reach of a given rule in Utah

2005"A mixed question involves 'the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' " State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 , ¶ 26 n. 3, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 6 .The Fourth Amendment guarantees ”[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const, amend.

2005"A mixed question involves 'the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' " State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 , ¶ 26 n. 3, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)). 6 .The Fourth Amendment guarantees ”[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const, amend.

2006Under this standard, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3,¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1116 .

2006Under this standard, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3,¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1116 .

2024Owners Ass’n, 2003 UT App 377, ¶ 9 , 80 P.3d 569 (quotation simplified).

2024Owners Ass’n, 2003 UT App 377, ¶ 9 , 80 P.3d 569 (quotation simplified).

2013Thus, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 103 P.3d 699 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶47 As our supreme court noted in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46 , 144 P.3d 1083 , the structure of the Grandparent Visitation Statute is “confusing” and “provides very little guidance to a district judge try

2013Thus, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 103 P.3d 699 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶47 As our supreme court noted in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46 , 144 P.3d 1083 , the structure of the Grandparent Visitation Statute is “confusing” and “provides very little guidance to a district judge try

2013Thus, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 103 P.3d 699 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶47 As our supreme court noted in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46 , 144 P.3d 1083 , the structure of the Grandparent Visitation Statute is “confusing” and “provides very little guidance to a district judge try

2013Thus, the “trial court’s factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings.” State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 12 , 103 P.3d 699 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). ¶47 As our supreme court noted in Uzelac v. Thurgood (In re Estate of S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46 , 144 P.3d 1083 , the structure of the Grandparent Visitation Statute is “confusing” and “provides very little guidance to a district judge try

2007"For a mixed question of law and fact, which requires a trial court to determine whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law, we [still] review legal questions for correctness, [but] we may ... grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ¶ 19 , 80 P.3d 553 (alterations and omission in original) (quotations and citations omitted).

2007"For a mixed question of law and fact, which requires a trial court to determine whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law, we [still] review legal questions for correctness, [but] we may ... grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a given fact situation." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ¶ 19 , 80 P.3d 553 (alterations and omission in original) (quotations and citations omitted).

2007We further explained that when considering " 'whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law,' " id. at 181 (quoting Pena, 869 P.2d at 986 ), deference to the lower court is created when a legal standard is defined "'so that it actually grants some operational discretion to the trial courts applying it," id. (quoting State v. Vincent, 883 P.2d 278, 282 (Utah 1994)). 129 In summary, factual issues are generally empirical, legal issues apply an abstract rule regardless of the specific facts, and mixed questions generally arise when the applicability of the legal rule

2006Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ¶43 , 98 P.3d 1 (reviewing a district court’s determination that water was put to beneficial use as a mixed question of fact and law). ¶ 16 When reviewing a district court’s conclusion regarding a mixed question of fact and law, we typically grant some level of deference to the district court’s application of the law to the facts.

2006Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 2004 UT 67, ¶43 , 98 P.3d 1 (reviewing a district court’s determination that water was put to beneficial use as a mixed question of fact and law). ¶ 16 When reviewing a district court’s conclusion regarding a mixed question of fact and law, we typically grant some level of deference to the district court’s application of the law to the facts.

2006But the determination of the question is also shaped by the interpretation and application of law-namely, the different willfulness standards found in Utah Code section 59-1-802(7)(b). 123 We find persuasive the approach articulated by the Second Cireuit in Hochstein: "[We will review the district court's findings on [the plaintiffs] control over [the company's] finances only for clear error, and give plenary review to its conclusion that this control did not make him [a responsible party] within the meaning of the statute." 900 F.2d at 547 .

2004As understood and applied by the court of appeals in this case, under that standard " ([a] trial court's factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings. " Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at 111 , 51 P.3d 31 (quoting State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1116 ).

2004As understood and applied by the court of appeals in this case, under that standard " ([a] trial court's factual findings are reviewed deferentially under the clearly erroneous standard, and its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness with some discretion given to the application of the legal standards to the underlying factual findings. " Brake, 2002 UT App 190 at 111 , 51 P.3d 31 (quoting State v. Loya, 2001 UT App 3, ¶ 6 , 18 P.3d 1116 ).

2004"A mixed question involves 'the application of law to fact or, stated more fully, the determination of whether a given set of facts comes within the reach of a given rule of law.' " Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 2008 UT 51 , ¶ 57 n. 11, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 , ¶ 26 n. 3, 63 P.3d 650 ) (further citation omitted).

2003“Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,¶ 42 , 44 P.3d 742 . ¶ 19 Fifth, Almon argues that, in addressing one of Noel’s claims unrelated to the Agreement, the trial court erred in determining that he was personally liable for damages resulting from his breach of fiduciary duty owed to Noel. “[W]e review the trial court’s legal conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference.... ” ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 .

2003“Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,¶ 42 , 44 P.3d 742 . ¶ 19 Fifth, Almon argues that, in addressing one of Noel’s claims unrelated to the Agreement, the trial court erred in determining that he was personally liable for damages resulting from his breach of fiduciary duty owed to Noel. “[W]e review the trial court’s legal conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference.... ” ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 .

2003“Specific performance as a remedy will stand and will not be upset on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.” Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24,¶ 42 , 44 P.3d 742 . ¶ 19 Fifth, Almon argues that, in addressing one of Noel’s claims unrelated to the Agreement, the trial court erred in determining that he was personally liable for damages resulting from his breach of fiduciary duty owed to Noel. “[W]e review the trial court’s legal conclusions for correctness, granting [them] no particular deference.... ” ProMax, 943 P.2d at 255 .