24 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brown v. Kroger Co.green2 sentences2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). 2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). | 4 | 4 |
Jefferson v. Rossgreen2 sentences2013On appeal, GDHS argues that a line of cases originating from Jefferson v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817 ( 301 SE2d 268 ) (1983), setting forth an exception to the five-year rule, should apply here because the parties had reached a final settlement of the case and all that remained was the formal entry of the consent order memorializing the settlement. 2013On appeal, GDHS argues that a line of cases originating from Jefferson v. Ross, 250 Ga. 817 ( 301 SE2d 268 ) (1983), setting forth an exception to the five-year rule, should apply here because the parties had reached a final settlement of the case and all that remained was the formal entry of the consent order memorializing the settlement. | 3 | 6 |
Zepp v. Brannengreen2 sentences2025It is reasonable in part, because it furthers the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and [of] protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.”10 But this Court has consistently held that the five-year rule does not apply to cases that have been resolved.11 Thus, here, where the probate court entered orders affording the 9 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008), citing Lewis v. Price, 104 Ga. App. 473, 476 (2) ( 122 SE2d 129 ) (1961). 2025It is reasonable in part, because it furthers the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and [of] protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.”10 But this Court has consistently held that the five-year rule does not apply to cases that have been resolved.11 Thus, here, where the probate court entered orders affording the 9 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008), citing Lewis v. Price, 104 Ga. App. 473, 476 (2) ( 122 SE2d 129 ) (1961). | 3 | 3 |
Lewis v. Pricegreen2 sentences2025It is reasonable in part, because it furthers the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and [of] protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.”10 But this Court has consistently held that the five-year rule does not apply to cases that have been resolved.11 Thus, here, where the probate court entered orders affording the 9 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008), citing Lewis v. Price, 104 Ga. App. 473, 476 (2) ( 122 SE2d 129 ) (1961). 2025It is reasonable in part, because it furthers the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and [of] protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.”10 But this Court has consistently held that the five-year rule does not apply to cases that have been resolved.11 Thus, here, where the probate court entered orders affording the 9 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Zepp v. Brannen, 283 Ga. 395, 396 ( 658 SE2d 567 ) (2008), citing Lewis v. Price, 104 Ga. App. 473, 476 (2) ( 122 SE2d 129 ) (1961). | 2 | 2 |
Ogundele v. Camelot Club Condominium Ass'ngreen2 sentences2015The five-year rule “places upon a plaintiff who wishes to avoid an automatic dismissal of his case by operation of law a duty to obtain a written order of continuance or other written order at some time during a five [-] year period and to make sure the same is entered in the record.” Ogundele v. Camelot Club Condominium Assn., 268 Ga. App. 400, 402 (2) ( 602 SE2d 138 ) (2004) (citations and punctuation omitted). 2015The five-year rule “places upon a plaintiff who wishes to avoid an automatic dismissal of his case by operation of law a duty to obtain a written order of continuance or other written order at some time during a five [-] year period and to make sure the same is entered in the record.” Ogundele v. Camelot Club Condominium Assn., 268 Ga. App. 400, 402 (2) ( 602 SE2d 138 ) (2004) (citations and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Perrygreen2 sentences1996Co. v. Perry, 168 Ga. App. 387, 388 ( 308 SE2d 848 ). 1996Co. v. Perry, 168 Ga. App. 387, 388 ( 308 SE2d 848 ). | 2 | 2 |
Freeman v. Ehlersgreen2 sentences2025See also Freeman v. Ehlers, 108 Ga. App. 640 ( 134 SE2d 530 ) (1963) (“[The five year rule’s] purpose is to prevent the cluttering of court records with unresolved and inactive litigation.”). 10 (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Med. 2025See also Freeman v. Ehlers, 108 Ga. App. 640 ( 134 SE2d 530 ) (1963) (“[The five year rule’s] purpose is to prevent the cluttering of court records with unresolved and inactive litigation.”). 10 (Punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Med. | 1 | 1 |
Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C.green2 sentences2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). 2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
