tort of another doctrine in California

2015Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620-621 (Prentice); Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 78-79 (Gorman).) Under that doctrine, "[a] person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney[] fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred." ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) 44 However, an award of attorney fees may not be imposed under the tort of another doctrine against a def

2015Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620-621 (Prentice); Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 78-79 (Gorman).) Under that doctrine, "[a] person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney[] fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred." ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) 44 However, an award of attorney fees may not be imposed under the tort of another doctrine against a def

2026The tort of 15 another doctrine does not apply to these facts.” (Id. at p. 1044; see id. at pp. 1045-1046.) Finally, defendants also point to Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305 , which stated “the theory” of recovery under the tort of another doctrine “is that the attorney fees are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of the damages in a personal injury action” and, like Third Eye Blind, stated that in such cases “there is no recovery of attorney fees qua attorney fees.” (Sooy, at p. 1310.) In addition to these cases, our own resear

2022(Sooy, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1312 ; see Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , 818−820.) Thus, even if the court’s June 2013 finding of reasonableness as to the fees the Law Corporation incurred to enforce its retainer agreement with Dougherty was not nullified in Karton II, the finding has no bearing on the issue of the Law Corporation’s alleged attorney fees as damages under the tort of another doctrine.

2026Co. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 408, 412 , disapproved on other grounds in Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , 816-820 & 820, fn. 8.) We noted that the tort of another doctrine “arguably would support a recovery from [the salesman] for the attorney fees incurred in [plaintiffs’] defense of the foreclosure proceeding,” but would not support recovery of “fees incurred in the ordinary two-party action” in which plaintiffs had sued the salesman for fraud.

2022(Sooy, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 1312 ; see Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813 , 818−820.) Thus, even if the court’s June 2013 finding of reasonableness as to the fees the Law Corporation incurred to enforce its retainer agreement with Dougherty was not nullified in Karton II, the finding has no bearing on the issue of the Law Corporation’s alleged attorney fees as damages under the tort of another doctrine.

2026(See Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 80 [“The tort of another doctrine does not allow a party to recover the fees and costs involved in litigating directly with a negligent defendant”]; David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“Prentice made clear that Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 ‘prohibits the allowance of attorney fees against a defendant in an ordinary two-party lawsuit’ [citing Prentice.] The courts have refrained from expanding the [tort of another] rule in a way that would undermine the general rule that a party bears his own attorney fe

2015Corp. (1963) 59 Cal.2d 618, 620-621 (Prentice); Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 78-79 (Gorman).) Under that doctrine, "[a] person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary loss of time, attorney[] fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred." ( Prentice, supra, at p. 620 .) 44 However, an award of attorney fees may not be imposed under the tort of another doctrine against a def

2026(See Gorman v. Tassajara Development Corp. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 44, 80 [“The tort of another doctrine does not allow a party to recover the fees and costs involved in litigating directly with a negligent defendant”]; David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“Prentice made clear that Code of Civil Procedure section 1021 ‘prohibits the allowance of attorney fees against a defendant in an ordinary two-party lawsuit’ [citing Prentice.] The courts have refrained from expanding the [tort of another] rule in a way that would undermine the general rule that a party bears his own attorney fe

2013If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 7, fn. omitted; see also David v. Hermann (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 672, 689 [“The courts have refrained from expanding the rule in a way that would undermine the general rule that a party bears his own attorney fees”].) Accordingly, the tort of another doctrine has not been extended to enable a defendant to recover fees and expenses incurred in defending against allegations of his or her own wrongdoing.

2025Tortious interference Orion also contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer for the cause of action Orion titled “tortious interference.” “California has traditionally recognized two economic relations torts: interference with the performance of a contract [citation] and interference with a prospective economic relationship.” (Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, 1140-1141 (Ixchel Pharma).) Orion’s complaint 9 Celestron cites David S. Karton, a Law Corp. v. Musick, Peeler Garrett LLP (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027 , 1044 for the proposition that “attorney fees a

2025Tortious interference Orion also contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer for the cause of action Orion titled “tortious interference.” “California has traditionally recognized two economic relations torts: interference with the performance of a contract [citation] and interference with a prospective economic relationship.” (Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1130, 1140-1141 (Ixchel Pharma).) Orion’s complaint 9 Celestron cites David S. Karton, a Law Corp. v. Musick, Peeler Garrett LLP (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027 , 1044 for the proposition that “attorney fees a

