24 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1984–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Oliver v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2026“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 (alteration in original) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). 2025See, e.g., Stevens -6- v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 245 (2005) (noting that “blood test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266”); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”).4 Instead, “the result of . . . [such an] analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms [of being under the influence of alcohol].” Thurston v. City of Ly | 9 | 10 |
Thurston v. City of Lynchburggreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Stevens -6- v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 245 (2005) (noting that “blood test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266”); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”).4 Instead, “the result of . . . [such an] analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms [of being under the influence of alcohol].” Thurston v. City of Ly 2024See id. at 753-54 (quoting Thurston, 15 Va. App. at 483 ); see also Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”); compare Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, No. 0331-23-3, slip op. at 11, 2024 Va. App. LEXIS 23 , at *14 (Jan. 23, 2024) (where there are other indicia of intoxication, the evidence of DUI is sufficient even when the defendant only has a BAC of 0.05),6 with Code § 18.2-269(A)(1) (“If there was at that time [a BAC of] 0.05 . . . or less . . . it shall b | 4 | 4 |
Brooks v. City of Newport Newsgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Stevens -6- v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 245 (2005) (noting that “blood test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266”); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”).4 Instead, “the result of . . . [such an] analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms [of being under the influence of alcohol].” Thurston v. City of Ly 2024See Brooks v. City of Newport News, 224 Va. 311, 316 (1982) (“The result of a breath analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms . . . .”); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”). | 3 | 3 |
Bristol v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015In Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 574-75 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006), the Supreme Court explained the arrest requirements of Code § 18.2-268.2: Under these provisions, a driver must be arrested within three hours of an offense before that driver may be required to submit to a breath or blood test. 2015In Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 574-75 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006), the Supreme Court explained the arrest requirements of Code § 18.2-268.2: Under these provisions, a driver must be arrested within three hours of an offense before that driver may be required to submit to a breath or blood test. | 3 | 3 |
Gardner v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2015Code § 18.2-266(ii) prohibits driving “while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” “That degree of intoxication, or being ‘under the influence of alcohol,’ is established when any person has consumed enough alcoholic beverages to ‘so affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior, as to be apparent to observation.’” Thurston v. Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 475, 483 , 424 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1992) (quoting Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 954 , 81 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1954)). 2015Code § 18.2-266(ii) prohibits driving “while such person is under the influence of alcohol.” “That degree of intoxication, or being ‘under the influence of alcohol,’ is established when any person has consumed enough alcoholic beverages to ‘so affect his manner, disposition, speech, muscular movement, general appearance or behavior, as to be apparent to observation.’” Thurston v. Lynchburg, 15 Va. App. 475, 483 , 424 S.E.2d 701, 705 (1992) (quoting Gardner v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 945, 954 , 81 S.E.2d 614, 619 (1954)). | 2 | 2 |
Breeden v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010In such cases, the arrestee “may be required to submit to a blood test” under Code § 18.2-268.2(C). 1 These statutory changes render inapt cases such as Breeden v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 148 , 421 S.E.2d 674 (1992), and its progeny, which interpreted prior versions of the implied consent statute that gave arrestees a right to elect between a breath or blood test. 2010In such cases, the arrestee “may be required to submit to a blood test” under Code § 18.2-268.2(C). 1 These statutory changes render inapt cases such as Breeden v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 148 , 421 S.E.2d 674 (1992), and its progeny, which interpreted prior versions of the implied consent statute that gave arrestees a right to elect between a breath or blood test. | 1 | 3 |
Pijor v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 (alteration in original) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Hudsongreen1 sentence2026Importantly, “circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Dowden v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.” Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003). “[C]ircumstantial evidence is competent and is entitled to as much weight as direct evidence provided that the circumstantial evidence is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Pijor, 294 Va. at 512 (alteration in original) (quoting Dowden v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 459, 468 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Holloway v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2026Importantly, “circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514 (2003)). | 1 | 1 |
Stevens v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Stevens -6- v. Commonwealth, 46 Va. App. 234, 245 (2005) (noting that “blood test results are not required to prove intoxication for prosecution under clauses (ii), (iii) or (iv) of Code § 18.2-266”); Oliver v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 20, 24 (2003) (“Test results from a breath or blood test are not necessary or required to prove driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.”).4 Instead, “the result of . . . [such an] analysis is but auxiliary proof which may tend to corroborate evidence of the objective symptoms [of being under the influence of alcohol].” Thurston v. City of Ly | 1 | 1 |
Brothers v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2022Brothers v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 468, 473-74 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
