23 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1974–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Murraygreen2 sentences2025State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 251 (2000) (citing State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)). 2024In assessing whether a defendant has demonstrated excusable neglect, a court must weigh "'the extent of the delay,'" "the purposes advanced by the five-year rule," "the nature of defendant's claim[,] and the potential harm presumed or realized" by defendant, State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 251 (2000) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)), as well as the "cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the [defendant's] claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits," Norman, 405 N.J. | 6 | 6 |
State v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2024In assessing whether a defendant has demonstrated excusable neglect, a court must weigh "'the extent of the delay,'" "the purposes advanced by the five-year rule," "the nature of defendant's claim[,] and the potential harm presumed or realized" by defendant, State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 251 (2000) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)), as well as the "cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the [defendant's] claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits," Norman, 405 N.J. 2022Super. at 470 . "[L]ifting the five-year bar . . . under the present circumstances would render the Rule largely meaningless." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 576 ; see also State v. Ellison, 448 N.J. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Afanadorgreen2 sentences2024Super. at 159 (quoting State v. Afanador, A-0151-23 8 151 N.J. 41, 52 (1997)). 1999See Afanador, supra, 151 N.J. at 52 , 697 A.2d 529 (explaining exceptional circumstances necessary for court to relax that bar). | 2 | 2 |
Ab v. Div. of Medical Assistance and Health Servicesgreen2 sentences2018"Continuous presence" is discussed in more detail in DOJ's Interim Guidance at 62 Federal Register 61415. [Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services "Questions and Answers on the Five-Year Bar," http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/pdf/PB-faq-QA5YearBar-06.23.04.pdf (last visited December 12, 2017) (emphasis added); A.B. , 407 N.J. 2013A.B., supra, 407 N.J.Super. at 349-50 [ 971 A.2d 403 ]. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Brewstergreen1 sentence2025See also Brewster, A-3057-22 11 429 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mayrongreen1 sentence2024Nonetheless, the court stated the "decision to entertain oral argument on a PCR petition [wa]s committed to 'the sound discretion of [PCR] court,'" citing State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ellisongreen1 sentence2022Super. at 470 . "[L]ifting the five-year bar . . . under the present circumstances would render the Rule largely meaningless." Mitchell, 126 N.J. at 576 ; see also State v. Ellison, 448 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences1992See also State v. Clark, 65 N.J. 426, 437-38 , 323 A.2d 470 (1974) (rule preventing “excessive sentence” claims from being raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding relaxed due to egregious circumstances presented, involving imposition of consecutive sentences contrary to fundamental purposes of Sex Offender Act under which petitioner had been convicted). 1992See also State v. Clark, 65 N.J. 426, 437-38 , 323 A.2d 470 (1974) (rule preventing “excessive sentence” claims from being raised in a post-conviction relief proceeding relaxed due to egregious circumstances presented, involving imposition of consecutive sentences contrary to fundamental purposes of Sex Offender Act under which petitioner had been convicted). | 1 | 1 |
Panzino v. Continental Can Co.green1 sentence1976The Appellate Division reversed essentially for the reason that the respondent possessed a vested right because the five year bar had extinguished the petitioner's claim at the end of March 1971. 135 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Laurick
red
2 sentences2025We reject defendant's argument that the relaxed standard for the five-year bar and excusable neglect set forth in State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 2018A PCR petition filed in the municipal court, other than one to correct an illegal sentence, "shall not be accepted for filing more than five years after entry of the judgment or imposition of sentence sought to be attacked, unless it alleges 3 We reject defendant's additional argument that the relaxed standard for the five-year bar and excusable neglect set forth in State v. Laurick, 120 N.J. 1 (1990), should apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claims. | 2 | 2018–2025 |
Matter of Montefusco
green
2 sentences2013A.B., supra, 407 N.J.Super. at 349-50 [ 971 A.2d 403 ]. 2011A.B., supra, 407 N.J.Super. at 349-50 , 971 A.2d 403 . | 2 | 2011–2013 |
Patel v. NJ MOTOR VEHICLE COM'N
green
2 sentences2009Although not necessary to the disposition of this appeal from the imposition of points for Patel’s fourth violation, the Appellate Division opinion further expressed approval of the MVC’s interpretation that the statute’s five-year exception was inapplicable to “third” offenses, and that it may only apply to a “subsequent ” offense, which the panel treated as a term of art in subsection e. Patel, supra, 403 N.J.Super. at 377-78 , 958 A.2d 481 . 2009Although not necessary to the disposition of this appeal from the imposition of points for Patel’s fourth violation, the Appellate Division opinion further expressed approval of the MVC’s interpretation that the statute’s five-year exception was inapplicable to “third” offenses, and that it may only apply to a “subsequent ” offense, which the panel treated as a term of art in subsection e. Patel, supra, 403 N.J.Super. at 377-78 , 958 A.2d 481 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Hale
