24 Texas opinions name it 1 courts 2001–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See Hernandez , 819 S.W.2d at 812 ; Dix and Dawson § 13.393 at 219. 2005See Hernandez, 819 S.W.2d at 812 ; Dix and Dawson § 13.393 at 219. | 3 | 3 |
Roberts v. Padre Island Brewing Co., Inc.green1 sentence2019In the supplemental affidavit, Cruz indicated that she had 10 In assessing this period, we find instructive Roberts v. Padre Island Brewing Company, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied). | 1 | 1 |
Ignatius G. ANG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the PROCTER & GAMBLE COMPANY, Defendant-Appelleegreen1 sentence2016This, in turn, depends on whether her allegations could have been “reasonably expected to grow out of [the] EEOC charge.” Dyer v. Wiregrass Hospice, L.L.C., 532 F.Supp.2d 933, 935 (M.D.Tenn.2008), citing Smith v. Ky. State Univ., 97 Fed.Appx. 22, 26 (6th Cir.2004); Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Dyer v. Wiregrass Hospice, LLCgreen1 sentence2016This, in turn, depends on whether her allegations could have been “reasonably expected to grow out of [the] EEOC charge.” Dyer v. Wiregrass Hospice, L.L.C., 532 F.Supp.2d 933, 935 (M.D.Tenn.2008), citing Smith v. Ky. State Univ., 97 Fed.Appx. 22, 26 (6th Cir.2004); Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Kentucky State Universitygreen1 sentence2016This, in turn, depends on whether her allegations could have been “reasonably expected to grow out of [the] EEOC charge.” Dyer v. Wiregrass Hospice, L.L.C., 532 F.Supp.2d 933, 935 (M.D.Tenn.2008), citing Smith v. Ky. State Univ., 97 Fed.Appx. 22, 26 (6th Cir.2004); Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 545 (6th Cir.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Management Team, LLCgreen1 sentence2015See Quixtar Inc., 315 S.W.3d at 31 (citing Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241–42). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson, Manley Dewaynegreen1 sentence2015See Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at 390 . 5 Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Vasquez’s motion with respect to court costs of $527.25. | 1 | 1 |
Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc.green1 sentence2015See Quixtar Inc., 315 S.W.3d at 31 (citing Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241–42). | 1 | 1 |
Tate v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Tate, 981 S.W.2d at 192–93 & n.5 (victim’s 4 See Clark v. State, No. 03-11-00085-CR, 2014 WL 708910 , at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 19, 2014, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Soto v. State, No. 04-09-00280-CR, 2010 WL 4273173 , at *9 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Oct. 29, 2010, no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication). –12– character not essential element of a claim of self-defense because proving who was aggressor did not depend exclusively upon character of victim). 5 We resolve Vasquez’s third point of error against him. | 1 | 1 |
Benito Elizondo-Vasquez v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Tex. Penal Code § 12.33 (specifying that punishment range for second-degree felony is between 2 and 20 years); see also Elizondo-Vasquez v. State, 361 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (reversing Vasquez’s plea on grounds that his trial attorney was ineffective and remanding case for further proceedings). | 1 | 1 |
Archie v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Archie v. State, 221 S.W.3d 695, 700 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co.green1 sentence2011See Prater v. State Farm Lloyds , 217 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court properly considered amended petition “a nullity” because it was filed after trial court had signed order granting take-nothing summary judgment in defendant’s favor); Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co ., 123 S.W.3d 728, 735 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (refusing to consider claims raised in petition filed after summary judgment granted). | 1 | 1 |
Prater v. State Farm Lloydsgreen1 sentence2011See Prater v. State Farm Lloyds , 217 S.W.3d 739, 741 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court properly considered amended petition “a nullity” because it was filed after trial court had signed order granting take-nothing summary judgment in defendant’s favor); Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co ., 123 S.W.3d 728, 735 (Tex. App. — Texarkana 2003, no pet.) (refusing to consider claims raised in petition filed after summary judgment granted). | 1 | 1 |
Collingsworth General Hospital v. Hunnicuttgreen1 sentence2009See Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d at 708 (“[T]he issue is whether the evidence introduced before the trial court shows facts in existence at the time of the TEC’s decision that reasonably support the decision.”). -6- 04-08-00508-CV We must determine whether the summary judgment evidence established, as a matter of law, that substantial evidence existed to support TWC’s decision. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2008See id. 4 Vasquez m ay, however, develop a record to support his ineffectiveness claim by m eans of a habeas corpus proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