Brown-Fitzgerald v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2010“As we recently explained, ‘Breeden is inapplicable because the essential feature of the statute it interpreted has changed.’” Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593 , 599 n.7, 601 S.E.2d 1 , 4 n.7 (2004) (quoting Oliver, 40 Va. App. at 23 , 577 S.E.2d at 516 ); see also Brown-Fitzgerald, 51 Va. App. at 237 n.3, 656 S.E.2d at 424 n.3. -6- (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the implied consent statute imposes a mandatory duty on an arresting officer to obtain blood testing for drivers suspected of being under the influence of drugs. 2010“As we recently explained, ‘Breeden is inapplicable because the essential feature of the statute it interpreted has changed.’” Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593 , 599 n.7, 601 S.E.2d 1 , 4 n.7 (2004) (quoting Oliver, 40 Va. App. at 23 , 577 S.E.2d at 516 ); see also Brown-Fitzgerald, 51 Va. App. at 237 n.3, 656 S.E.2d at 424 n.3. -6- (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the implied consent statute imposes a mandatory duty on an arresting officer to obtain blood testing for drivers suspected of being under the influence of drugs. | 1 | 1 |
Overbee v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2008Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 575 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006) (citing Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 242-43 , 315 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1984); Thomas v. Town of Marion, 226 Va. 251, 254 , 308 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1983)). 2008Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 575 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006) (citing Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 242-43 , 315 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1984); Thomas v. Town of Marion, 226 Va. 251, 254 , 308 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Town of Mariongreen2 sentences2008Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 575 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006) (citing Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 242-43 , 315 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1984); Thomas v. Town of Marion, 226 Va. 251, 254 , 308 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1983)). 2008Bristol v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 568, 575 , 636 S.E.2d 460, 464 (2006) (citing Overbee v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 238, 242-43 , 315 S.E.2d 242, 243-44 (1984); Thomas v. Town of Marion, 226 Va. 251, 254 , 308 S.E.2d 120, 122 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Kehl v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004Kehl v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 602, 605 , 426 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1993). 2004Kehl v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.App. 602, 605 , 426 S.E.2d 127, 129 (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003Indeed, “[a] cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a statute be construed from its four corners and not by singling out a particular word or phrase.” Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536 , 248 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1978). 2003Indeed, “[a] cardinal rule of statutory construction is that a statute be construed from its four corners and not by singling out a particular word or phrase.” Commonwealth Natural Resources, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 529, 536 , 248 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
City of Corvallis v. Carlilegreen1 sentence2003See also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 1541 n.1 (William Draper Lewis ed., 1898) (“Offenses against the public peace include all acts affecting the public tranquility, such as assaults and batteries, riots, routs and unlawful assemblies, forcible entry and detainer, etc.” (quoting City of Corvallis v. Carlile, 10 Or. 139, 142 (1882)). 7 In his argument to this Court Hudson contends that “if the defendant is able to demonstrate that he was physically unable to submit to breath testing, the burden shifts to the Commonwealth to prove that a blood test was not available | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Farmer v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1994In Farmer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 337 , 404 S.E.2d 371 (1991) (en banc), relied upon by the appellant, we upheld a conviction in which the Commonwealth had been allowed to introduce evidence that a defendant had refused to submit to a field sobriety test. 1994In Farmer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 337 , 404 S.E.2d 371 (1991) (en banc), relied upon by the appellant, we upheld a conviction in which the Commonwealth had been allowed to introduce evidence that a defendant had refused to submit to a field sobriety test. | 2 | 1993–1994 |
Leake v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2025Hence, in cases where the Commonwealth does not introduce a chemical test of a defendant’s blood or breath at trial, “whether a [person i]s under the influence[ must be determined from] ‘all of the evidence of his condition at the time of the alleged offense.’” Hogle v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 743 , 754 (2022) (emphasis added) (quoting Leake, 27 Va. App. at 109 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Cutright v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2010“As we recently explained, ‘Breeden is inapplicable because the essential feature of the statute it interpreted has changed.’” Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593 , 599 n.7, 601 S.E.2d 1 , 4 n.7 (2004) (quoting Oliver, 40 Va. App. at 23 , 577 S.E.2d at 516 ); see also Brown-Fitzgerald, 51 Va. App. at 237 n.3, 656 S.E.2d at 424 n.3. -6- (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the implied consent statute imposes a mandatory duty on an arresting officer to obtain blood testing for drivers suspected of being under the influence of drugs. 2010“As we recently explained, ‘Breeden is inapplicable because the essential feature of the statute it interpreted has changed.’” Cutright v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 593 , 599 n.7, 601 S.E.2d 1 , 4 n.7 (2004) (quoting Oliver, 40 Va. App. at 23 , 577 S.E.2d at 516 ); see also Brown-Fitzgerald, 51 Va. App. at 237 n.3, 656 S.E.2d at 424 n.3. -6- (Emphasis added.) Nothing in the implied consent statute imposes a mandatory duty on an arresting officer to obtain blood testing for drivers suspected of being under the influence of drugs. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Ghameshlouy v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2010Id. at 51-52 & nn. 2 and 3, 675 S.E.2d at 856 & nn. 2 and 3. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Rafferty
green
2 sentences2000However, as this Court does not have *522 jurisdiction over an appeal from a conviction of refusal to take a breath or blood test, see Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319 , 402 S.E.2d 17 (1991), the appeal of that conviction is transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to Code § 8.01-677.1. 2000However, as this Court does not have *522 jurisdiction over an appeal from a conviction of refusal to take a breath or blood test, see Commonwealth v. Rafferty, 241 Va. 319 , 402 S.E.2d 17 (1991), the appeal of that conviction is transferred to the Supreme Court of Virginia pursuant to Code § 8.01-677.1. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Simon v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1984The instant test results might very well become admissible as rebuttal evidence in accordance with the holding of the Supreme Court in Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412 (1979). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.