WOODEHAVEN TOWNEHOMES, INC. v. Ferdinandgreen2 sentences2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). 2025See also Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 68 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004); Lewis, 104 Ga. App. at 476 (2). 11 See, e.g., Woodehaven Townehomes, Inc. v. Ferdinand, 296 Ga. App. 325, 326 (1), n. 3 ( 674 SE2d 384 ) (2009) (“The five-year rule applies to cases awaiting disposition, not to cases already adjudicated by verdict or judgment.”) (punctuation omitted), quoting Lott v. Arrington & Hollowell, P.C., 258 Ga. App. 51, 55 (2) (b) ( 572 SE2d 664 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Department of Medical Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Centergreen2 sentences2025Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Center, 265 Ga. 638, 640 (1) ( 458 SE2d 635 ) (1995). 2025Assistance v. Columbia Convalescent Center, 265 Ga. 638, 640 (1) ( 458 SE2d 635 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Garibay v. Terrygreen2 sentences2021The five-year rule embodied in OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) has “the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Garibay v. Terry, 299 Ga. 701, 702 ( 791 SE2d 806 ) (2016). 2021The five-year rule embodied in OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) has “the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and protecting litigants from dilatory counsel.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Garibay v. Terry, 299 Ga. 701, 702 ( 791 SE2d 806 ) (2016). | 1 | 1 |
Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2015See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga. App. 489, 489-490 ( 731 SE2d 378 ) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds by O’Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 369 (5) ( 750 SE2d 689 ) (2013). *403 2. 2015See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga. App. 489, 489-490 ( 731 SE2d 378 ) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds by O’Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 369 (5) ( 750 SE2d 689 ) (2013). *403 2. | 1 | 1 |
O'Dell v. Mahoneygreen2 sentences2015See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga. App. 489, 489-490 ( 731 SE2d 378 ) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds by O’Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 369 (5) ( 750 SE2d 689 ) (2013). *403 2. 2015See Jinks v. Eastman Enterprises, 317 Ga. App. 489, 489-490 ( 731 SE2d 378 ) (2012), overruled in part on other grounds by O’Dell v. Mahoney, 324 Ga. App. 360, 369 (5) ( 750 SE2d 689 ) (2013). *403 2. | 1 | 1 |
Windsor v. City of Atlantagreen2 sentences2015“Whatever the merits [of the underlying case], if for five years there is no written order signed by the trial judge and properly entered in the trial court’s records, the case is dismissed by operation of law.” Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 337 ( 695 SE2d 576 ) (2010). 2015“Whatever the merits [of the underlying case], if for five years there is no written order signed by the trial judge and properly entered in the trial court’s records, the case is dismissed by operation of law.” Windsor v. City of Atlanta, 287 Ga. 334, 337 ( 695 SE2d 576 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Spivey v. Hembreegreen2 sentences2012Barnes, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur. 1 That the costs were not paid is undisputed. 2 The trial court noted that it was incorporating this order by reference into the order that is at issue in the present case, and took judicial notice of the dockets of all four cases. 3 We granted the application under the authority of Spivey v. Hembree, 268 Ga. App. 485, 486, n. 1 ( 602 SE2d 246 ) (2004), which provides that “[t]his Court will grant a timely application for interlocutory review if the order complained of is subject to direct appeal and the applicants have not otherwise filed a notice of 2012Barnes, P. J., and Blackwell, J., concur. 1 That the costs were not paid is undisputed. 2 The trial court noted that it was incorporating this order by reference into the order that is at issue in the present case, and took judicial notice of the dockets of all four cases. 3 We granted the application under the authority of Spivey v. Hembree, 268 Ga. App. 485, 486, n. 1 ( 602 SE2d 246 ) (2004), which provides that “[t]his Court will grant a timely application for interlocutory review if the order complained of is subject to direct appeal and the applicants have not otherwise filed a notice of | 1 | 1 |
Fulton County v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saintsgreen2 sentences2010Finally, this Court has already held that by this language the legislature intended to make the five-year rule “binding upon all court proceedings and not limited to suits.” Fulton County v. Corp. &c. of Latter Day Saints, 133 Ga. App. 847, 848 (1) ( 212 SE2d 451 ) (1975). 2010Finally, this Court has already held that by this language the legislature intended to make the five-year rule “binding upon all court proceedings and not limited to suits.” Fulton County v. Corp. &c. of Latter Day Saints, 133 Ga. App. 847, 848 (1) ( 212 SE2d 451 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen2 sentences2010See Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 727 (1) ( 279 SE2d 223 ) (1981). 2010See Rogers v. DeKalb County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 247 Ga. 726, 727 (1) ( 279 SE2d 223 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Lakes v. Marriott Corp.green2 sentences2010As we have explained, the renewal provision gives “a plaintiff an opportunity to *57 escape from an ‘untenable position’ and relitigate the case, and thus there is no ‘bad-faith exception’ to the right to dismiss and later relitigate, despite inconvenience and irritation to the defendant.” Lakes v. Marriott Corp., 264 Ga. 475, 476 ( 448 SE2d 203 ) (1994) (citation omitted). 