policies and regulations.” They argued that the City had the “unwritten policy . . . to treat religiously affiliated schools differently than non-religiously affiliated schools.” They stated in their opposition to the City’s anti-SLAPP motion that their Monell claim “arise[s] from City’s selective enforcement of the Resolution, and not from [] Burnett or any City employee’s protected activity.” At the hearing on the motion, they empha

2014(Kelly v. City of Oakland, supra, at p. 785 .) The Ninth Circuit stated: “A defendant in a civil action cannot wait until the last brief before the district court to present a defense which, if properly placed in issue, would have affected the course of the jury trial.” (Ibid.) This suggests that the issue could have been raised at that late date if it would not have affected the course of the trial—a principle consistent with the California authorities cited above.

2014(Kelly v. City of Oakland, supra, at p. 785 .) The Ninth Circuit stated: “A defendant in a civil action cannot wait until the last brief before the district court to present a defense which, if properly placed in issue, would have affected the course of the jury trial.” (Ibid.) This suggests that the issue could have been raised at that late date if it would not have affected the course of the trial—a principle consistent with the California authorities cited above.

2025Hernandez v. County of Tulare (9th Cir. 2012) 666 F.3d 631, 637 .) The trial court concluded that the lawsuit did not concern a matter of public concern and failed to set forth sufficient allegations concerning the County’s policies to hold the County liable under the Monell doctrine.8 We focus on the court’s conclusion that the second amended complaint failed to allege a County policy or custom of retaliation. a.

2025Hernandez v. County of Tulare (9th Cir. 2012) 666 F.3d 631, 637 .) The trial court concluded that the lawsuit did not concern a matter of public concern and failed to set forth sufficient allegations concerning the County’s policies to hold the County liable under the Monell doctrine.8 We focus on the court’s conclusion that the second amended complaint failed to allege a County policy or custom of retaliation. a.

2025(Estate of Osuna v. County of Stanislaus (E.D.Cal. 2019) 392 F.Supp.3d 1162, 1174 .) However, liability for a custom or practice claim under section 1983 of title 42 of the United States Code “may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents.” (Trevino, supra, 99 F.3d at p. 918.) “ ‘Although ‘[i]t is difficult to discern from the caselaw the quantum of allegations needed to survive a motion to dismiss a pattern and practice claim,’ [citation], ‘where more than a few incidents are alleged, the determination appears to require a fully-developed factual record.’ [Citation.]” (Estate of Osu

2025(Meehan v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 102 , 107 [two unconstitutional acts by county officials occurring three months apart not sufficient to show a custom or practice]; Oyenik v. Corizon Health Incorporated (9th Cir. 2017) 696 Fed.Appx. 792 , 20 794 [“one or two incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy”]; cf. Mitchell v. County of Contra Costa (N.D.Cal. 2022) 600 F.Supp.3d 1018 , 1029–1030 [Monell claim adequately pleaded where complaint alleged 15 lawsuits against county involving constitutional violations similar to those plaintiff asserted].) In additi

2025(Meehan v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1988) 856 F.2d 102 , 107 [two unconstitutional acts by county officials occurring three months apart not sufficient to show a custom or practice]; Oyenik v. Corizon Health Incorporated (9th Cir. 2017) 696 Fed.Appx. 792 , 20 794 [“one or two incidents are insufficient to establish a custom or policy”]; cf. Mitchell v. County of Contra Costa (N.D.Cal. 2022) 600 F.Supp.3d 1018 , 1029–1030 [Monell claim adequately pleaded where complaint alleged 15 lawsuits against county involving constitutional violations similar to those plaintiff asserted].) In additi

2024(Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 ; see also Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 350 [“The availability of immunity from liability under section 1983 in state court is governed by federal, not state law”].) Yet if a plaintiff does not suffer an underlying constitutional deprivation by a deputy or officer of a government entity, the plaintiff’s Monell claim automatically fails.

2024(Arce v. Childrens Hospital Los Angeles (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1455, 1485 ; see also Pitts v. County of Kern (1998) 17 Cal.4th 340, 350 [“The availability of immunity from liability under section 1983 in state court is governed by federal, not state law”].) Yet if a plaintiff does not suffer an underlying constitutional deprivation by a deputy or officer of a government entity, the plaintiff’s Monell claim automatically fails.

2023Pickens’s allegations also do not satisfy California pleading standards: “An appellate court’s ‘ “only task in reviewing a ruling on a demurrer is to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action.” ’ [Citations.] The reviewing court assumes the truth of allegations in the complaint which have been properly pleaded and gives it a reasonable interpretation by reading it as a whole and with all its parts in their context. [Citations.] However, the assumption of truth does not apply to contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law and fact.” (Gentry v. eBay, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th

2023Appellants clarified that this is their position in their reply brief and at oral argument. 14 To determine whether a plaintiff’s claim arises from protected activity for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion’s first prong, we “consider the elements of the challenged claim and what actions by defendant supply those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1063 .) Our Supreme Court has cautioned that these actions “that form the basis for a claim” differ from “those that merely lead to the liability-creating activity or provide evidentiary support for th

2022Section 1983 claim based on violation of due process right to disclosure of favorable evidence “The prosecution has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause to disclose evidence to a criminal defendant . . . [¶] . . . [that is] both favorable to the defendant and material on either guilt or punishment. [Citation.]” (In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544 , fn. omitted; see also Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 (Brady).) “In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held ‘that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request viol

2022(Evans, supra, 38 Cal.4th at 6 .) 18 action pursuant to that policy caused a violation of that constitutional right.” (Zuniga v. Housing Authority (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 82, 103-104 (Zuniga).) Because we conclude plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged they were deprived of a constitutional right, their associated Monell claim also fails. 3.

2018To establish Monell liability, "`a plaintiff must "identify the challenged policy, [practice, or custom,] attribute it to the [county] itself, and show a causal link between the execution of the policy, [practice, or custom,] and the injury suffered."' [Citation.] In addition, plaintiffs must `present scienter-like evidence of indifference on the part of a particular policymaker or policymakers.' [Citation.] The requirement of producing scienter-like evidence on the part of an official with policymaking authority is consistent with the conclusion that *283 `absent the conscious decision or del