probable effect error in North Dakota

2013“If the trial error is one of constitutional magnitude, we must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering the probable effect of the error in light of all the evidence.” State v. Bethke, 2009 ND 47, ¶ 25 , 763 N.W.2d 492 (citation omitted).

2013“If the trial error is one of constitutional magnitude, we must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering the probable effect of the error in light of all the evidence.” State v. Bethke, 2009 ND 47, ¶ 25 , 763 N.W.2d 492 (citation omitted).

2013However, “not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, followed by an argument the conduct denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 . [¶ 22] “[A]bsent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse on grounds the prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument.” State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 7 , 721 N.W.2d 387 .

2013However, “not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, followed by an argument the conduct denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 . [¶ 22] “[A]bsent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse on grounds the prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument.” State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 7 , 721 N.W.2d 387 .

2013However, “not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, followed by an argument the conduct denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 . [¶ 22] “[A]bsent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse on grounds the prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument.” State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 7 , 721 N.W.2d 387 .

2013However, “not every assertion of prosecutorial misconduct, followed by an argument the conduct denied the defendant his constitutional right to a fair trial, automatically rises to an error of constitutional dimension.” State v. Kruckenberg, 2008 ND 212, ¶ 20 , 758 N.W.2d 427 . [¶ 22] “[A]bsent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not reverse on grounds the prosecutor exceeded the scope of permissible closing argument.” State v. Schmidkunz, 2006 ND 192, ¶ 7 , 721 N.W.2d 387 .

2023The explanatory note to N.D.R.Crim.P. 52 provides, “To determine whether error affecting substantial rights of the defendant has been committed, the entire record must be considered and the probable effect of the error determined in the light of all the evidence.” When evaluating the likely effect of a trial error, we determine “whether the error was so prejudicial that substantial injury occurred and a different decision would have resulted without the error.” State v. Rende, 2018 ND 33, ¶ 7 , 905 N.W.2d 909 (quoting State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335, 339 (N.D. 1987)).

2016“If the trial error is one of constitutional magnitude, we must determine whether or not 'the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering the probable effect of the error in light' of all the evidence.” Kelley, 450 N.W.2d at 732 (citing State v. Smuda, 419 N.W.2d 166, 168 (N.D.1988)).

2009“When determining whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider the probable effect of the error in light of all the evidence.” Kruckenberg , at ¶ 15. *252 [¶ 18] Before considering whether the admission of this testimony constitutes obvious error, “[w]e have repeatedly cautioned [that] a party making a constitutional claim must provide persuasive authority and reasoning, and without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities an argument is without merit.” Olson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2008 ND 59, ¶ 26 , 747 N.W.2d 71 .

2009“When determining whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we consider the probable effect of the error in light of all the evidence.” Kruckenberg , at ¶ 15. *252 [¶ 18] Before considering whether the admission of this testimony constitutes obvious error, “[w]e have repeatedly cautioned [that] a party making a constitutional claim must provide persuasive authority and reasoning, and without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities an argument is without merit.” Olson v. Workforce Safety & Ins., 2008 ND 59, ¶ 26 , 747 N.W.2d 71 .

2009“If the trial error is one of constitutional magnitude, we must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt by considering the probable effect of the error in light of all the evidence.” Id. (citation omitted).

2002Id. [¶ 22] Although the trial court erred in excluding Kirvida’s testimony of the charges to which she had actually pled guilty, we conclude the error was harmless, given the record in this case.

2001State v. Leinen, 1999 ND 138, ¶ 17 , 598 N.W.2d 102 . [¶27] The written statement of the witness was cumulative to other more direct evidence offered at trial.

2001State v. Leinen, 1999 ND 138, ¶ 17 , 598 N.W.2d 102 . [¶27] The written statement of the witness was cumulative to other more direct evidence offered at trial.

2000City of Fargo v. Erickson, 1999 ND 145, ¶ 13 , 598 N.W.2d 787 .

2000City of Fargo v. Erickson, 1999 ND 145, ¶ 13 , 598 N.W.2d 787 .

1992Pertinent is the explanatory note to Rule 52, N.D.R.Crim.P., which states that “[t]o determine whether error affecting substantial rights of the defendant has been committed, the entire record must be considered and the probable effect of the error determined in the light of all the evidence.” See also State v. Carmody, 253 N.W.2d 415 (N.D.1977) (even constitutional violations can be harmless error).

1988State v. Janda, 397 N.W.2d 59 (N.D.1986).

1988Manning, supra . " After reviewing the entire record in this case and considering the probable effect of the error, we believe that substantial prejudice resulted from the admission of the blood-alcohol test results into evidence.

1988Manning, supra.” After reviewing the entire record in this case and considering the probable effect of the error, we believe that substantial prejudice resulted from the admission of the blood-alcohol test results into evidence.

1986State v. Schneider, supra. The court in Williams v. Zahradnick, 632 F.2d 353, 361-62 (4th Cir.1980) set forth a nonexclusive list of factors to consider in determining whether a Doyle violation was harmless: “1.

1980State v. Hager, 271 N.W.2d 476 (N.D.1978).

1977Obvious errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.” In State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975), in discussing harmless and obvious error, we said: “In our review of trial court error, we are guided by Rule 52, N.D.R.Crim.P., which defines ‘harmless’ and ‘obvious’ error.