2010As we have explained, the renewal provision gives “a plaintiff an opportunity to *57 escape from an ‘untenable position’ and relitigate the case, and thus there is no ‘bad-faith exception’ to the right to dismiss and later relitigate, despite inconvenience and irritation to the defendant.” Lakes v. Marriott Corp., 264 Ga. 475, 476 ( 448 SE2d 203 ) (1994) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Berry v. Siskingreen2 sentences2010See Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 5 (3) ( 195 SE2d 255 ) (1973). 2010See Berry v. Siskin, 128 Ga. App. 3, 5 (3) ( 195 SE2d 255 ) (1973). | 1 | 1 |
REPUBLIC CLAIMS SERVICE COMPANY v. Hoyalgreen2 sentences2009He provides no authority for this position, and we find it wholly unpersuasive. 6 210 Ga. App. 88 ( 435 SE2d 612 ) (1993). 7 264 Ga. 127, 128 ( 441 SE2d 755 ) (1994) (a party who wishes to avoid mandatory, automatic dismissal under the five-year rule must obtain a written order, “signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court hy filing it with the clerk”). 8 See Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 67 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004). 9 See OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) (“[a]ny action in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismisséd”) 2009He provides no authority for this position, and we find it wholly unpersuasive. 6 210 Ga. App. 88 ( 435 SE2d 612 ) (1993). 7 264 Ga. 127, 128 ( 441 SE2d 755 ) (1994) (a party who wishes to avoid mandatory, automatic dismissal under the five-year rule must obtain a written order, “signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court hy filing it with the clerk”). 8 See Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 67 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004). 9 See OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) (“[a]ny action in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismisséd”) | 1 | 1 |
Goodwyn v. Cartergreen2 sentences2005Goodwyn v. Carter, 252 Ga. App. 114, 115 ( 555 SE2d 474 ) (2001). 2005Goodwyn v. Carter, 252 Ga. App. 114, 115 ( 555 SE2d 474 ) (2001). | 1 | 1 |
West v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences1996Compare West *8 v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 603 ( 330 SE2d 803 ) (order granting leave of absence, but filed only in the minutes of the superior court and never entered in the record, was not a written order taken in the case for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-41 (e)) with Loftin v. Prudential &c. 1996Compare West *8 v. Dept. of Transp., 174 Ga. App. 603 ( 330 SE2d 803 ) (order granting leave of absence, but filed only in the minutes of the superior court and never entered in the record, was not a written order taken in the case for purposes of OCGA § 9-11-41 (e)) with Loftin v. Prudential &c. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Cobb Countygreen2 sentences1987See generally Adams v. Cobb County, 184 Ga. App. 879 ( 363 SE2d 260 ) (1987). 1987See generally Adams v. Cobb County, 184 Ga. App. 879 ( 363 SE2d 260 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Swint v. Smith
green
2 sentences1984The Supreme Court quoted with approval the reason for the 5 year rule as explained in Swint v. Smith, *916 219 Ga. 532 ( 134 SE2d 595 ), to wit: “the five year rule has ‘at least the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and protecting litigants from dilatory counsel____’ ” The court then held: “The litigation here has been resolved by jury trial and verdict, and all that remains is the entry of judgment reflecting what has already been accomplished. 1984The Supreme Court quoted with approval the reason for the 5 year rule as explained in Swint v. Smith, *916 219 Ga. 532 ( 134 SE2d 595 ), to wit: “the five year rule has ‘at least the dual purpose of preventing court records from becoming cluttered by unresolved and inactive litigation and protecting litigants from dilatory counsel____’ ” The court then held: “The litigation here has been resolved by jury trial and verdict, and all that remains is the entry of judgment reflecting what has already been accomplished. | 2 | 1983–1984 |
State Highway Department v. Union Oil Company
neutral
2 sentences1978Dept. v. Union Oil Co., 129 Ga. App. 596 ( 200 SE2d 301 ), we held that the five-year automatic dismissal rule in Code Ann. § 3-512 which, as amended, expressly applied to a condemnation proceeding, had been repealed by the Civil Practice Act; and that the five-year rule contained in CPA § 41 (e) (Code Ann. § 81A-141 (e)) did not apply to a condemnation proceeding. 1978Dept. v. Union Oil Co., 129 Ga. App. 596 ( 200 SE2d 301 ), we held that the five-year automatic dismissal rule in Code Ann. § 3-512 which, as amended, expressly applied to a condemnation proceeding, had been repealed by the Civil Practice Act; and that the five-year rule contained in CPA § 41 (e) (Code Ann. § 81A-141 (e)) did not apply to a condemnation proceeding. | 2 | 1975–1978 |
White v. KFC National Management Co.