green
2 sentences1992In State v. Hale, 116 N.J.Super. 106 , 281 A.2d 106 (Law Div.1971), the trial court’s failure to give the defendant a sanity hearing where the record indicated that the defendant might well have been insane when he committed his crime raised an issue of “fundamental injustice” that justified relaxing the five-year bar. 1992In State v. Hale, 116 N.J.Super. 106 , 281 A.2d 106 (Law Div.1971), the trial court’s failure to give the defendant a sanity hearing where the record indicated that the defendant might well have been insane when he committed his crime raised an issue of “fundamental injustice” that justified relaxing the five-year bar. | 2 | 1986–1992 |
State v. McQuaid
green
2 sentences2025Since the delay prejudiced the State due to loss of evidence and memory erosion of relevant witnesses, McQuaid 147 N.J. at 485 , achieving "justice" by allowing PCR would be A-3057-22 12 "more an illusory temptation than a plausibly attainable goal." Ibid. 2025Since the delay prejudiced the State due to loss of evidence and memory erosion of relevant witnesses, McQuaid 147 N.J. at 485 , achieving "justice" by allowing PCR would be A-3057-22 12 "more an illusory temptation than a plausibly attainable goal." Ibid. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Parker
green
1 sentence2024Defendant contended "that oral argument was required on his initial PCR application" and "that the [judge] erred in finding no excusable neglect in order to toll the five-year bar." In a written opinion, the PCR court noted "there [wa]s a strong presumption in favor of oral argument in connection with an initial petition for" PCR, citing State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 , 283 (2012). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Norman
green
1 sentence2024In assessing whether a defendant has demonstrated excusable neglect, a court must weigh "'the extent of the delay,'" "the purposes advanced by the five-year rule," "the nature of defendant's claim[,] and the potential harm presumed or realized" by defendant, State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 251 (2000) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 580 (1992)), as well as the "cause of the delay, the prejudice to the State, and the importance of the [defendant's] claim in determining whether there has been an 'injustice' sufficient to relax the time limits," Norman, 405 N.J. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Ellison
neutral
1 sentence2022Super. 113, 125, 127 (Law Div. 2016), aff'd o.b., 455 N.J. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Martin
green
1 sentence2018In addition, we decline to address defendant's additional argument that because he was not advised of his right to appeal and the applicable time frame, the five-year bar should be relaxed under State v. Martin, 335 N.J. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Guaman v. Velez
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 251, 23 A.3d 451 ; N.J.S.A. 30:4J-9e. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Marshall
green
2 sentences1992In State v. Marshall, 244 N.J.Super. 60 , 581 A.2d 538 (Law Div.1990), the Law Division emphasized that substantial constitutional questions will overcome potential procedural bars, such as the five-year rule, to a petition for post-conviction relief. 1992In State v. Marshall, 244 N.J.Super. 60 , 581 A.2d 538 (Law Div.1990), the Law Division emphasized that substantial constitutional questions will overcome potential procedural bars, such as the five-year rule, to a petition for post-conviction relief. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
cluster 296597
green
1 sentence1974Cir.1970) as to a two-year residence requirement for admission to tenancy in public housing, and in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F. 2d 646 (2d Cir.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), as to a similar five-year requirement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Dillon v. United States
green
1 sentence1974Cir.1970) as to a two-year residence requirement for admission to tenancy in public housing, and in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F. 2d 646 (2d Cir.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), as to a similar five-year requirement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Swenson v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1974Cir.1970) as to a two-year residence requirement for admission to tenancy in public housing, and in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F. 2d 646 (2d Cir.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), as to a similar five-year requirement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Taylor v. Jackson
green
1 sentence1974Cir.1970) as to a two-year residence requirement for admission to tenancy in public housing, and in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Housing Authority, 442 F. 2d 646 (2d Cir.1971), cert. den. 404 U.S. 863 , 92 S.Ct. 113 , 30 L.Ed.2d 107 (1971), as to a similar five-year requirement. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.