McDonald v. Dankworthgreen1 sentence2008See McDonald , 212 S.W.3d at 348-49 ; Walker , 101 S.W.3d at 750 . | 1 | 1 |
Pena v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005) (hereinafter, “Pena I”), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133, 145-46 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating and remanding opinion back to court of appeals). 2007See 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005) (hereinafter, " Pena I "), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133, 145-46 (Tex. Crim.App.2006) (vacating and remanding opinion back to court of appeals). | 1 | 1 |
Pena v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005) (hereinafter, “Pena I”), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133, 145-46 (Tex.Crim.App.2006) (vacating and remanding opinion back to court of appeals). 2007See 166 S.W.3d 274 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005) (hereinafter, " Pena I "), vacated, 191 S.W.3d 133, 145-46 (Tex. Crim.App.2006) (vacating and remanding opinion back to court of appeals). | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). 2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). | 1 | 1 |
McCoy v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). 2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gollihar v. State
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Muniz v. Vasquez
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Alderete
green
2 sentences2015Relying primarily on this Court’s opinion in State v. Alderete, 314 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2010, pet ref’d), the State contends the stop was justified and, therefore, the trial court erred ruling to the contrary. 2015Relying primarily on this Court’s opinion in State v. Alderete, 314 S.W.3d 469 (Tex.App.--El Paso 2010, pet ref’d), the State contends the stop was justified and, therefore, the trial court erred ruling to the contrary. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Recer
green
1 sentence2025Although he raises colorable claims with minimal record support concerning his counsel’s decision not to file a motion for jury-recommended community supervision, Vasquez’s claim is not “firmly rooted in the record” such that we can conclude his counsel’s error was more than a “mere mistake.” See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782; Recer, 815 S.W.2d at 731 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Mungia
green
1 sentence2024Analysis Despite the State addressing the merits of Vasquez’s motion and making several arguments before the trial court, including that Vasquez failed to perform in accordance with the agreement, on appeal the State summarily argues that the trial court was without authority to dismiss because “[n]one of the exceptions to the general rule are applicable herein.” Although a trial court’s ability to dismiss a case is limited, the State is incorrect that the trial court’s ability is bound by the confines of the aforementioned listed “exceptions to the general rule.” See Mungia, 119 S.W.3d at 816 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Acosta v. State
green
1 sentence2023Acosta, 233 S.W.3d at 352–53, 355–56. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Dewberry v. State
green
1 sentence2014See id.; Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735 , 755–56 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Walker v. Ricks
green
1 sentence2008See McDonald , 212 S.W.3d at 348-49 ; Walker , 101 S.W.3d at 750 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Arizona v. Youngblood
green
2 sentences2007In addressing whether the pre-trial destruction of evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a distinction between "material, exculpatory evidence" and "potentially useful evidence." See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). 2007In addressing whether the pre-trial destruction of evidence constitutes a denial of due process of law under the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States has drawn a distinction between "material, exculpatory evidence" and "potentially useful evidence." See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 , 109 S.Ct. 333, 337 , 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Campbell v. State
green
2 sentences2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). 2001Campbell v. State, 2 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. grt'd) ("[I]f a silent record clearly indicates no reasonable attorney could have made such trial decisions, to hold counsel ineffective is not speculation."), rev'd on other grounds, 49 S.W.3d 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); McCoy v. State, 996 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd) (same). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.