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 73-74 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Republic Claims Service Co. v. Hoyal
green
2 sentences2009He provides no authority for this position, and we find it wholly unpersuasive. 6 210 Ga. App. 88 ( 435 SE2d 612 ) (1993). 7 264 Ga. 127, 128 ( 441 SE2d 755 ) (1994) (a party who wishes to avoid mandatory, automatic dismissal under the five-year rule must obtain a written order, “signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court hy filing it with the clerk”). 8 See Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 67 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004). 9 See OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) (“[a]ny action in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismisséd”) 2009He provides no authority for this position, and we find it wholly unpersuasive. 6 210 Ga. App. 88 ( 435 SE2d 612 ) (1993). 7 264 Ga. 127, 128 ( 441 SE2d 755 ) (1994) (a party who wishes to avoid mandatory, automatic dismissal under the five-year rule must obtain a written order, “signed by the trial judge, and properly entered in the records of the trial court hy filing it with the clerk”). 8 See Brown v. Kroger Co., 278 Ga. 65, 67 ( 597 SE2d 382 ) (2004). 9 See OCGA § 9-11-41 (e) (“[a]ny action in which no written order is taken for a period of five years shall automatically stand dismisséd”) | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Allen v. Hatchett
green
2 sentences1986This court recently addressed the application of the five-year rule to an action which had been removed to federal court and subsequently remanded, and adhered to the principle first enunicated in Allen v. Hatchett, 91 Ga. App. 571 (1) ( 86 SE2d 662 ) (1955): “ ‘When an action in a State court is removed to a Federal district court, the jurisdiction of the State court is suspended until the case is remanded to the State court, at which time the case resumes the status it occupied at the time of the removal.’ While Allen dealt with the question of default by failure to timely file defensive ple 1986This court recently addressed the application of the five-year rule to an action which had been removed to federal court and subsequently remanded, and adhered to the principle first enunicated in Allen v. Hatchett, 91 Ga. App. 571 (1) ( 86 SE2d 662 ) (1955): “ ‘When an action in a State court is removed to a Federal district court, the jurisdiction of the State court is suspended until the case is remanded to the State court, at which time the case resumes the status it occupied at the time of the removal.’ While Allen dealt with the question of default by failure to timely file defensive ple | 1 | 1986–1986 |
City of Chamblee v. Village of North Atlanta
green
2 sentences1986Such a dismissal is not on the merits, City of Chamblee v. Village of North Atlanta, 217 Ga. 517 (3) ( 123 SE2d 663 ) (1962), and no appeal would lie from such a dismissal. 1986Such a dismissal is not on the merits, City of Chamblee v. Village of North Atlanta, 217 Ga. 517 (3) ( 123 SE2d 663 ) (1962), and no appeal would lie from such a dismissal. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State Highway Department v. Noble
green
2 sentences1975At that time the *848 pertinent portion provided that "... any suit filed in any of the courts of this State in which no written order is taken for a period of five years the same shall automatically stand dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff." After the Supreme Court ruled in State Highway Dept. v. Noble, 220 Ga. 410 ( 139 SE2d 318 ) that this five-year rule was not applicable to an appeal pending in the superior court from an assessors' award in a condemnation proceeding, the statute was amended by Ga. L. 1967, pp. 557, 558. 1975At that time the *848 pertinent portion provided that "... any suit filed in any of the courts of this State in which no written order is taken for a period of five years the same shall automatically stand dismissed with costs to be taxed against the party plaintiff." After the Supreme Court ruled in State Highway Dept. v. Noble, 220 Ga. 410 ( 139 SE2d 318 ) that this five-year rule was not applicable to an appeal pending in the superior court from an assessors' award in a condemnation proceeding, the statute was amended by Ga. L. 1967, pp. 557, 558. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Dollar v. Webb green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.