2022In Karton II, however, we reversed that ruling without qualification (Karton II, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 614 ), and, therefore, the court’s ruling retained no further “vitality or force.” (Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655 ; see Odlum v. Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564 [“the reversal of a judgment or order ordinarily leaves the proceeding in the same situation in which it stood before the judgment or order was made”].) Even if the trial court’s finding of reasonableness survived our disposition in Karton II, that finding has no relevance on the question whether the fees

2022In Karton II, however, we reversed that ruling without qualification (Karton II, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at p. 614 ), and, therefore, the court’s ruling retained no further “vitality or force.” (Hampton v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 652, 655 ; see Odlum v. Duffy (1950) 35 Cal.2d 562, 564 [“the reversal of a judgment or order ordinarily leaves the proceeding in the same situation in which it stood before the judgment or order was made”].) Even if the trial court’s finding of reasonableness survived our disposition in Karton II, that finding has no relevance on the question whether the fees

2022Under that doctrine, a “person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary 22 loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” (Prentice, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 620 , italics added; see Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 (Sooy) [the “theory of recovery is that the attorney fees are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of th

2022Under that doctrine, a “person who through the tort of another has been required to act in the protection of his interests by bringing or defending an action against a third person is entitled to recover compensation for the reasonably necessary 22 loss of time, attorney’s fees, and other expenditures thereby suffered or incurred.” (Prentice, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 620 , italics added; see Sooy v. Peter (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1305, 1310 (Sooy) [the “theory of recovery is that the attorney fees are recoverable as damages resulting from a tort in the same way that medical fees would be part of th

2026(Id. at pp. 504-507.) However, the high court agreed the plaintiff was entitled to recover the attorney fees he incurred in the unsuccessful specific-performance action against the sellers under the tort of another doctrine, reasoning that “[i]f [the broker] had not first falsely notified plaintiff that his offer had been accepted . . . plaintiff would not have incurred attorney fees in seeking to obtain the property in a suit for specific performance against the sellers,” and thus the broker’s misrepresentation was “the direct cause of plaintiff’s action for specific performance against the s

2021The claim that Mai made here—that she was forced to procure the services of an attorney to defend herself in the Fike suit as a result of Robinson’s fraud—falls into one of these limited categories known as the “tort of another” theory.2 While such doctrines are sometimes described as exceptions to the general “American rule” that each party pays for their own attorney’s fees (see, e.g., Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984) 35 Cal.3d 498, 505 ; Flyer’s Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor 2 The tort of another doctrine allows for the recovery of attorney’s fees as damages when a plai

2026Servs., LLC (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1311 (Third Eye Blind), in which this court again observed the tort of another doctrine allows recovery as damages 6 We also relied on our earlier decision determining that fees are not recoverable under the statute providing reimbursement of real estate fraud victims.

2014The trial court awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs against Motz under the tort of another doctrine citing Third Eye Blind, supra, 127 Cal.App.4th 1311 .

2022(See Navellier v. Sletten, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 94 [sufficiency of claims “‘is an issue which the [party asserting the claims] must raise and support in the context of the discharge of [its] [second-step] burden to provide a prima facie showing of the merits of [its] case.’” (Italics omitted.)].) 11 The cross-complaint also included allegations not based on Stacie’s complaint, including that “while being fully aware of the sale and intending to profit from it, Stacie and Barnes actively encouraged Thomas to sign the sale-related documents.” 17 71, 87, fn. 9, citing Prentice v. North America

2015(See Prentice, supra, 59 Cal.2d at p. 621 [fees must be proximate consequence of defendant’s negligence]; see generally Brewer v. Teano (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1030 [“Causation in the law of negligence is not determined by a 19 linear projection from a ‘but for’ premise.

2015On summary judgment, however, it was Santa Fe’s burden to conclusively negate these elements of East LA Health’s cause of action—that is, to prove that any violations that may have existed in 1991 no longer exist—or to show that East LA Health “has not established, and cannot reasonably expect to establish, a prima facie case of causation [and injury].” (Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 768 ; accord, Ennabe v. Manosa 8 In light of our conclusion that, even if successful on the merits of its claims for fraud or negligent misrepresentation, East LA Health is not entitled to

2014(See Sixta v. Ochsner (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 485, 491 [cross- complainant vendee could recover attorney fees incurred in defense of subsequent purchaser's action due to cross-defendant vendor's negligent misrepresentation that improvements were located on real property sold by vendor to vendee].) Further, we are aware of no case law, and the Mortzazavis have cited none, holding that a party may recover damages pursuant to the doctrine of tort of another in the absence of proof of an underlying tort or an indemnity cause of action. 16 IV.